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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What is to be presented here is an argument on
behalf of a technique of teaching.

The technique

~UiqUE for conductllrg discussions,

and I -\nl-u....t...--.....t~o;:---• ..,J/(

show why it should be freely used by teachers.
to the technique I

is~ 6 ~<- ~,~J

I

refer

propose as "honest questioning," and

immediately acknowledge that I was not the originator
The technique
of that name or o( the ~echn~qu~ itself.
1
Ill\ ~V !C.\ r~
&ch~ (
At this
will be discussed~ in Chapter V.
point it is enough to say that an honest question is
one to which the teacher does not know the answe7 and

-rov~~v

to which the student can_giye

A

correct answer.

questioning can be seen from many
will be shown, but it should be

po~nt,

Honest

of view, as

~~
. . r-...eP
~ft, first of all,

from the point of view of the teacher.

From that point

of view, honest questioning is simply an efficient way
to do what many teachers believe they ought to do at
the beginning of a school year or before they begin
1

~
~

2

That is, it is a yay to find out
the student is.
I claim that honest questioning can be widely
It can be used in science or humanities courses,

used.

and with young or old students.
produce the same sorts of
~mpirical

In all cases it will

e~ects.

But I

provide no

evidence to support this general claim, nor

,. he
more specific claims I make--nothing other than the
•.
tra«script of a class, which is presented as Chapter
Although I do not present an empirical study,

the

ideas for which I argue did not arise out of consideration of theory, but out of classroom practice.
teaching young children I

From

learned the importance of

listening and of watching for opportunities to get
students to see a problem.

The experience with younger

students made it difficult for me to try to teach older
students using the traditional lecture, and I
discovered that they,
questions.
base~

too, responded to honest

The support I do provide for these claims

on classroom experience derives in part from

theory.
theories,

I make the assumption that if various
initiated by different concerns, point to

similar ways of treating other persons,
some merit in the practices.

there may be

I also assume that if the

effects claimed for certain practices are predictable

3

from and explicable by a number of theories,

it is

reasonable to suppose the effects are not wholly
imaginary.

I

find additional support for my claims

from another source.

Even if it were established that

the effects of honest questioning were what I

claim,

and even if the effects were adequately explained, it
would have to be shown that those effects were
justified by reference to the proper ends of teaching.
I will show that the effects of honest questioning can
be so justified, and, therefore, honest questioning
itself is a justifiable practice.

If the present

ar ument is sufficiently convincing, others may find it
worthwhile to expend the enormous amounts of effort
required to

gath~r

quantifiable data.

Arguments for and against discussion are usually
presented in the context of arguments for and against
other methods of teaching, most especially the methods
of recitation and lecture.

These arguments, culled

from the literature of the last hundred years, are
presented in Chapter II.

In Chapter II, I also

acknowledge the similarities between the honest
questioning and some other techniques of discussion and
or questioning, and briefly note the differences
between my arguments and the arguments of those who
have proposed these similar techniques.

4
Since honest questioning results in a kind of
discussion that will be unfamiliar to most, Chapter III
consists of a transcription taken from one two and
three quarter hour class session.

There was no partic-

ular reason for choosing this class or_ this group of
students.

When the time came to make a tape, I did so

in the next class that came up.

Chapter IV provides an

informal description of the discussion, emphasizing
those characteristics which are typical of discussions
led by a teacher who uses honest questions.
It is in Chapter V that I

spell out my assump-

tions about the proper ends of teaching and show why it
is reasonable to expect that honest questioning will
contribute to their achievement.

I

claim that ration-

ality is the end of teaching, and define rationality as
including both the

abili~y

to reason in the narrower

sense of reason and the ability to recognize and act in
accordance with proper ends.

(Although I believe

honest questioning could enable persons to achieve both
parts of rationality,

the transcript I

present shows

honest questioning employed only to improve the
student's ability to reason in the narrower sense.
cannot justify this omission.
that

sin~e

I

I explain it by saying

schools have power over students'

futures,

have usually chosen not to challenge their enrollment

I
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in class

too vigorously by pressing them to consider

why they have done so.)
If asked, few teachers would deny that
rationality is at least one proper end of teaching.
But having accepted the rationality of the student as
an end, a

teacher may be uncertain how to produce it.

I am proposing that honest questioning is a means to
that end, but that it also may be conceived as a means
to a less grand, more immediately comprehensible goal.
For honest questioning is a sensible way for a

teacher

to find out where a student is and it is, as stated on
the first page, ·a truism of teaching that the teacher
o u g·h t

to be g i n w he r e the s t u d en t

is•

A t each e r

can u s e

honest questioning to achieve her immediate goal of
finding out where the student is and be confident that
in doing so she will be fostering his rationality.
In Chapter VI, I

(1)

show that honest questioning can

be expected to contribute to the student's coming to
"know that" and to "know how."

I

take no particular

position regarding the nature of propositional
knowledge as a whole, claiming only that "knowing that"
depends at least on the individual's knowing how to
justify a belief.

Epistemologists differ regarding

nature of propositional knowing,

the

but they do agree that

some conceptions of it are mistaken.

I

assume that

6
whatever passes for teaching should not derive from
those clearly mistaken ideas about knowing but should
rather be consistent with whatever approaches a current
consensus regarding necessary conditions of knowing.
Chapters V and VI include attempts to justify the
honest questioning as a method of teaching.

Chapters

VII and VIII offer explanations of its effects.

In

Chapter VII it is shown how the results of honest
questioning could be explained in terms of portions of
Piagetian theory.

I make no pretense of evaluating

that theory as a whole, and do not wish to suggest that
the truth of my claims depends on the adequacy of that

'

theory any more than I wish to suggest that the
adequacy of that theory guarantees
proposal.

I

the worth of my

simply wish to show how my proposal that a

student can best learn to reason with words by tryin&
to reason with words is consistent with the work of
Piaget.

My proposal is consistent with Piaget's claim

that children must act to learn, and consistent with
his belief in the necessity of cognitive conflict for
development.

My emphasis on a verbal technique is

obviously consistent with Piaget's early work, and can
be interpreted as being consistent with much of his
later work.

I agree with Piaget that we do not learn

to do by being told.

I agree that we must learn by
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trying and being corrected by the environment.

We

learn to ride a bicycle by getting on it and adjusting
our responses as necessary.
trying to use them.

We learn to use words by

But the analogy with the bicycle
For skill at using

does not tell the whole story.
words is a social skill.

As we learn to fence not by

going through the motions in solitude but by responding
to a skillful partner, we will learn to use words
intelligibly by trying to make ourselves understood to
a skillful partner.
Chapter VII aligns honest questioning with one
theory of cognitive development, and Chapter VIII
aligns honest questioning with a
communication~

therapeutic model of

I have chosen t i show the similarities

and differences between the techniques of honest
questioning and the client-centered therapeutic
techniques of Carl Rogers.

There are several reasons

for focusing on Rogers' work.

Despite the lack of

conceptual clarity in his writing, I
stimulating when I began to teach.

found his ideas
Rogers himself

attempted to employ his ideas in the classroom, and so
did many teachers during the 1960's who made efforts
improve the emotional climate of classrooms.
Rogers'
them,

While

ideas felt right to those who tried to apply

they also appeared to be incomplete and Chapter

to

8
VIII suggests addenda to Rogers'
chapter,

though critical,

formulation.

The

is in -part an effort to repay

a debt.
Chapter IX deals with some of the obvious
objections to honest questioning.

This concluding

chapter also attempts to right the balance so that, in
urging this particular method of teaching, I may not be
sPen to be overstating the case for it.

I

try here to

place honest questioning within the framework of other
teaching activities and I note the relationship between
honest questioning and the student's experience,
between honest questioning and the acquisition of
information.

The very interesting question of

appropriate methods of evaluating the effects of honest
questioning as a researcher or a
considered.

teacher is briefly

The chapter and the dissertation conclude

with a few remarks on the practicality of honest
questioning, and on the function of honest questioning
as an ideal.
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1.
Throughout this dissertation I shall use
feminine pronouns to refer to teachers, and masculine
pronouns to refer to students.
This is purely for the
sake of readability.
There are places where locutions
of the sort "she/he" would lead to at least a moment's
worth of puzzlement.

CHAPTER II

A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF MAJOR TEACHING METHODS

The Recitation
Oral instruction in classrooms takes one of three
forms:

recitation,

lecture, discussion.

None of the

three forms is entirely satisfactory as a teaching
.method.

The recitation, so common to primary

instruction in particular, has been under attack at
least since the time of Comenius in the seventeenth
century.

The attacks were intensified at the end of the

nineteenth century, when critics of recitation were able
to employ a new science, psychology, as a weapon against
it.

(1)

William James, for example, acknowledged in

Talks to Teachers on Psychology that "words, words,
words must constitute a large part •

• of what the

human being has to learn," but he deplored the failure
of the teacher to ensure that what was learned was
understood.

His illustrative story is well known:

A friend of mine, visiting a school, was asked to
examine a young class in geography.
Glancing at the
book, she said: "Suppose you should dig a hole in
the ground, hundreds of feet deep, how should you
find it at the bottom,--warmer or colder than on

10
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top?" None of the class replying, the teacher said:
"I'm sure they know, but I think you don't ask the
question quite rightly.
Let me try."
So, taking
the book, she asked: "In what condition is the
interior of the globe?" and received the immediate
answer from half the class at once: "The interior of
the globe is in a condition of igneous fusion." (2)
James'

object~on

was not that children were required to

learn such information, nor was it that the teacher
would try to ascertain whether they had in fact learned
such information.

It was rather to recitation by the

book, and it was an objection James made partly on the
grounds of efficiency.

If the information was to be

readily available to students,

then the teacher must

change her tactics, and James urged her to "multiply the
cues as much as possible •

• don't always ask the

question, for example, in the same way; don't use the
same kind of data in numerical problems; vary

•

• as

much as you can." (3)
Writing in the same decade as James, Joseph Mayer·
Rice amassed data from visits to twelve hundred
classrooms, and used them to make the same point but
with greater emphasis and fervor:
The instruction throughout the school consists
principally of grinding these answers verbatim into
the minds of the children.
The principal's ideal
lies in giving each child the ability to answer
without hesitation, upon leaving her school, every
one of the questions formulated by her.
In order to
reach the desired end, the school has been converted
into the most dehumanizing institution that I have
ever laid eyes upon. (4)
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Rice continued a few pages later, "in no single exercise
is a child permitted to think.

He is told just what to

say and he is drilled not only in what to say, but also
in the manner in which he must say it." (5)
Rice•s expose, initially published as a series of
articl~s

in the periodical, The Forum, caused a stir, as

muckraking is supposed to do.
cause teachers to change.

But apparently i t did not

In 1912,

twenty years after

Rice made his study, Romiett Stevens undertook a study
of tHe use of questions in classrooms and found

the same

sorts being asked in the same way and with the same
frequency.

Her brief work is filled with examples and

statistics.

It was common for teachers

to ask two or

three questions per minute, hurling them as fast as
students could reply.

Stevens, as James and Rice before

her, was displeased by what she found.

(6)

The studies of Rice and of Stevens bracket the
time of John Dewey•s most intense efforts to reform
education.

If his labors had so small a salutary effect

on classroom procedures as a whole, perhaps it is not
altogether surprising that recitation in unacceptable
form,

the form described here, is still to be found in

schools.

Teachers today are, possibly, more concerned

than teachers in the late nineteenth century to be
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friendly to children, and most would reject the extreme
rigidity of the teacher immortalized by James.
Furthermore,

teachers now may not know the term

"recitation" as the name of a method, much less think of
themselves as using it.

But,

if the recitation method

can be taken to consist essentially of the teacher
posing questions

to which she expects the student to

give a particular answer which she will then evaluate,
then teachers do use recitation and do so extensively.
(7)

Arno A. Bellack and his
~lassrooms

team observed contemporary

and reported that recitation provided the

basic pattern of classroom interaction.

The recitation

"started with the teacher asking a question, which a
pupil answered,

•

• (and concluded with)

the teacher's

reaction to or rating of the pupil's response." (8)
They .suggest a possible rationale for this typical
procedure:
From another point of view, teachers may assume
that students 'learn by doing.'
Their aim would be,
therefore, to stimulate and guide the 'doing' by
repeated solicitations.
From this point of view,
classroom discourse may be seen as a rehearsal of
cognitive processes, or in short, an opportunity to
practice thinking as viewed by these teachers.
Since thinking begins with a problem, one way for
the teacher to encourage pupils to think is to pose
a problem in the form of a question.
Thus, the aim
of teaching is to stimulate and shape the pupil's
cognitive responses.
The teacher stimulates and
directs the response by posing a problem that
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initiates the pupil's thinking; that is, he asks a
question that requires an answer.
The teacher
further modifies this response by his subsequent
reactions. (9)
Bellack and his colleagues have provided a
generous interpretation of the function of recitation.
If the passage quoted cannot be read as an enthusiastic
endorsement of the recitation method, it is, at least
not an attack.

Richard Hyman, one of Bellack's col-

leagues, does, elsewhere, explicitly endorse the use of
recitation while noting its dangers.

He writes that the

greatest strength of the method is that the "teacher can
quickly get direct feedback from the students, and that
the teacher can give prompt responses to the students'
remarks." (10)

Hyman cautions, however, that the

recitation is to be used for "elaboration and expansion
of ideas--rather than to judge or bludgeon students •
the recitation method has great potential for creating
a threatening situation for the student •

• any

situation is threatening where someone is constantly
being evaluated • • • " (11)

Hyman does not object to

evaluation and states his position clearly: "The teacher
must focus on diagnosis and commentary.

This does not

imply the elimination of evaluation, for surely the
student needs to be encouraged and praised for his
achievements.

He even needs to be reprimanded at times
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for poor performances." (12)
Hyman insists that evaluation is an essential part
of the recitation, and in any case, when the teacher is
looking for a particular answer, it is likely that her
response will tend to be in the form of an evaluation.
But the unforeseen effect of constant evaluation by the
teacher, no matter how kindly it is done, may be that
the student gradually comes to assume that the final
authority is neither reason nor the methods of inquiry,
but the teacher or the textbook.

This is a serious

objection to raise against recitation.

A yet more

serious objection is that recitation as it is practiced
tends to reduce knowledge to collections of information.
Unfortunately,

there are those who would not see this

reduction as an objectionable result of recitation, but
rather as a point in favor of it.

Benjamin Bloom's

well-known study of teachers' educational objectives
gives credence to this claim.

Bloom based his

conclusion that the primary goal of most teachers is,
effect,

in

the transmission of information, on the fact

that most of the questions teachers ask require little
more of students than the recall of information.

(13)

Teachers emphasize knowledge (by which Bloom means
information or what is passed off as information) "as an
educational objective out of all proportion to its
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usefulness." (14)

Bloom hoped that his

taxonomy would

stimulate teaching aimed at the development of higher
level cognitive processes.

He hoped teachers would ask

questions requiring students to interpret,
analyze,
learned.

to apply,

to synthesize, and to evaluate what they had
However, were they to do so,

the objectionable

features of recitation might well be retained.
though a

to

For

teacher could not look for verbatim answers if

she asked the student to apply information, she could
still look for one answer in particular, could still
think i t appropriate to evaluate the student's reply
simply as correct or incorrect, as good or bad.
Two objections have
recitation:

be~n

raised to the method of

that i t may fail to foster students' ability

to evaluate sources of information, and that i t can
convey the impression that growth of knowledge is
essentially the acquisition of information.
need to detail

There is no

the grounds for rejection of the method

of recitation any further here.

But before turning

attention to the method of the lecture, I
observation to make.

have a final

Insofar as the teacher adopts the

suggestions of Hyman ("focusses on diagnosis and
commentary") and of Bloom (asks questions requiring
higher level cognitive skills)

she will be moving,

however little, along a line from recitation toward
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discussion.
The Lecture
As

the recitation has traditionally been the

preferred method of

te•chin~

younger students,

the

lecture has been the most commonly used method of
instruction for older students.
The lecture, like the recitation, has changed in
form over the long centuries of its use.
times, when books were expensive,

the lecture might have

been just what the etymology of the word
reading from a book.
of a book.

(15)

In medieval

sugge~ts--a

It might also have been a summary

Today a lecture might provide a summary

of the required reading, emphasizing what the instructor
thinks has greatest significance, or it may provide
background for the reading.

More rarely, a teacher

might use a lecture as an opportunity to present her
ideas and interpretations to an audience.
these cases,

In all of

the primary purpose of the lecture may be

said to be the transmission of information.

(16)

The lecture antedates by many centuries those
techniques of printing which made inexpensive books
possible.
able,

When printed matter was not readily avail-

the lecture method of transmitting information was

clearly justified on the grounds of efficiency.

The

lecture might be justified today on the grounds of
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efficiency in some circumstances: as,

for example, when

a teacher is presenting her own new ideas to an audience
and has no facilities for duplicating notes cheaply.
But oral transmission is not efficient compared to
transmission through print and it is,

therefore, odd

that the lecture is such a common form of instruction
today.

It is odd precisely because many teachers and

students, however mistakenly, do think of teaching as
essentially transmitting information.
goal,

If that is the

there are better ways to achieve it.

Jean Piaget,

not an enthusiast of the cultural transmission model of
learning, writes:
The sentimental and natural worriers have been
saddened by the fact that schoolmasters can be
replaced by machines.
In my view, on the other
hand, these machines have performed at least one
great service for us, which is to demonstrate beyond
all possible doubt the mechanical character of the
schoolmaster's function as it is conceived by
traditional teaching methods: if the ideal of that
method is merely to elicit correct repetition of
what has been correctly transmitted, then it goes
without saying that a machine can fulfill these
conditions correctly. (17)
The lecture is inefficient both because it
presents information more slowly than most can read and
more quickly than most can transcribe.

Those who love

the lecture would not be put off by such an objection.
Though they may embrace a transmission of information
model of education, and thus, presumably, value

19
efficiency,

they would argue that the lecture arouses

the interest of the student more effectively than the
printed word does.

Hyman states that the arousal of the

interest of the student in the subject is one of the
most important functions of the lecture.

It would be

foolish to deny that if one must lecture one should try
to keep the interest of the students.

But it would be

difficult to sustain the claim that a lecture is
inherently capable of arousing greater interest than a
book can arouse.

One might wonder whether a person

whose interest in geology was not aroused by the printed
version of "On a Piece of Chalk," would be any more
interested in geology after hearing Thomas Henry Huxley
deliver that lecture, even though one might concede it
likely that the lecture might prove more entertaining.
(18)

Whether the entertainment value of the lecture has

educational significance is

the question, to which

Theodore M. Greene's comments on excitement will serve
for now as an answer: "Excitement is relatively easy to
arouse, both in lectures and in discussion, and though
some types of excitement do reflect a real involvement
in real issues, excitement is often superficial, more
emotional than reflective, and not indicative of genuine
student interest and growth." (19)
Whether the lecture is or is not interesting does
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depend in part on the lecturer, just as the interest of
the book depends in part on the author.

If the lecture

is not interesting, i t is not the fault of the form.
But as in the case of the recitation,

the most serious

objection that can be raised against the lecture is an
objection which does derive from an inherent characteristic of the form.

No matter how interesting the

lecture is, it casts the student in the role of audience.

It is a consequence of the form that "despite the

best efforts on the part of a

lecturer, the student who

has to rely chiefly on lectures for his academic
instruction is almost certain to be overimpressed by the
lecturer's expert authority and to accept much too
'

passively and uncritically the lecturer's own
conclusions regarding what is and is not factually the
case." (20)
The problem of student passivity has not been
overlooked by those who do believe that the lecture is
an indispensable tool for the teacher.

Hyman, for

example, suggests the lecture is improved insofar as the
lecturer permits students to question and follows
questions where they lead.

And that amounts to saying

that the lecture, like the recitation, is improved as it
assumes some of the characteristics of a discussion.

21
The Discussion: General Remarks
· I have said that the recitation and the lecture
move toward discussion when teachers encourage students
to answer in their own words, de-emphasize certain forms
of evaluation, ask high level cognitive questions,
permit students to ask question.

That seems obvious,

but it would not be obvious just when that movement
toward carries the recitation or the lecture across the
border and transforms it wholly into discussion.

It

would not be obvious because it is not obvious what a
discussion is.

Meredith Gall and Joyce Gall found that

the names teachers gave to.the methods they employed
were misleading.

"The term 'discussion method'

(was) used to describe a broad variety of classroom
interaction patterns" (21)

including some that looked

very much like recitation, "characterized by a
preponderance of teacher talk and fact questions." (22)
Discussion is not even distinguishable from other
methods by the amount of student participation, for in a
recitation the students may

~

more words than their

teacher.
I do not intend to propose that some of the
activities called discussions be given other names,
though lack of conceptual clarity and looseness of
language create a multitude of problems.

Nor am I

even
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interested in working out some sort of classification
scheme, useful though such a scheme may be.

The Galls

have proposed one such taxonomy, and David Dietrick has
proposed another.

(23)

I acknowledge the variety of

activities labelled "discussion" and draw the following
conclusions: 1) Since so many kinds of activity are
identified as discussions,

teachers apparently value

discussion, at least in principle;

2) The conceptual

confusion over the nature of discussion indicates
confusion over the purpose of discussion.

That is

reason enough to consider, as I do in later chapters,
what this purpose might properly be; 3) Given the range
of activities labelled "discussion," I

am under no

obligation to defend my application of the label to the
technique proposed in this dissertation.

It is enough

to say that the technique is assuredly neither
recitation nor lecture, and so may as well be called a
technique of discussion.
Given the fact that a wide assortment of activities may be labelled "discussion," it is not surprising
that researchers cannot agree on the effects or the
effectiveness of discussion.

Dietrick maintains that

" generally, lecture and discussion methods appear to be
equally effective with regard to acquisition of
information." (24)

McKeachie would not be perturbed if
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discussion did turn out to be less effective for the
transmission of information:
Student-centered teaching might be ineffective in
achieving lower-order cognitive objectives.
There
seem to be few instances of such a loss.
Students
apparently can get information from textbooks as
well as from the instructor.
But we had also
predicted that any superiority of student-centered
discussion methods would be revealed in higher-level
outcomes. •
• The more highly one values outcomes
going beyond knowledge acquisition, the more likely
that student-centered methods will be preferred.
(25)
That position is close to the position of Gall and Gall:
On the basis of research f~ndings, then, it appears
that the discussion method is effective in helping
students to master curriculum content, especially
when cognitive outcomes beyond the level of knowledge are desired.
Discussion also ~ay be more
effective than the lecture method in promoting
higher cognitive outcomes. (26)
In 1954-5 the Journal of General Education devoted
an issue to the topic of discussion.

The articles,

contributed by philosophers and instructors in
humanities, each contained the message that discussion
was the teaching method most appropriate to a liberal
education.

The authors justified this claim on the

grounds that it was discussion that could lead, for
example,

to understanding, interpretation, and

evaluation.

(27)

Discussion is, wrote Joseph Schwab,

"the experience of moving toward and possessing
understanding and a liberal arts education is concerned
with the art and skills of understanding." (28)
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Theodore Greene praised discussion for promoting
"reflective inquiry" and

"~emonstrating

the universal

need for the interpretation of evidence." (29)

Charles

Wegener chose discussion as that method capable of
achieving the ends of liberal education, which "require
that the student be constantly invited to think,
reflect,

to inquire, and to judge.

to

For such a purpose a

teaching technique is requisite in which the basic
procedure is

the raising of a problem and the guidance

of an inquiry." (30)
Whatever people mean by discussion, whatever
benefits they claim for it, all admit that conducting
one is difficult and that success is rare.

Greene, who

has been practicing the method for years, acknowledges
failing more often than not.

And Gall and Gall remark

that "classroom discussions are frequently boring,
aimless, and even threatening to some participants."
(31)

Any method of teaching can be done badly, and each

method has its peculiar dangers.

But no matter how well

the recitation and the lecture are done they may be
objected to on grounds intrinsic to the form.
not so in the case of the discussion.

This is

A discussion can

indeed be conducted badly, but when conducted well,
discussion is a superior method of teaching because it
is a form without intrinsically objectionable
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characteristics.
In particular, I

This I

claim and this I want to show.

hope to show what form a discussion may

take in order to be effective.

Discussion: Some Specific Proposals
The claims (cited in the previous section) on
behalf of discussion do not amount to an adequate
argument for its use.

And the fact that what Jre

referred to as discussions often go badly suggests that
few possess the skills discussion leaders need.

Others

besides myself have provided both more substantial
arguments for discussion as a way of teaching, and
descriptions of techniques intended to improve the
likelihood that discussions will be fruitful.
now briefly review a few of these proposals.

I
I

shall
do so

for the sake of claiming kinship and acknowledging
indebtedness, and also because it will help to define my
position if I

identify those points at which my argument

and description diverge from theirs.

I begin with a

report of an experiment designed to test the
effectiveness of techniques somewhat similar to those
proposed here and move to those which are more similar.
M. L. Abercrombie shares with the other authors
whose work will be described the belief that new
knowledge will be the outcome of a successful dis-
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cussion.

That is to say,

the point of discussion is not

to simply articulate what is already believed or known.
In her book Anatomy of Judgment, Abercrombie records her
efforts to use free group discussion as a teaching tool
after she repeatedly found that her medical students,

to

whom she taught zoology, knew the facts but did not
think scientifically.

Although her experiment was

carried out with eighteen to twenty year olds, she
believes free group discussion is appropriate for
students of all ages.

It

might be most useful where at present least used,
where autistic (32) thinking is most dominant,
namely in teaching children.
Our methods of formal
education are still governed by a notion that
children's little heads are empty •
• whereas the
truth is that it is because they are too full of
what we do not understand that they are difficult to
teach. (33)
Abercrombie believes that whatever the age of the
learner, "the kind of-change which has to be effected is
the reassessing and rearranging of what is already in
the mind, rather than the receiving of new packets of
'facts.'" (34)

It is this ability to reassess and

rearrange on which inventiveness of imagination in
science depends, and it is

this ability which, Aber-

crombie hoped, would be fostered by group discussion.
In group discussion, students would better recognize
their own ways of working, particularly "the part that
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one's past experience and present attitudes play in
determining what we see." (35)

Such recognitions would

enable them to reassess and rearrange,

to make new

associations of schemata.
Abercrombie describes the role of the teacher in
discussion in these words:
My main task was to make it possible for students to
compare and contrast the statements they made with
those that others made •
• I tried to be socially
reassuring and avoided making statements which -could
seem to reprove any individual, or even to praise,
because praise of one implies by contrast criticism
of the others • • • I tried •
• to direct emotion
into effective channels, so that they could be
usefully anxious about the difficulties of thinking
clearly and not be diverted by being anxious about
its becoming apparent that they had difficulties in
thinking clear~y. (36)
The role she outlines for the teacher is not that of the
expert and Abercrombie gives as reason for this that
There is a danger in the teacher summarizing
discussion in too final a way, because it tends to
inhibit further thinking by the student.
They
[sic] should not be given the impression that
decisions can be made tidily and finally on the
matters discussed in the course, but rather that the
function of the discussion is to start them
thinking. (37)
Students were often uncomfortable with, and
hostile to,
Abercrombie.

the non-authoritarian role adopted by
She nevertheless concluded that the

results made the struggle worthwhile.
The course brought the student face to face with the
need for continued change in himself, if he is to
take in more of the information available to him.
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• The aim was to make it possible for the student
to relinquish the security of thinking in
well-defined, given channels and to find a new kind
of stability based on the recognition and acceptance
of ambiguity, uncertainty and open choice. (38)
Despite their discomfort, compared on the following dimensions,

students in the discussion course did

better than those students in the lecture course:
They tended to discriminate better between facts and
conclusions, to draw fewer false conclusions, to
consider more than one solution to a problem, and to
be less adversely influenced in their approach to a
problem by their experience of a preceding one.
That is, they were more objective--more flexible in
their behavior. (39)
Abercrombie's explanation of the effects of
discussion on learning draws on the work of psychologists in various specializations: of Adelbert Ames in
perception; of Freud in psychoanalysis; of'Piaget in
genetic epistemology; and of

s.

H. Foulkes in group

analytic psychotherapy •. From Ames, Abercrombie borrows
the assumption that experience and attitude determine,
at least partly, what we see.

From Freud, she learned

"to consider more seriously the possibility that a
person's behaviour might be changed in a desirable
direction by allowing him to talk, as distinct from
talking to him or at him." (40)
group discussion as

She defends her use of

the particular vehicle for inducing

learning, using evidence supplied by Foulkes and on the
authority of Piaget, both of whom emphasized the
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importance of interaction with others for the development of thinking.
While Abercrombie's work seems admirable to me, I
differ with her over the limited role she allows the
teacher.

In her model,

the teacher appears to be a

comforter, and a facilitator of others' conversations.
While it is important to recognize that students have
feelings and that these affect learning, I

see no

compelling reason for the teacher not to intervene more
directly in the students' cognitive development.

Nor,

as will now be seen, do the McMurrys.
I referred earlier (this chapter, footnote 1)
work of Charles A. and Frank M. McMurry,
called The Method of Recitation.

As I

the

to a

handboo~

said there, the

McMurrys implicitly define recitation as oral interchange between teacher and student.

What they propose

as the correct way to conduct a recitation is what I
would call the proper way to conduct a discussion, but
the difference in terminology ought not obscure the
closeness of our positions.
The McMurrys'

handbook is for teachers.

It

therefore but sketches the outlines of theory while
illustrating the techniques in some detail.

They open

their short statement of theory by stating what they
take to be a generally shared assumption:

that humans
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are alike in some ways,

including the way they learn.

There are, the McMurrys write, universal laws of
learning, and it therefore follows that universal
principles of teaching method must be discoverable.
They ground their proposals for practice in these laws
of learning on the one hand, and on the other hand in
the universal aims of instruction.

There can be no

question that there are such universal aims.

A glance

at any textbook, observation in any classroom, will
reveal them.

It simply is the case that all instruction

aims at "mastery of these (general) rules and principles, and the ability to apply them." (41)
The aim of instruction is always the same.
methods which vary,

taking now an inductive now a

deductive approach.

The McMurrys insist that the

inductive approach is the one consistent with the
of learning.

It is

la~s

As the chief exemplar of the inductive

approach and of the method of recitation they propose,
the McMurrys cite Socrates,

to whom teaching meant

not the telling of what the instructor knows, but
rather the asking of such questions as will call up
previous experience, guide the thought of the
student, and draw him out (educate) to a free
expression of his own ideas.
The new conclusions
reached in the course of the conversation
constituted the knowledge acquired. (42)
The McMurrys organize the presentation of their
method around Herbart's sequence of steps to be followed

31
in organizing a lesson, although they see a need to
modify Herbart's prescriptions or the interpretations of
these.

For example,

the McMurrys believe it is a

mistake to assume that "every recitation should show the
full treatment of a topic through the series of five
steps." (43)

What they do insist on is that the teacher

begin by calling up to the student's mind prior experiences relevant to the new material to be learned.
This, Herbart's stage of preparation, must be done
through conversation, in which the teacher skillfully
questions the student.

While the purpose of the stage

of preparation is chiefly to prepare the mind to receive
.new knowledge by calling up rel$ted knowledge,
preparation may have other useful effects.

One is that,

as they converse, students are likely to find out what
they don't know, and their awareness is in turn likely
to lead to questions or problems of interest to them.
Another useful effect is that the teacher will hear, and
consequently have the opportunity to correct,

the

students' mistaken interpretations.
The name which the McMurrys give to the practice
they recommend is "the developing plan," a name which
apparently derives from the stage of instruction which
follows preparation.

This stage consists in providing

an absolute minimum of facts and then, using questioning
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as in the first stage, drawing from the students
inferences based on both their· old experience and this
new information.

Charles McMurry was teaching in

DeKalb, Illinois when John Dewey was teaching in
Chicago.

Undoubtedly the McMurrys knew of Dewey's work

and perhaps that is why they emphasize the principle and
its corollary that the student who seeks an answer to a
felt question will learn more effectively than the
student to whom the question is merely posed, and that
what is called "information" may not inform.

Infor-

mation is what serves to answer a student's question.
In the remaining steps of the sequence, the student·is
to use his information to arrive at general principles,
and general principles are to be applied to new
situations.
The McMurrys plainly believe that the teacher who
uses the developing plan of instruction must remain
firmly in charge and know exactly where she is going.
Their teacher is more than a facilitator.

She has a

direct contribution to make to the student's learning:
"if a person is left entirely to himself in acquiring
knowledge, he is likely to make serious mistakes in even
the simplest observations, and to be very superficial."
(44)

The McMurrys are not afraid to assert that the

teacher's position derives in part from her greater

33

knowledge and that it is her responsibility to use that
knowledge to her students' advantage.

The McMurrys

insist on the importance of the teacher being knowledgeable.

They set high standards for the occupation,

and it counts in their favor that they recognize, better
than some contemporary reformers of teaching,

the

impossibility of improving practice by formulating a set
of techniques to be used mechanically.

Many skills are

required if the developing plan of instruction is to be
conducted effectively: "A well-grounded process in
teaching will not save the teacher who lacks knowledge
of his subject, who lacks insight and tact in managing
children, or who is destitute of spirit and
originality." (45)
My objections to the McMurrys' methods are both
major and minor.

The minor objections may reflect

nothing more than current fashions regarding appropriate
ways of treating children.

While I questioned Aber-

crombie for seeming to strip the teacher of all
authority, I

question the McMurrys for allowing her too

much, as they seem to when they encourage the teacher to
correct the student's previous experience if he has
incorrectly interpreted it.

(46)

I

find the remark

discomforting even though I

deny that all interpret-

ations of experience are equally justifiable.

Perhaps
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my discomfort would evaporate if I knew how these
corrections were to be made.

The same remarks might

apply to my objection to the McMurrys' claim that there
is a certain order that the mind must follow in
learning. (47)

I

could accept this as a claim that

there is a general pattern in the process of learning,
but not as a claim that each person must have precisely
the same sequence of experiences in order to arrive at a
given conclusion.

I am not sure what the McMurrys mean,

especially in the light of the way they summarize the
steps necessary if the teacher is to keep a discussion
from wandering: she must state a clearly defined aim to
the class, must make herself an outline of the pivotal
questions, and these must form a necessary sequence.
(48)

The McMurrys show only a little concern over the

possibility of authoritarian behavior on the part of the
teacher, but that lack of concern was widespread in the
early twentieth century when it was not the custom to
worry much about students'

sensibilities, or what might

be called the affective environment.

The major

objection I have to The Method of Recitation is that,
while it is designed as a practical handbook (49), it
fails in fact to give effective instructions to the
teacher who might want to work towards the goals the
authors outline.

Some teachers would be able to figure
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out how to put the developmental plan into practice,
ju&t as some people could look at an item of clothing
and figure out how to duplicate it.

But those teachers

Having made these

would be few and far between.

objections, I now say that the McMurrys' proposals ought
not be consigned to history.
appears to be sound.

Much of what they say

The task that remains is the task

of showing teachers what techniques will lead to their
desired goals.
John McCollum has attempted this task.

He,

too,

has written a handbook, one intended to teach teachers
what sorts of questions to ask.

His scheme for

classifying questions derives directly. from a model of
scientific thinking.

McCollum describes the "inductive

knowledge-generating and testing process of: 1.
Acquiring and describing data.
explanations.

2. Developing

3. Making predictions based on the

explanations," (50) and prescribes the kinds of
questions that will foster the student's ability to use
that process.

These are the:

Open Describing Question: "What are some of the
things the article told us about Antarctica?"
Closed Describing Questions: "What is the climate
like in Antarctica?" "what grows there?" "What
animal life do they have there?"
"How are the
animals in Antarctica different from those in
(Oregon)?"
Explaining Questions: "What might happen
if we took some of our (Oregon) animals to
Antarctica?" "How do you account for some animals
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having thin fur and others having thick fur?" (51)
As the McMurrys do, McCollum distinguishes between
appropriate and inappropriate sorts of teacher
questions, but unlike them he pays equal attention to
the distinction he sees between appropriate and
inappropriate teacher responses.

It is precisely on the

affective climate of the classroom that John McCollum
focuses a great deal of his attention.

McCollum

believes that if the student is to learn, he must feel
he is accepted.

Therefore, it is imperative that the

teacher listen to what the student has to say,

that she

learn how to check up to be sure she understands what he
said, and that, with few exceptions, she learn not to
evaluate what he has to say.

This last condition is

especially important, because learning "depends on the
students acquiring the understanding and skill to
evaluate their own ideas." (52)

McCollum grounds his

proposals in humanistic psychology and the incomplete
argument he sketches in his introduction is sufficient
for a manual of practice.
McCollum's proposals,
much to recommend them.

like the others cited, have

But McCollum has offered an

analytic tool as a teaching tool.

He is not the only

one to have made this pedagogical mistake:

it has

occurred countless times throughout history.

Because an
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understanding of this mistake is germane to my argument,
it is a mistake I
taken from the

shall illustrate with another example

litera~ure

of questioning.

In the 1960's and early 1970's the scientific
/

model of thinking chosen as the basis of McCollum's
taxonomy was not the model preferred by educators
interested in improving teachers' questioning strategies.

The experiments reviewed by Virginia M. Rogers

were all designed to teach teachers how to ask high
level cognitive questions.

(53)

In each case attempts

were made to teach teachers how to classify questions
according to Bloom's taxonomy.

All of the authors

claimed at least some short term success as a result of
their efforts.

That is,

teachers learned to ask

questions demanding higher level cognitive skills of
their students.

It might be useful to learn to classify

questions according to the taxonomy, but to teach such a
skill in order to improve teachers' question-asking
techniques seems analogous to trying to teach students
to speak well by teaching grammar rules.

Bloom's

taxonomy, like the rules of grammar, was designed as an
analytic tool, and teaching the use of an analytic tool
is not likely to be the best way to improve practice.
One does not learn to analyze or classify the ways that
different people walk in order to learn to walk, nor
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even to improve one's own walking, even though such a
study might be useful for other purposes.

Some people

may learn to speak well or to ask better questions while
they learn the analytic language, but I
McMurrys:

concur with the

the deductive approach seems contrary to the

"laws of learning."

An inductive approach is

preferable, and it is such an approach that I will argue
for here.
A wholly satisfactory proposal for a technique of
teaching will have to satisfy a number of desiderata.
It will have to take into account the intellectual aims
of teaching, as the McMurrys' and McCollum's proposals
do.

It will have to take into account the effect of

emotions on learning, as Abercrombie's and McCollum's
proposals do.

And it will have to be compatible with at

least some psychological theories, as Abercrombie's and
McCollum's proposals are.

In addition, a wholly

satisfactory proposal will be justifiable from the point
of view of current thinking about the nature of
knowledge, and will be justifiable from the point of
view of the proper ends of teaching (which I

take to

include more than the sheer acquisition of knowledge
and/or cognitive development).

Abercrombie,

the

McMurrys, McCollum do not attempt to justify their
proposals from such lofty perspectives.

I will show
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that what I

propose does take into account all the

factors which must be taken into account, can be shown
compatible with psychological theories, and can be
justified from the points of view of the nature of
knowledge and the proper ends of teaching.

But I will

also show, when I begin my argument proper, that one
great advantage of my proposal is that it can be
presented in terms that teachers can understand.

The

McMurrys' proposal was couched in terms of aims.
Examples were given, but not useful instructions.
McCollum, and the people Virginia Rogers cited, also
spoke of aims and offered examples.
presented taxonomies,

In addition they

the tools .of analysis, disguised

as tools of instruction.

But learning to classify

questions is one kind of learning, learning to ask good
questions another kind.

It is conceivable that a ·person

could learn to classify questions according to a given
taxonomy but still not be able to ask questions in
various categories.

It is not conceivable that a person

could learn to ask honest questions and not ask better
questions.

Honest questioning is,

therefore, presented

as a technique the use of which will lead teachers to
ask better questions (and. consequently to lead better
discussions).

Chapter III, a transcript of a class

session, illustrates the technique of asking honest
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questions to find out where the students are.
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1. The objections made to recitation in the
nineteenth century were not to recitation as such, but
to recitation as it was practiced.
A distinction was
made between good recitation practices and bad
recitation practices.
For example, Charles A. and Frank
M. McMurry wrote a handbook, The Method of Recitation,
to be discussed later in this chapter, prescribing good
practice.
They appear to include in the category of
recitation any oral interchange between teacher and
student.
I prefer, for reasons which will be made
explicit, to distinguish recitation from discussion.
2. William James, Talks to Teachers on
Psychology, new edition (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1939), p. 150.
3. Ibid., p. 82.
4. Joseph Mayer Rice, The Public School System of
the United States (New York: The Century Company, 1893),
p. 31.
5. Ibid. p. 38.
6. Romiett Stevens, The Question as a Measure of
Instructional Efficiency, Contributions to Education,
no. 48 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1912).
7. Teachers are no longer confined to asking
questions orally of the entire group of students, but
the workbook, different programming devices, and even
objective tests, can plausibly be seen as extensions of
the recitation method.
8. Arno A. Bellack, H. M. Kliebard, R. T. Hyman,
and F. L. Smith, Jr., The Language of the Classroom (New
York: Teachers College Press, 1966), p. 55.
9. Ibid., p. 249.
10. Ronald T. Hyman, Ways of Teaching, 2nd ed.
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1974), p. 202.
11. Ibid., p. 202.
12. Ibid., p. 203.
13. Benjamin Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational
Objectives.
Handbook I: Cognitive Domain (New York:
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David McKay Company, Inc., 1956), p. 28.
14. Ibid., p. 34.
15. Samuel G. Williams, The History of Mediaeval
Education (Syracuse, New York: C. W. Bardeen, 1903), pp.
141-2.
16. The lecture did, at one time, serve another
purpose.
In American Education: The Colonial Experience, 1607-1783 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p.
215, Lawrence Cremin describes the lecture at Harvard in
the eighteenth century, where students were trained to
argue orally: "The lecture was the master's way of
demonstrating systematic thought at its best: he would
commonly cast a proposition as a question, divide and
subdivide it into its various elements, dealing with
each separately, and then indicate the relationships
among the several parts." That kind of lecture was
itself a model argument.
Few teachers today would be
capable of constructing and delivering anything
resembling it.
17. Jean Piaget, The Science of Education and the
Psychology of the Child, .trans. Derek Coltman (New York:
Orion Press, 1970), p. 77.
18. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York:
Barnes and Noble Books, 1949), pp. 284-5.
19. Theodore M. Greene, "The Art of Responsible
Conversation," Journal of General Education 8
(1954-5):48.
20. Ibid., p. 48.
21. Meredith D. Gall and Joyce P. Gall, "The
Discussion Method," in Seventy-fifth Yearbook of the
National Societ for the Stud of Education, Part 1,
ed. N. L. Gage Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1976), pp. 166-7.
22. Ibid., p. 168.
23. David C. Dietrick, "Review of Research," in A
Com arative Stud of Lecture and Discussion Methods, by
Richard J. Hill No place of publication given.
The
Fund for Adult Education, 1960), pp. 90-118.
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24. Ibid., p. 94.
25. Wilbert J. McKeachie, Teaching Tips: A Guide
Book for the Beginning College Teacher, 6th ed.
(Lexington, Mass: D. c. Heath and Co., 1969), p. 76.
26. Gall and Gall, "The Discussion Method," p.
200.
27. The terms "understanding," "interpretation,"
"evaluation," echo Bloom's categories.
See above, page
16.
The issue of the journal to which I refer includes
articles by Joseph Schwab and Charles Wegener, both of
whom were teaching at the University of Chicago when
Benjamin Bloom was conducting his research.
All were no
doubt involved with the problem of creating satisfactory
comprehensive exams, which were administered at that
time to undergraduates at the end of a yearlong course
of study.
Perhaps this accounts for some of the
similarity of language.
28. Joseph Schwab, "Eros and Education," Journal
of General Education 8 (1954-5):51.
29. Greene, "The Art of Responsible Conversation,"
p. 48.
30. Charles Wegener, "Discussion and Aims of
Liberal Education," Journal of General Education 8
(1954-5):27.
31. Gall and Gall, "The Discussion Method," p.
166.
32. The Oxford English Dictionary Supplement gives
as a definition of "autism:" "morbid admiration of
oneself."
It also cites Bleuler.
Autistic thinking is
thought which is "divorced from logic and reality." A
Dictionary of Psychology, revised edition, provides the
following definition of "autistic thinking:" "mental
activity which is controlled by the wishes of the
individual, as contrasted with reality thinking,
"
Abercrombie appears to be using "autistic 11 not to
suggest that children's thought is pathological but to
suggest that it is less logical and realistic than adult
thought.
33. M. L. J. Abercrombie, The Anatomy of Judgment
(London: Hutchinson, 1960), p. 81.
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34. Ibid., p. 109.
35. Ibid., P• 16.
36. Ibid., p. 76.
37. Ibid. , p. 78.
38. Ibid., p. 141.
39. Ibid. , p. 18.
40. Ibid. , p. 60.
41. Charles A. and Frank M. McMurry, The Method of
Recitation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1905), p.
11.
42. Ibid., p. 142.
43. Ibid., p. 3 27.
44. Ibid., p. 75.
45. Ibid. , p. 317.
46. Ibid. , p • 97.
47. Ibid., p. 288.
48. Ibid., P• 147-51.
49. Ibid. , p. vii.
50. John A. McCollum, "AhHah!" The Inquiry Process
of Generating and Testing Knowledge (Santa Monica, Ca.:
Goodyear Publishing Co., 1978), p. 81.
51. Ibid., p. 80.
52. Ibid., p. 83.
53. Virginia M. Rogers, "Modifying Questioning
Strategies of Teachers," Journal of Teacher Education 23
(Spring 1972):59-62. Rogers herself designed an
experiment to teach teachers how to ask higher level
questions.
She provided this reason (page 58) for
teachers to do so: "With open-ended and high level
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questions the answer may be secondary to the reasons
given to support it.
These reasons are clues to the
thought processes used, the depth of understanding, and
the lev~l of thinking attained by the pupil."
Compare
this with Richard Suchman's rationale for his inquiry
training program.
See J. R. Suchman, "Inquiry Training:
Building Skills for Autonomous Discovery," MerrillPalmer Quarterly 7 (1961): 147-70.
In Suchman 1 s program
children watch short films about which they may ask
questions which may be answered "yes" or "no." No
physical manipulation of materials is permitted: "the
teacher has very little access to the cognitive
operations that a child is performing while exploring a
piece of apparatus.
By permitting children to obtain
data only through verbalized operations (i.e. questions)
we give the teacher greatly increased access--however
indirect--to the children's processes."

CHAPTER III

TRANSCRIPTION OF A DISCUSSION

The third chapter consists of a transcription of a
class discussion.

The participants were not selected in

any formalized way.
a tape recorder.

I merely went to class one day with

No advance warning had been given that

I intended to do this, and when I arrived I

explained my

wish to record and asked students whether they objected.
None did.

The students appeared to be comfortable with

each other, perhaps in part because the group was small.
On this evening it was smaller than usual.

Out of the

class of eleven students, only eight were present.

The

number of absences was greater than normal for this
group, but not high for the time of year at which the
tape was made.

This was the last of ten sessions of the

third quarter of the year, and so it fell in June, at a
time when teachers are likely to have all sorts of
school obligations, and most of these students were
practicing teachers.

They taught in upper middle
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class suburban schools and at one upper middle class
private school in the nearby city, at levels from
kindergarten through high school.

Each had at least

four years of teaching experience, and two had more than
ten years experience.

The other students came from

different backgrounds: graduate studies in the
biological sciences, nursing, business, and computer
programming.

As it happened,

two of the absentees were

the business man and the computer programmer.

The

youngest person in the group w·as the graduate student in
biological sciences, who was in his early twenties.
Several students were in their mid-thirties.

All of the

students were working toward master's degrees (in
reading, special education, school psychology, for
example) at a small teacher's training college in the
Midwest.

The course in historical and philosophical

foundations of American education in which the tape was
made was required.

It met, as graduate courses for

teachers often do, in the late

afternoo~

and early

evening, from 4:25 to 7:10.
The transcription amounts

to about forty percent

of what was recorded in a discussion which lasted two
and one quarter hours.

(We took half an hour out of our

two and three quarter hour class for general business
and for a break.)

Two long sections were excised, one
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on what a psychologist is, and one on the sort of
responsibility which might distinguish the professional
from the non-professional.

Sections in which the group

fragmented so that several people were talking at
once--sometimes to no one in particular--were also
deleted.

Much material was omitted simply because it

could be omitted without losing the thread of the
discussion.

As a result of cutting,

the discussion

appears to be less tortuous than it was.

That

distortion was inadvertent, but elimination of some
repetition has had the effect of improving readability.
Even if every word of the original discussion had
been incluqed, much of its character and content would
have been lost.

For example, it is not possible to

preserve the pacing of the conversation.

There were

times when all participants spoke at once or interrupted
each other, and there were long moments when no one
spoke at all, perhaps because they were thinking, or
perhaps because they were tired.

The warmth,

the good

humor, and the involvement of the group leave few
traces: a transcript is but a script of a discussion.
In preparation for this,

their last session, the

students had read several chapters from Arthur Bestor's
The Restoration of Learning, P. H. Hirst's article
"Liberal Education" from the Encyclopedia of Education,
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and the article "The Basis of Education" by Robert
Maynard Hutchins.

In the previous class,

the group had

argued about Bestor's effort to justify liberal arts
education on the grounds that such an education was
practical.

The teacher had decided that it would be

fruitful to explore further the relationship between
liberal education and practical knowledge, and the
relationship between the theoretical and the practical.
Such relationships are usually of interest to teachers
and appeared to be so to those in this group.
The teacher made a few introductory remarks to
review what had been said earlier, and to call attention
to what she hoped would be the major focus of attention
for the evening's discussion.

She concluded her remarks

by stating Hirst's four criteria of liberal education:
liberal education is based on the structure of knowledge, is distinguished as a pursuit of knowledge for its
own sake, is not narrowly specialized and, finally, has
nothing to do with vocational education.
(1)

Teacher: Do you see now why, from Hirst's
Aristotelian point of view, it would be
inappropriate to try to justify liberal education
on the grounds that it is practical?

(2)

Shan: Could I

(3)

Teacher:

just jump in?

By all means.
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(4)

Shan: I graduated from a liberal arts college,
and what I

think is interesting is that the

education department was never recognized as a
department.

The professors and the board of

trustees wouldn't accept a major in education
based on the fact that it was vocational
training.
(5)

~

I graduated from a liberal arts college that

destroyed its department of education •
(6)

Teacher: Conant argued that the only function of
a school of education was to provide supervision
for student teaching.

All courses should be

taken out of other schools: courses in
educational psychology should be taught by
psychologists, courses in history and in
philosophy of education by historians and
philosophers.
(7)

Shan: That's what we did in school.

We had one

person in the education department and then we
took everything else in other departments.
(8)

Teacher: Let's talk about what the preparation of
the teacher ought to include.

Bestor claims that

a liberal arts education is all but sufficient
preparation for teaching.
(9)

Jean: I

Do you agree?

think it makes a big difference whether
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it's little kids or big kids.
(10)

Teacher: Why do you say that?

(11)

Jean: They're such very different human beings •
• I guess it's because of communication •

(12)

Teacher: Can you say what the big difference
might be?

(13)

Jean: Well, if I were going to teach small kids,
I would need to go to college to learn how to
communicate with kids because I don't remember
how they think, how they perceive • •

(14)

Sandy: My view of teacher education has always
been that we don't have enough kids in it.

I

'

don't think you learn any of these things until
you're ~orking with children.

We literally only

saw children for one quarter of the whole four
year period •

• I can get into catalogs and

teachers' manuals and things like that on my own
• • I've always thought that it was a shame
because the only time I wasn't working with
children--I've been teaching children since I was
six years old--was when I was supposedly learning
how to teach.
pre~aration

A much larger part of teacher

should have been experience in the

classrom.

(15)

Maryanne: That experience should be from the time
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you decide that education is your field •
(16)

Rob: To compare it to my own experience, it would
make about as much sense as studying theoretical
science for three and a half years and then
sticking the kid in the chemistry lab and saying,
"Don't you know how to do chemistry?

You've been

\

reading books on it."

It seems ridiculous.

You

learn how to deal with your subject matter, kids,
by dealing with kids.

It struck me a little

funny--nothing personal, Jean--to say, "I want to
go to college to learn about little kids,"
because that's the only place there are no little
kids

• • •

(17)

Jean: Yes, but where would you go to learn •

(18)

Rob: Be a parent.

(19)

Jean: Some parents can't communicate.
laughter)

That would be useful •

They really can't.

(Much

They don't seem to

have any conception of how limited their
children's experiences are and what they don't
understand because they shouldn't understand.
They're just too young •
In the next few minutes, almost all took the opportunity
to contribute to a collective lament.

Parents,

they

said, bring their problems to teachers who are supposed
to know how to solve them, but don't.

53
(20)

~I

think I see where Jean's coming from •

The problem comes in in the difference between
the theoretical and the practical.

You know a

child does not fall into page five, paragraph
seven, and that's the thing that really disturbed
and frustrated me.

I had to spend all that time

on how it should be and when I went out to teach
I saw kids did not fall into these categories.
(21)

Teacher: You're all saying that somewhow or other
you need practical experience with children and
that you need to learn how to communicate with
children.

What does that mean, "to learn to

~ommunicate with children?"

How is it done?

Do

you learn it by simply being out there with
children?
(22)

Sandy: You need to know theories.

You need some

background in order to be able to judge what
direction you're going in.

I'm not trying to say

you don't need the theory, but the balance •
(23)

Irene: First, I'm not sure what people are saying
when they say "liberal education."
on thinking of Piaget.

Then, I kept

Let's say you want to

I

learn reading, or some other skill.

He says that

you have different experiences that lead up to
the development of that skill.

You have to have
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experiences.

Whatever goes into the development

of that skill, you experience different steps.
Some of the steps might involve concrete
experience with the children.

It might involve

It might involve a discussion

reading a book.

approach to learning.

I'm not sure what we mean

by the practical versus the theoretical.

I don't

want to perceive it as a dichotomy.
(24)

Teacher: I
terms.

think we have to concentrate on three

What do we mean by theory?

mean by liberal?

What do we

And what do we mean by

professional?
(25)

Sandy: Are we talking about the liberal as
liberal arts or •

• Liberal arts is really a

body of knowledge and liberal education is
perhaps a body of experiences
(26)

Shan: I agree.
education.

•

Traveling might be a liberal

Experience might be a

liberal

education because you're working through
something one on one with a little kid, an
animal, a relationship •
(27)

Teacher: Are you saying

(28)

Shan:

that~

experience •

I wouldn't want to say any experience.

I

definitely wouldn't want to say that.
(29)

Teacher: Only those experiences for which you are
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prepared contribute to your liberal education?
(30)

Shan: I

haven't thought it through that far.

(31)

Irene: I had always thought of liberal arts as a
body of information.

You go and take English, or

philosophy~

Liberal education, well, you need a

philosophy.

And I

thought the liberal arts were

everything that wasn't science.

I don't think

that now •
(32)

Teacher: It was a common misconception.

But you

don't think that liberal arts program was
inten e

to produce a liberally educated person

necessarily?

(33)

Irene: I don't think it.was.

(34)

Sandy: Does liberal come from the same root as
library?

(35}

Teacher: No.

Although both come from Latin.

"Liberal" comes from the Latin "liber" meaning
"free".

Our word "library" comes from the Latin

"libra" meaning "book".

Let me say the

distinction you are trying to make is an
interesting one, but historically, I believe it
is accurate enough to say that the liberal arts
were intended to produce the liberally educated
person.

But look at the root.

the arts of the free man.

Liberal arts are

They are also the
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liberating arts.
(36)

But what do they free you from?

Jean: When you have to concentrate on your major
then you're no longer free to take the courses
you're curious about, like Science 101.

What you

were freed from in your earlier, liberal
education, was the need to zero in on the skill
to get your job.
(37)

Teacher: So you're free from having to
specialize?
criteria.

That sounds close to one of Hirst's
Is there anything else the

libe~al

arts might free you from?
(38)

Rob: He who ends his education on a liberal note
is free to go on to anything but he who has a
professional education is bound to that
profession.

(39)

I'm quoting, it sounds like • •

Teacher: Franklin?

Who wanted to provide

students with the basic tools so that they would
be prepared to learn any business, profession or
calling?
(40)

Shan: Engineers can only deal with problems in
the way they're trained.

(41)

Teacher: Are you giving a practical justification
for liberal arts again?

(42)

Shan: Yes.

Not intentionally •

• Much like

what Rob said, if you had liberal arts for four
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years you'd tasted •

• if I

took science and

didn't like it then I could go back to history •
• I could then decide which avenue out of this
whole highway of ideas I wanted to go down.
(43)

Teacher: Now it sounds as though you're trying to
justify liberal education on the grounds that it
exposes you and enables you to make choices.

Do

you think those are the only or even the best
justifications for a liberal arts education?
(44)

Sandy: I'd like to analyze it in somewhat broader
terms.

I keep thinking it frees you from being

ignorant.

I couldn't put it together until Shan

said it gives you the ability to solve problems.
(45)

Teacher: What kinds of problems would it help you
to solve?

Do I need a liberal education to solve

the problem of how I'm going to buy a new car?
(46)

Sandy: As you get more specialized you narrow
down the problems you can solve and the methods
you can use •

• if you're following a liberal

arts track you're learning a much broader range
of methods of solving problems.
(47)

Teacher: Are you?

(48)

Rob: I

think you do learn more about

problem-solving in a liberal education, because
as you learn more disciplines and gain more
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facility with them you learn more different ways
to solve problems.
(49)

Teacher: How is a liberal arts education going to
teach you to solve the problem of making a
living?

(50)

Irene: It's teaching you how to problem solve.
Not, er •

• what problems to solve.

If you

have the ability to problem solve, you
theoretically have the ability to go from problem
to problem.
(52)

Teacher: So you're holding to that: a liberal
arts education is justified on the grounds that
it improves one's practical problem-solving
ability?

There were "yesses," chuckles, and one "no."
(52)

Irene: No.

That is not my justification.

I

think knowledge is the justification in and of
itself.

I

think you learn problem-solving

techniques in a variety of ways and no more in
liberal education than through a more specialized
education.
(53)

Sandy:

Hmm~

I

see a difference between an

intellectual problem and a practical problem like
changing a tire or like earning a living •
(54)

Teacher: What kind of difference?
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(55)

Sandy:

(giggling) There's one thing in my mind

right now and I can't get past it •
absent-minded professor •

• it's the

.(General laughter)

He zeroes in on one intellectual pursuit and he
can't change his own tire.
he's using •

all right it shows you the ways

to collect materials,
together,

It's different •

to put the information

to reason it out, and come to some sort

of solution or

furthe~

questions.

In a practical

situation you're trying to solve a problem.

In

an intellectual situation you may want, ah •
you may be perfectly happy with more questions.
(56)

Teacher: Are you backtracking1

I

think you were

saying liberal education was justified by its
ability to improve your problem-solving •
(57)

Sandy: But your intellectual problem-solving, not
all your problems.

(58)

Shan: I'm trying to look at it from the other
way.

If practical is knowing how to change a

tire,

then let's say a person specialized in

tire-changing.

Now how does that specialization

help the person, and now I'm trying to think of
something liberal like •
analyze all the factors

• like do history or
leading up to the Civil

War and make some statement about the causes.
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I'm trying to turn it around.

I don't know that

tire-changing can help a person solve liberal
problems,

therefore, I don't know that a liberal

training can help solve practical problems.
(59)

Karen: But a liberal education will give me some
start for finding the answer to a practical
problem.

I can go to the library and read a book

on how to change a

tire.

Whereas a specialized,

practical education is not going to help me
answer a philosophical •
(60)

Teacher: You're referring to skills, Karen?

Are

those skills necessary in order to pursue a
liberal education or are they themselves a part
of liberal education?
(61)

Karen: I want to say "yes" to both questions.

(62)

Teacher: I would say those skills, reading and
knowing how to find information, are not a part
of liberal education.

(63)

Sandy: I would differ with you.

You have to

teach those skills in the· younger grades and they
are as much a part of liberal education as
liberal arts subjects are in college.
(64)

Teacher: So then, you are rejecting the views of
Bestor, Hirst, Hutchins?

To them the liberal

arts are the fundamental forms of inquiry.

The
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skills one needs would not be part of •
(65)

Rob: I'd like to turn this in another direction.
Something about the reason liberal education
hangs together is that it shares a set of skills.
Once you've learned something of the
problem-solving methods of history, you've also
learned them for economics, government.

But the

skills necessary for the vocational stuff, are
much more basic, reading, writing • • •

that's

why it's practical to have a liberal arts
education because it's practical for learning
more liberal arts.
(66)

Teacher: Why would you want to learn more liberal
arts?

(67)

Rob: Something about the higher achievers going
into the liberal arts,

the lower achievers going

into professions and vocations.

That's~

observation •
(68)

Irene: What about engineers, doctors,

(69)

Rob: Well, I guess I don't want to include

lawyers?

professionals.
(70)

Teacher: Now what do you mean by professional?
We'd better identify some professions.

(71)

Various voices: Medicine.
league baseball.

Teaching.

(General laughter)

Law.

Major
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(72)

Teacher: You notice immediately that everyone
wants to be called a professional and we end up
calling every occupation a profession.

But let's

take those which we think most would agree to
call professions and see what their
characteristics are.
(73)

Jean: They require further education.

(74)

Teacher: Meaning what, Jean?

(75)

Jean: Two things: one is that you subscribe to a
profess~onal

journal so that you stay up on the

latest research, and the other is that you
periodically go back for further formal
education.
(76)

Teacher: Can you think of other criteria?

Look

at medicine, law •
(77)

Irene: What they charge •

(78)

Sandy:

• and how the charge is determined.

They can set their own rates if they're
professionals.
(79)

Teacher: Now then, if I'm a caterer who reads the
caterer's journal, and goes to France to study,
and can charge five hundred dollars for a meal
for ten, am I a professional?

(80)

Many voices: "yesses,"

(81)

Shan: Lawyers and doctors know something that

"no~s,"

and "why nots?"
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other people don't know and you have to trust
them.

I have to lay myself there and say,

"please take care of me,"

beca~se

I don't know

why my heart beats forty thousand times a minute.
I don't have the ability to find out.

I can take

the book out and check on my prescriptions but I
can't understand the books.
they've got the magic.

It seems to me

Whatever it is you can't

get at it easily.
(82)

Teacher: Special knowledge?

(83)

Irene: I'm trying to distinguish between the
caterer who satisfies the criteria and the
doctor.

Maybe it's· a broader base of knowledge.

No, I'm not sure that's true •
(84)

Teacher: Why is the doctor's training not
exclusively experiential?

Suppose we apprenticed

the young doctor to be with an experienced doctor
who taught him what to do.

Once admitted to the
I

group of doctors he answers questions about why
he does what he does by saying: "it works," or
"that's the way I was taught."

Would you accept

those answers?
(85)

Irene: You need a broader base of knowledge.

( 8 6)

Teacher: Can you say what you mean by broader?
Does that mean more information?
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(87)

~

Maybe he was just lucky once.

What he did

may not work the next time.
(88)

Teacher: Supposing he has one hundred percent
success?

He does know what will work.

He says,

"I've tried this on five hundred and sixty-three
patients.

Here are their names and addresses.
Call them."

They're all cured.
(89)

Irene: Let me use an example from my own field.
It's

There's a new intelligence test coming out.
based on theory.

You can use it practically if

you're a technician.
it,

But if you want to apply

to understand it, you have to understand the

theory behind the test.

So a professional is one

who understands the theory •
instrument,

• behind the

the technical process, or behind the

mechanical operation.
(90)

Shan: You can take that into the classroom which
goes back to our original questions.

There's a

theory on brain growth which says that kids reach
plateaus and that their synapses don't connect
and that at that point they cannot learn.

Now I

might be a teacher for four hundred years and
notice that when kids turn twelve "A" students
drop down to

"c" students.

I could tell a parent

that I know this from experience, and they'll
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start learning again, so not to worry.

But if I

have theory behind it, I can explain to them
rather than just saying this is the way it is.
If you have the theory you speak on a different
level with the parents or the patients.
(91)

Teacher: Do you want to say the professional
knows the theory?

Do you want to say it gives

you a way to explain what you observe?
(92)

Rob: It's a way to fit it into an organized
background.

I mean a technician doesn't know why

he's doing what he's doing.
(93)

Jean: I

think he may know why.

I don't think he

understands the larger picture of where it fits
into a whole.

(Jean went on to talk about the

nursing field, where, she said, each kind of
nurse, e.g.

licensed practical nurse,

registered

nurse, wished to be considered professional but
did not want those below them in the hierarchy to
be so considered.)
(94)

Teacher: It may be true that in fact everyone
wants to be called professional, but if the term
is going to have any meaning at all, you might
want to insist that the professional is, for
example,

the one who knows the theory.

Do you

think that by this criterion a teacher qualifies
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as professional?
(95)

Someone: They should be a professional.

(96)

Teacher: If that is so, then what do you think is
the theoretical basis of their practice?

(97)

Several voices: Psychology.

(98)

Teacher: Then I'm going to want to ask you why
you chogse psychology as the theoretical
underpinning for teaching, and what you mean by
"knowing psychology."
you that we
thinking.

~ry

First let me suggest to

to distinguish two sorts of

Instrumental thinking or reasoning is

the kind we do when we're doing practical
problem-solving.

In instrumental thinking, we

accept the goals or ends as given.

We don't

question whether we want to change the tire or
write the paper.·

We simply want to know how to

do those things.

The question for the

instrumental thinker is, "How do I
problem?"

solve this

Now, when we think critically we may

not take the goals or ends for granted.
ask, "But why maintain the democracy?"
good citizen?"

We may
"Why be a

or, "Why buy a new car?"

We want

to know what count as good reasons for our
actions.

And we also want to know what count as

good reasons for our beliefs: "Why do we believe
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such-~nd-such?"

I suggest that the general goal of critical
thinking is understanding, while the general goal
of instrumental thinking is control, and I

then

suggest that liberal arts education is education
in critical thinking.
distinction.

Now consider this

You may know the theories or the

explanations given by the historian, and thus in
a sense you have the science, that is,
knowledge produced by the historian.

the
But you

have not the art of being an historian.

You have

the theoretical knowledge of the historian, but
you cannot yet engage in the practice of being an
hiatorian.

We look at theories and demand that

they translate into practical problem-solving,
and I

think that is a mistake.

If I

learn the

theories of history, do I do so to solve my
practical problems or the current problems of the
world?
(99)

What does it mean to be an historian?

Irene: I was just thinking of what you were doing
here.

You could talk about a

theory of

education, talk about the importance of dialogue,
but without getting us to do it, you're not a
teacher.

But it doesn't mean we're going to

solve any practical problems and in point of
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fact, I don't think we have.
laughter)

(Much general

• But I'm saying it's an act of

doing, but using your theory.

You can't just do

something helter-skelter, you have to have a
theory behind it.

You can learn in school about

Piaget, but if all you can do is spout Piaget and
cannot sit down with a student and act upon that
theory, well, it has nothing to do with
problem-solving, then you are not doing the art
of teaching.

Of Piagetian teaching • • • I'm

trying to tie it in with science versus the art
0

(100)

f

•

Shan:

•

• becoming an historian.

There's an

interpretation implied, not just a rote
memorization of the theories of historians, but
evaluation, and concluding, and doing some of
your own writing.
(101)

Teacher: What does it mean to be a psychologist?
Who is the psychologist?
knows all the theories?

Is it the person who

-

Or the one who knows one

theory, or a person who knows one ·theory and
practices psychotherapy according to that theory?
What about the person who has good human
relations skills, whatever these might be?

What

about the person who goes through therapy and
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develops these skills?

What about the skillful

manipulator of others who knows how to get what
she wants?

Who is the psychologist?

(102)

Someone: Not the one who just knows the theory.

(103)

Teacher: Do you want the teacher to be a
psychologist in some sense?

(104)

Jean: I would want them to have the human
relations skills rather than the theory.

(105)

Shan: They have to know lots of theories.

I use ·

whatever I need at that moment.
(106)

Teacher: So you use it to solve your practical
problems?

(107)

Irene: I want someone who can use whatever they
need to fit the needs of that child at that
moment.

They don't all respond to the same

thing.
At this point the teacher gave another short
mini-lecture,
science.

this one on the history of psychology as a

A strictly empirically-based psychology,

modelled after a nineteenth century view of the natural
sciences seeks to explain human behavior in terms of
causes, or correlations.

Other psychologists,

those

whose ideas originate in European phenomenology, for
instance, look at man as a thinking being who attaches
meaning to the things and events of his world, who can
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give reasons for his beliefs and actions.

(108)

Teacher: Which psychology can the teacher choose?
How is she to choose?

And what can psychology do

for the teacher?

(109)

Sandy: Okay,

the purpose of studying the theory

of psychology is to come to a reasonable analysis
of what I believe.

I may forget the names of the

people we've read for this class, but I have
taken

w~at

we've discussed and come to my own

analysis and my own beliefs.

(110)

Teacher: Would it be okay for the doctor to
forget what he has learned?

(111)

Sandy: Not everything.

But I don't mind when he

pulls a book off the shelf and checks something
that he may not be sure of •

(112)

Teacher: I

think it is true that there is a

2enerally agreed on body of law to which the
lawyer refers.

The same is true of doctors, at

least if they're practicing conservative
medicine.

But look at the problem of the

teacher: how many psychologies does she have to
choose from?

Does that fact have any bearing on

the problem of whether the teacher is considered
a professional?
(113)

Shan: This goes along with that.

I

teach seventh
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grade and someone else teaches eighth grade and
someone below me taught sixth grade and we all
have different philosophies.

I mean I don't know

what came before and we all come from different
places and the parents and the kids,

too, get

mixed up, which doesn't make us look any better.

(114)

Teacher: Is that because teachers have such
different goals.
goal: "To

ge~

In law, you said, there's one

the client off the hook."

medicine the goal is to cure.

In

Teachers say the

2oal is the learning of the students, but do we
a1l mean the same thing by learning?

(115)

Irene: I

think that having so many theories does

make it difficult.

I would consider a good

teacher as one who could go into a classroom and
teach each child individually, but I don't know
whether that makes her professional.

(116)

Teacher: It makes her competent?

Do you want to

hold to the criterion of professional that you
set up before?

Should the professional refer to

a body of theoretical knowledge?
out what that is for the teacher?

Have we figured
It seems a

little odd that as teachers we refer to the
discipline of psychology.

Lawyers refer to law •
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• • Does it have to be psychology?
(117)

Irene: I would guess that as you get higher up in
education they will not say psychology.

They

will say their own content.
(118)

Teacher: Is the college teacher considered a
professional?

(119)

Maryanne: In universities you need· a degree in
your specialized area but you don't need a degree
to teach.

You can be a mechanic and be hired at

a junior college to teach auto mechanics.
(120)

Teacher: Are you saying that at the college level
teachers are not professionals?

(121)

Someone: Professional what?
teachers?

Probably not.

Professional

They may be profesional

historians, or philosophers, or physicists.
The group then considered the criterion of a good track
record, which they claimed lawyers and doctors had but
teachers as a group had not.

They examined the case of

chiropractors and then expressed uncertainty about the
criteria of more education and theoretical knowledge.
The teacher then summarized what seemed to be the
position:

that teachers neither referred to a generally

accepted body of theory, nor did they share generally
accepted goals.

That is,

teachers did not agree on what

learning was, nor on what kind to promote.

After she
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said this,

the group groaned and someone said, "Then we

don't have a profession."
(122)

Teacher: Did you want to be professionals?

(123)

Irene: I

(124)

Teacher: Let's throw out psychology for now.

think we should be •
Is

there some other body of knowledge that you think
the teacher needs to know?
(125)

Irene: The math teacher has to know math and the
English teacher has to know English.

(126)

Teacher: Should math teachers be professional
mathematicians?

(127)

Irene: That would be terrible.

How many teachers

have we all had who were brilliant in their area
but couldn't teach.

That just makes them a

professional mathematician, but not •
(128)

~

They should know how to communicate what

they're teaching to whomever they're teaching it.
(129)

Teacher: Does that get you back in some sense to
psychology?

(130)

Rob: Communication skills.
across ideas.

I

Being able to get

suppose that's psychology.

would set up as a criterion the ability to
communicate.
(131)

Teacher: The teacher as professional communicator?

I
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{132)

Rob: It's more than that.
of knowledge, methods,

To communicate a body

technique,

that sort of

thing.
(133)

Shan: That does get us back to psychology though.

(134)

Teacher: Are you saying that it is the teacher's
primary job to communicate?

{135)

Rob: Yes,

that's what they do.

(136)

Teacher: This is exactly where we began.

Jean

said one has to go to college to learn to
communicate with children.

And that ability to

communicate is crucial for the teacher.
(137)

Jean: But wherever people have to work as a group
to make the thing go, communication is vital.

(138)

Teacher: Therefore the ability to communicate
doesn't distinguish teaching as a profession?

(139)

Jean: In my undergraduate work in public health
the emphasis was on education and that meant
communication.

At the end of that sequence you

understood much more about how to take what you
hear from people who are from a different
subculture •
(140)

Shan: Which is really interesting because you
didn't go through teacher training and I

went

through liberal arts and teacher training and
never had any of that.

It's so strange, because
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if your job is communication •
ordinarily, when we approach the end of our time,

I ask

the group if someone could summarize positions, and if
no one can then I

try to.

was provided by anyone.

In this instance no summary
The discussion was moving in a

lively manner, and, perhaps because this was our last
session together, I

let it go on.

We ended the

discussion reluctantly at this point, and then talked
about the course as a whole.

CHAPTER IV

A DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCUSSION

Introduction
Although the observations which follow refer to
one discussion in particular, I wish to provide a
description that could be applied to any discussion led
as this one was led.

The discussion transcribed in

Chapter 'III will be taken to be representative of a
type, and differences which reflect unique characteristics of this group will be ignored.
within discussions of this

However,

type, variations will occur,

and the kinds of variations which may be expected will
be noted in the sections describing student and teacher
behaviors.
The description is organized into four parts.
first part, The Content of the Discussion, answers
question "what was the discussion about?"
part, The Behavior of the Students, answers

The
the

The second
the

question, "what were the students doing?"

The third

part, The Behavior of the Teacher, answers

the question

"what did the teacher do?"

The fourth part of the
76
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description, Outcomes, answers

the question, "what

happened and was it worthwhile?"

The Content of the Discussion
It is not easy to list the several topics of this
discussion, and in discussions of the sort I

am

describing,

that is often the case.

learn that,

since there are interconnections between

ideas,

Students rapidly

it is difficult to resolve one problem without

dealing with others.

Carrying on a discussion is a bit

like rehabilitating an old house: one cannot start at
one corner of one room and work one's way neatly through
the building.

If one is

to rehabilitate effectively,

one must tackle whole systems, several of them simultaneously.

Only in this destructive, messy way can one

do the job well.
Initially, it seemed that the first major topic of
the discussion was to be the relationship of liberal
arts education to the training of teachers.

But the

attention of the group rapidly turned from the role of
the liberal arts to a critique of teacher training.

A

passing suggestion was made that teachers needed to
learn how to communicate, but the group let that
suggestion lie, as they indignantly deplored the failure
of teacher training to include practical experience.

It

op-
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was apparently the word ''practical" an~ the implied
suggestion that teacher training was too theoretical
that prompted the mention of theory.

A few minutes were

spent .arguing the relative worth of the practical and
the theoretical, and then the group recognized a need to
clarify concepts, choosing first to try to say what they
meant by liberal arts.

They were unsuccessful in their

attempt, one abbreviated by their unplanned return to
the original question,

that is, how the liberal arts

were to be justified.

They were subsequently unable to

resolve the question whether a liberal arts education
develops superior problem-solving ability, and when the
discussion got bogged down

th~

teacher redirected

attention toward the concept of profession.
students failed

The

to establish a set of criteria by which

to distinguish profession from non-profession.

But they

did seem satisfied that at least one criterion was
necessary.

This was the criterion of theoretical

knowledge on which professions were,
founded.

Using this criterion,

they claimed,

the group was led,

through a consideration of their own assumption that
tPaching was founded on psychology,

to the position of

doubting whether teaching was, after all, a profession.
If teaching was founded in psychology,
foundations were shaky,

then its

since there were so many
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psychologies to choose from.

Finally the discussion

came full circle as participa~ts reconsidered the
suggestion--almost ignored when first made--that
teachers must know how to communicate.
If a discussion is to be judged according to
whether participants,

individually or collectively,

arrive at answers to all the questions

that are raised,

then this discussion failed, as did all the previous
discussions in which the group had engaged.
do most discussions of this sort,

So in fact

though not all break

off leaving quite so many loose ends.

The charac-

teristics of the group and of the teacher which
contributed to the inconclusiveness of the discussion
will be mentioned in the appropriate sections.

But the

principal reason why this kind of discussion is likely
to be inconclusive is that the questions discussed are
genuinely discussible, and, by definition,

that means

they are difficult to answer.
Not all questions are discussible.

For example, a

question about the size of the financial contributions
of state and federal government to education could be
settled by reference to a book with the appropriate
statistics, not by talk.

But had this group been trying

to decide how to find out whether senior citizen
volunteers reading to first graders could affect reading
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scores,

they would have had something to talk about,

namely how to design a suitable experiment, or how to
conduct an inquiry.

Had the group been trying to figure

out how to conduct a study to determine the effect of
salary on teacher performance, participants would again
have found

themselves in the midst of lengthy

discussions as

they tried to select criteria against

which teacher performance was
words,

they would have found

to be judged.

In other

themselves discussing, as

they so often did, questions of concept, e.g., what is
teaching, what is good

teaching?

Questions of concept

were,·for this group, of primary concern, but it should
not be assumed that only questions of concept are
discussible.

(1)

Questions of interpretation of texts

or events, questions of method are all discussible.
Answers

to these kinds of questions are not likely to be

quickly found,

a fact which,

it must be admitted,

initially causes some students a degree of frustration.
That this discussion resulted in nothing more than the
discovery of the complexity of the questions addressed
is not a mark against it.

Discussions must be evaluated

by other criteria than how many questions are answered.
What these criteria may be will be suggested in the
final section.
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The Behavior of the Students
It may be helpful to think of discussions as
located on a many stranded continuum.

The strands of

the continuum would represent, at least, participants'
social skills,

their intellectual skills, and whatever

pertinent knowledge they bring to bear on the problems
under discussion.

At one end of the continuum might be

placed "discussions" carried on by persons with minimal
social and intellectual skills, who,

in effect,

monologues, expressing their uninformed opinion.

carry on
This

sort of exchange is exemplified in the parallel play of
young children.

At the other end of the continuum could

be placed discussions between participants who, having
well-developed social skills,

listen to and respond to

each other; who, having well-trained minds,

speak the

language of reason; and who, finally are immersed in the
problem being talked about and well-acquainted with its
literature.

Such discussions are rare indeed!

They are

not likely to be heard in classrooms where students are
assembled for one short term.
A classroom discussion is,

in all likelihood,

going to fall between the extremes of the continuum.
The exact position will be determined in part by the age
of the students,

since age will,

to some degree, affect

social and intellectual skills, and, also,

level of
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knowledge.

The students who participated in this

discussion were all adults whose social skills were
well-developed.

They showed great good will, seldom

interrupting each other, and never "putting each other
down" in any way.

There were few if any signs that they

were not listening to each other; occasionally their
responses were indirect, as if a bit preoccupied with
their own thoughts (22, 87), (2) or delayed as if the
speaker was

replyin~

to what had been said some time

previously (16, 23, 42, 83).
But these students were not characters in a Becket
play.

That they were listening to each other can be

concluded from the fact that there were times when they
disagreed with each other, and that they were socially
skillful can be concluded from looking at the way they
handled disagreements.

A few disagreements were over

relatively insignificant matters.

Jean and Rob

disagreed (16-19) over where one could go to learn to
communicate with children.

Contradicting Rob, Jean

argued that being a parent was not enough,
parents could not communicate.

since some

Much later Jean and Rob

appeared to disagree again (92-93) when Jean said that
technicians did know why they did what they did,

but

simply could not place their actions in a larger
context.

Both Jean and Rob, as well as

the rest of the
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class fail
questions.

to recognize the ambiguity o_f "why"
To take but two examples of more significant

disagreements: Karen (59)
all,

insisted, in opposition to

that liberal arts education could help one solve

practical problems; and Irene (52) differed with others
when she insisted that in her opinion, knowledge was its
own justification.

Neither statement was taken up or

directly challenged by the group:
resulted in heated exchange.
oc~urred

certainly neither

No disagreement that

could be said to have been disruptive and

occasionally disagreements were not even recognized or
acknowledged.
teachers

For example, after Jean said she wanted

to possess human relations skills rather than

theory, Shan asserted that teachers must know lots of
theories (104-5).
the views.
silent,

No one made any effort to reconcile

Whether students openly disagree or remain

the fact of disagreement is,

in this sort of

discussion, rarely the occasion of discourtesy.
particular discussion it never was:

In this

from beginning to

end not an instance of bad manners could be discerned.
If these students possessed well-developed social
skills,

they were less well-developed on other strands

of the continuum.

Their intellectual skills did not

appear to be very sophisticated.

It is not a criticism

of them to say so, although it is a criticism of the
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kind of schooling they have had,
are,

that, bright as they

they do not have minds trained closer to capacity.

The speech of students whose minds have been
well-trained is likely to include numerous linguistic
pointers, what are referred to by English teachers as
transition phrases, indicating the relationship between
thoughts.

Well- trained speakers (and writers)

acknowledge what follows,

offer hypotheses and

counterexamples, make or challenge assumptions, and
~nd

speak of necessary

sufficient conditions.

Such

pointers were all but absent in the speech of students
in this group.
to "because"

Their metalinguistic vocabulary extends
(11, 14, 16, 48, 140),

"criteria" (83),

and "example" (89).

"analyze" (41),
Furthermore, by

definition, persons with well-trained minds have good
command of reasoning skills, while students in this
group do not.

Sometimes their logic is fallacious,

as

when Sandy begs the question (63), and when Rob appears
to be implicitly assuming the equivalence of converses
( 67 ) •

But the weakness of their intellectual skills is

revealed most strikingly by their preferred methods of
supporting a point.

Most often they rely on the

fabricated example (26, 36, 40, 42, 55, 59, 81, 90).
Karen argued that what she took to be liberal arts
education could help people learn to solve practical
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problems, but one doubts that she had ever gone to the
library to find out how to change a
possibl~,

tire.

they use the personal example

When
(14, 89, 99,

113, 140), as Sandy does when she cites her own
experience as evidence that teacher training "did not
have enough children in it."

When the examples,

fabricated or real, are used as evidence,

they often

provide no or weak support for the speaker's point.
Karen's statement that liberal arts education will help
one solve the problem of changing a tire may be true,
but it is comparable to saying that training as a
surgeon will help one carve the holiday turkey:

such

incidental benefits do not justify a surgeon's training.
If Sandy's example had been intended sim~ly to
illustrate her point (as Irene's example at 99, or Rob's
analogy at 16), and had illustration been needed,

it

would have been useful, but judged by the wording, it
seems to be offered as evidence for a general claim
about all teacher training, not just hers.
her example is, of course, inadequate.
emphasize again that I am not faulting
Their experience is
is,

in fact, my own.

As evidence,

(I wish to
these students.

the experience of most students, and
Their poorly developed skills are

the consequence of instructional methods which demand
passivity of students and ignore the social nature of
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knowledge and of learning.)
A third strand on which a discussion could be
located can be called the knowledge strand.

The quality

of a discussion is affected by how much participants
know about its subject.

In this case the participants

might have been hard-pressed to identify the subject:
witness the way themes changed from moment to moment.
However,

the changes were not propelled by idiosyncratic

associations.
dered, e.g.

The concepts amongst which they floun-

liberal arts education, theory,

profession,

practiee, are linked to one another, and in ways
difficult to delineate.
turns,

In fact,

for all its twists and

the discussion was controlled by one topic, to

which attention always returned, and that was the topic
of teacher training.
Teacher training was a topic the students "chose,"
but it was one they were ill-prepared to discuss.

It

seems an odd comment to make of a group of students who
had been through or were undergoing teacher training.
But they were familiar with the topic in the way that
the layman is familiar with money.

The layman has had a

great deal of firsthand experience with money, but sheer
familiarity does not ensure his ability to discuss it in
coherent fashion.

The participants in the discussion

had been exposed to teacher training, but they had
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little knowledge of forms of teacher training other than
their own and they had not read the literature
extensively.

Judging by the fact that they hardly ever

refer to it (see
references),

1!

and

~

for what may be indirect

they had not assimilated what they had been

required to read for class.

Their own experience,

including .the master's program they were currently
enrolled in, remained, quite naturally,

far more salient

for them than the reading they had done.
It is to be expected that people will draw first
of all on their own experience as
subject of discussion.

The

that pertains to the

livel~ness

of this dis-

cussion is largely attributable to the fact that the
participants were trying to make sense to themselves of
their own experience,

to which, as already observed,

they refer often (e.g., 4, 5, 7, 14, 16, 20, 67, 89, 93,
99, 100, 113, 139, 140).

Personal recollection can lead

discussions far afield and so interrupt the flow of
conversation.

But reminiscing did not preoccupy this

group.

Only once in the transcript were participants

unable

to resist taking turns telling what happened to

them (after 19).

Even on that occasion, the stories

they told of their troubling experiences with parents
who brought to them problems teachers were ill-prepared
to solve were germane to the question of teacher
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training, and once each person had, as it were, provided
a footnote,

the discussion proper was resumed.

Earlier, I noted the students'

frequent use of

examples drawn from their own experience, criticizing
this behavior from the point of view of argumentation.
sometimes, however, examples are introduced not as
They are introduced as

illustration, nor as evidence.

material to be worked over, as when people talk about
what has happened to them in order to understand it.
And this--reflecting on experience--might have been what
participants were doing from time to time.

They seem to

have been trying to explain their experiences in terms
of ideas

they were considering in the course of the

discussion, as for example, when Shan (113)

suggested

that the variety of teaching styles in her school might
be a potential source of confusion for students and
parents.
It was obviously not the objective of this group to
achieve some sort of consensus:

they were teachers, but

they were not in a faculty meeting trying
policy.

t~

establish

Equally obviously, it was not the objective of

anyone in the group to win a victory or score points off
others.

There were no signs that participants

understood themselves to be engaged in a sporting
debate, an exercise of wits.

On the contrary, for the
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most part, participants seemed unsure of themselves,
aware that they were not making their points clearly to
others, or, more importantly,

to themselves.

Only

rarely did anyone make an unqualified assertion such as
Sandy's at (63): "You have to teach those skills in the
younger grades and they are as much a part of liberal
education as liberal arts subjects are in college."
Even Irene's "No.

That is not my justification.

think knowledge is

the justification in and of itself,"

(52)

I

one of the most emphatic, forceful statements made

in the entire discussion includes a hint of doubt.

The

qualifying self-reference, "I think," was in keeping
with the consistently--and appropriately--hesitant
manner of the group.

Taken as a whole the mood of

participants in this discussion was neither selfconsciously conciliatory, nor combative, but rather,
meditative,

like the mood of a small group of children

engaged in some utterly absorbing project such as
building a sandcastle at the water's edge.

And again,

like the children of such a group, participants in the
discussion were each uncertain how their efforts would
turn out.

None was an expert at the assigned task.

learned what they were doing and how to do it as they
went along.

All
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The Behavior of the Teacher
Although each participant in the discussion had
his or her own way of speaking, all were absorbed in a
common task and their behavior could be described in
identical terms.

The behavior of one student was not

readily distinguishable from the behavior of another.
But the teacher's behavior was very different from the
behavior of other participants, as it was different from
the behavior typical of teachers.
In the first place,

the teacher's behavior

appeared to differ from that of other teachers in the
amount of speaking she did.
ex~luded

If the mini-lectures are

from the calculation, the teacher spoke less

than the students.
has more entries

That is

to say, although the teacher

than any single student, students as a

group have more entries than the teacher and speak more
words.

(See table 1)

Secondly, while teachers usually

spend much time dispensing a great deal of information,
this teacher spent very little time doing so, and on few
occasions (1, 6, 8, 35, 37, 39, 64, 98, after 107).
'

Thirdly, while she did provide some information to
students, did try to direct the course of the discussion
(8, 24, 35, 70), did summarize (21), what the teacher
did most was question.

Every utterance except those at

3, 6, 62, and 136 was a question or included a question.
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Number of Entries per Individual
Teacher

57

All students

83

Shan

15

Rob

13

Jean

12

Sandy

12

Maryanne

2

Bev

2

Irene

17

Karen

2

Total entries 140.

Students names presented in the

order in which they first spoke.
Table 1
Asking questions is,
mentioned,

like the other behaviors

typical of teachers, but the kinds of

questions this

teacher asked were not typical at all.

What the teacher did ask was,
believed
~

~

in effect, what students

and why they believed what they did

~

On occasion she asked students if they could be

more specific (12, 74, 86) by asking them what they
meant.

Sometimes she asked them what they meant in

order to start them off on a new problem (21).

She

asked questions which provided correction (39), and
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which offered interpretation (29).

She made general-

izations based on what the students had said and asked
them if that was what they were saying (27, 42).

She

asked students to make suggestions (37), and to consider
her suggestions

(101).

She asked for examples (45),

and she invented examples (79)
group had proposed.
distinctions (60).

to test criteria the

She invited students to make
She asked, in short,

the sorts of

questions anyone might ask who could not understand what
someone else was saying.

She did not, as would have

been expected of a teacher, ask questions to learn what
the students remembered of what they had read or of what
she had told them.

The behavior of this teacher was,

finally, unlike the behavior of other teachers in that
she never overtly appraised the students'

responses or

performances.
Much more could be said about the teacher's
behavior.

Undoubtedly she let pass some remarks which

she would not want students

to think she accepted.

may have shown too much of a

She

tendency to let students

get off the subject, as she did at the outset

~

Perhaps she should have intervened and corrected
mistakes, especially mistakes in reasoning (58, 65 and
elsewhere), as they occurred.

(3)

Certainly she failed

to use metalinguistic pointers as often as she could

93
have done.

There were times when she could, in the form

of questions to students, have identified their own
remarks as, possibly, statements of necessary or
sufficient conditions (126, 134), as in need of
qualification

(28),

and could have identified her own

remarks as paraphrases (37), as generalizations (51), as
analo ies (79).

It was, admittedly, not the most

skillful performance.
how as she went along.

The teacher,

too, was learning

The question to be taken up in

the next section is whether this sort of discussion,
even when clumsily handled, was worthwhile to students.

Outcomes
The specific outcomes of the discussion were
these.

A few distinctions were teased out and a few

insights--not all entirely welcome--were won.

Jean (93)

differentiated between knowing why one does something
and understanding where that something fits
larger picture.

into a

Irene (50) called attention to the

difference between learning how to solve problems and
iearning what problems to solve.

And Sandy (53)

tried

to separate intellectual from practical problem-solving.
Insights occurred in the form of new relationships
perceived, or relationships perceived anew.

Irene (89)

concluded her exploration of the relationship between
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theory and practice saying, "so the professional is one

"

who understands the theory behind the instrument.
She appeared to be phrasing the relationship between
theory, practice, and profession in what was,
somewhat more satisfactory way.

for her, a

Sandy suggested (44)

that the liberal arts freed you from being ignorant and
immediately observed that she had just put that together.

Rob's manner when he made his simple affir-

mation, "Yes,

that'·s what they do," (135)

that is,

teachers communicate, unmistakably conveyed the
impression of seeing an old idea afresh, as if all the
problems of teachers, all the programs to improve
teaching,. all the research on teaching were to be
reduced to questions about the nature of communication.
There were instances of collective as well as of
individual insight.

As a group, all assented

to Rob's

assertion that a principal skill of the teacher is skill
at communication.

And then all were shocked by the

realization that only Jean's

training in public health

had included training in this skill.

None of the

certified teachers had been taught to communicate.

The

most significant moment and the dramatic conclusion to
the discussion came when all admitted their failure
establish that teaching was a profession (121).

to

They

wanted to believe it was, but had to admit that they did
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not yet know what a profession was, and that it was
doubtful that teachers could be called professionals if
they could not agree what learning was.
It must be admitted that the number of distinctions made, insights achieved,
in this

ideas clearly formulated
It may

two hour discussion were few in number.

be that if the students had been asked to write on the
various topics before and after the discussion,

the

essays written afterwards would show changes which could
be accepted as resulting from the discussion.

But it is

also quite likely that no new ideas would endure close
examination in further discussion.
were but steps along the way and

The new perceptions

this very provi-

sionality must prompt many to wonder again whether
discussion, which produces so little in the way of firm
knowledge,

is worth the effort.

It appears
related tasks.

that the students were working on two
On the one hand they appeared to be

trying to make sense of their own experiences, and on
the other hand they appeared to be trying to make sense
to themselves, as well as

to others.

Exactly what the

relationship is between making sense of and making sense
~is

not a matter to go into here, but ordinary

experience confirms

2f

that people struggling to make sense

struggle to make sense, and at least sometimes when

96
people cannot make sense to themselves,

they feel

that

they have not made sense of what has happened to them.
These two tasks are ongoing--no one ever makes sense of
everything and no one always makes sense--and they are
undoubtedly tasks which are and ought to be undertaken.
Yet one may still ask whether the struggle to make sense
of or to make sense are or ought to be the primary tasks
to be undertaken within the classroom.

The struggle is

time-consuming, and when, after all, are students
"acquire knowledge?"

to

Why not simply tell the students

what they are supposed to know?

Why,

in this case, did

I not tell them my ideas on teacher training, or
Bestor's ideas, or what I

thought of Bestor? (4)

Suppose students had memorized Hirst's ideas?
Would that have been learning?

A student could have

memorized a passage with more new-to-him ideas than came
out of discussion,
took.

in less time than the discussion

But, without anticipating in detail the arguments

of subsequent chapters,
refuses

I will say that a teacher who

to deal with those ideas students already have

on a subject, and instead requires them to remember what
others say, builds on shifting sand.

When required

reading presents ideas considerably at variance with
their own,

students may merely assimilate those new

ideas to old schemas, which is

to say they may distort
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them.

Old patterns of thought can stand in the way of

new learning.

(Students should read good writers and

thinkers, and it is unfortunate that, very often,
more carefully a writer states his case,
tedious students find him.

the

the more

I hope that one result of

extensive experience with class discussions of the sort
transcribed here might be an increased patience for and
ability to understand the conscientiously written word).
At this point I will simply assert that if,

in the

course of a discussion, students reconsider some of
their beliefs and recognize their inadequacy, and make
some progress
beliefs,

towards a better formulation of other

then that discussion is worthwhile.

That is

the chief criterion by which a discussion is to be
evaluated.

If the criterion is accepted,

discussion in Chapter III was worthwhile.

then the
But this

conclusion will not be sufficient for my purpose.

It is

possible to accept the worthiness of an activity for
students without accepting it as a foundation of
learning.

But it is precisely as a foundation of

learning that I am proposing discussion.

I want to say

that not only was this discussion of worth to the
students, but that discussion conducted as

this one was,

one which takes into account students' beliefs and gets
students to reconsider these as

they try to make sense
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of experience and make sense to others, has an essential
role in classrooms.

The defense needed on behalf of the

essentiality of discussion will have to show that i t
does contribute to the growth of students' knowledge,
and this defense will now be provided.
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1. One of my assumptions is that concepts are
not and cannot be acquired all at once, in full flower,
as it were.
Nor, to change the image, can they be
transferred to another person like pieces of currency.
Each concept a person possesses is embedded in networks
of concepts.
D. W. Hamlyn writes: "To have a concept is
not an all-or-none affair; there are degrees of
understanding and degrees in the complexity of what is
understood.
Conceptual development is as much as
anything an initiation into a web of understanding which
may be more or less involuted at any given time."
"Epistemology and Conceptual Development," in Cognitive
Develo ment and E istemolog , ed. Theodore Mischel (New
York: Academic Press, 1971 , p. 10.
2. The underlined numbers throughout this chapter
refer to entry numbers in Chapter III.
3.
John Brubacher cites the Jesuits' Ratio
Studiorum on discussion methods.
The teacher is to
"preside in such a way that he may himself seem to take
part on both sides; he shall praise anything good which
is said, and call it to the attention of all; if some
unusu~lly difficult objection is proposed, he shall make
a brief suggestion to support the defender or dir~ct the
objector; he shall no~ keep silent too long, nor yet
speak all the time, but let the pupils set forth what
they know; he shall •
• not permit an objection which
is practically answered to be pressed too far, nor an
answer which is unsound to stand too long; after a
discussion, he shall briefly define and explain the
entire matter."
The honest questioner would, it is
clear, satisfy some but not all of the requirements of
the Jesuit teacher!
The quotation, found in A History
of the Problems of Education (New York: McGraw Hill Book
Company, 1947), p. 189, comes from E. A. Fitzpatrick,
St. Ignatius and the Ratio Studiorum (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1933), p. 154.
4.
"Who is so stupidly curious to send his son
to school in order that he may learn what the teacher
thinks?" Augustine, St., De magistro, (New York:
Appleton-Century Co., 1938), p. 55.

CHAPTER V

HONEST QUESTIONING AND RATIONALITY

In the previous chapter, I described the behavior
of participants in a class discussion and the results of
that discussion.

That discussion was representative of

a kind of discussion, one distinguished from other forms
of social interchange by the kinds of question asked.
In this chapter, I examine in greater detail the nature
of thoie questions.

I will also try to justify these

kinds of question from the point of view of their
immediate value to the teacher and from the point of
view of rationality.

Finding Out Where the Student Is
It is in fact a commonplace amongst teachers that
they ought to begin teaching where the student is, and
it is for this reason that they do sometimes try to find
out where he is before they begin teaching.
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(1)

101
Teachers use different methods to find out where the
student is, and choose them according to what they mean
by "where the student is."

They do not always intend

to

find out what students know that is relevant to the
subject in order to prepare the mind for the
apperception of new knowledge, as Herbart would have
teachers do.

(2)

By "where the student is," some

teachers may mean what the student "knows," and what the
teacher wants to learn is what students already know
about a given subject.

These teachers may administer a

diagnostic test prior to beginning a course or a unit of
study to find out whether a student can give the
expected answers to a set of .questions.

A teacher who

makes such an interpretation may decide on the basis of
the student's answers what level of reader he requires
or what learning materials he should be given.

Some

teachers may want to find out what interests students
have.

That interpretation of "finding out where the

student is" may be made by a teacher who hopes to show
connections between the students'
is trying to teach.
"motivate" students.

This may be her way of trying to
Interpretations of the phrase

"where the student is" differ as
differ.

interests and what she

teachers' objectives

I am here proposing an interpretation which is

more likely to result in the teacher both finding out
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what the student knows and finding out what it is that
moves him.

(3)

On this interpretation,

to "find out where the

student is" is to "find out what the student believes
about a given subject and why he believes it."

Finding

out what he believes can include finding out those
substantive beliefs he holds about the subject and can
also include finding out those beliefs he has which
reflect his feelings about the subject.

For example, a

teacher who wishes to find out where the student is,

in

this sense, may find out not only what beliefs he holds
about the origin of the English novel, but also that he
believes English literature is boring or fascinating.
(4)

Whether the student's beliefs about the subject are

positive or negative,
inappropriate,

true or false, appropriate or

those beliefs,

together with his reasons

for them, whether these are adequate or inadequate,

~

where the student is with respect to that particular
subject.

One reason why "finding out what the student

believes and why he believes it" is a sensible
interpretation of "finding out where the student is" is
that, as I

will argue in later chapters,

if the teacher

does not find out what the student believes about a
subject,

she cannot,

logically, find out what he knows

and she probably cannot "motivate" him.
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Honest Questions
If

the teacher tries to find out what the student

believes and why he believes it,
likely ask the student questions.
if she is

then she will most
(5)

And furthermore,

to be successful in her inquiry, she will, I

contend, ask what I

refer to as honest questions,

examples of which can be found

(6)

throughout Chapter III.

All of the questions the teacher asked in that class
session were honest.

An honest question is here defined

as one to which the questioner does not know the answer
and to which the respondent can give a correct answer.
The honest question is a request for information not yet
in the possession of the questioner.

The honest ques-

tion is a question about the student's beliefs and his
reasons for them, and he is,

therefore, clearly in a

position to give a correct answer to such a question.
As was apparent in Chapter III, it may be difficult for
the student to do so, but he can state correctly· that he
doesn't know what he thinks (believes), or that he has
this reason for believing, or that he doesn't know what
he believes.
Honest questions may be contrasted with non-honest
questions, of which there are two principal varieties.
One,

the checking-up question, is used by a teacher to

find out whether students have learned what she asked
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them to learn.

When the teacher asks, for example,

"What is the capital of Illinois?" or "How does Skinner
define learning?"'she expects students to have learned
the answer.

What the teacher learns from the student's

answer is that he does or does not remember what she or
the book said.

In a trivial sense, if he remembers what

the book said and tells her what the book said,
student is telling the teacher what he believes.
believes that this is what the book said.

the
He

But if a

tea her wants to find out what the student believes the
capital of Illinois is (an absurd example,

to be sure),

or whether he accepts Skinner's definition of learning,
she cannot do so by asking the checking-up question.
the teacher is

If

to find out what the student believes

about the subject,

then her purpose is better served by

an honest question.
A second kind of non-honest question is frequently
asked in classrooms.

It is the rhetorical question,

asked by students as well as by teachers.

The rhe-

torical question may be asked either when the answer is
assumed to be obvious to both questioner and respondent,
e.g.

"How much of television is worth watching?" or when

it is assumed by the questioner that no possible good
answer can be given.
"Why do I

A student may, for example, ask

have to do this?" in such a way that it is
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obvious he has decided already that no adequate reason
can be offered.

When the rhetorical question is asked,

it is with no pretence of finding out where the
respondent is.
The honest question is not a "What is •
"Tell me ho~ •

• " or a

It is likely to begin

• " question.

with phrases which refer to the respondent's mind,
phrases such as "What do you think •
tell me why you •

"

(S~e

" or "Can you

Chapter III)

And this is

to be expected, since the honest questioner is trying to
learn what another believes.

(7)

Nevertheless,

the

phrasing of the question is not a certain guide to its
I

honesty.

A "Why do you think •

r

"

question could be

asked rhetorically or be asked as a way of checking up
on the student.

Ultimately, what determines the honesty

of a question is the intention of the questioner:

if she

acknowledges that she does not and cannot know in
advance what her students believe, and if she remembers
that her task is, first of all,
are,

to find out where they

then her questions are likely to be honest.

(8)

While there is much to be said for the honest
question on pedagogical grounds, before I

say it, I wish

first to point out that neither the checking-up question, nor the rhetorical question, asked when it is
assumed no good answer can be given, are acceptable
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forms of social behavior in our society.
asked,

When they are

they are asked by persons who assume they are in

a position of power, or by persons who believe they have
been wronged, in just those circumstances when the
normal rules of courtesy are being ignored or forgotten,
or have been suspended.

Since there is no reason why

teachers should not be bound by the rules of courtesy,
there are good grounds to avoid using these two sorts of
question in the classroom.

To a degree,

teachers

themselves, at least implicitly, recognize their
shortcomings.

For example,

the older the students,

the

more circumspect the teacher in her way of asking
checking-up questions.

At the university level,

teachers are more likely to put checking-up questions to
the group as a whole than to particular students.

(And

of course they will ask checking-up questions of
individuals on written exams.)

The older the student,

the more likely he would resent being catechized.
bad manners

It is

to quiz people without being given

permission to do so, and it is equally bad manners to
assume that others know nothing about a given subject,
that they have no beliefs about it,

that whatever

beliefs they do have are not to be taken seriously.
Good manners require that we give other persons a chance
to state their positions as completely as they care to;
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that we in turn state our interpretations of their
positions,

so giving them a chance to correct us,

and

that we do these things before we tell them all we know.
The honest questioner begins with the assumption that
she does not know the other's mind, and her questions
are intended to acknowledge that ignorance.

Thus it

seems obvious enough that on the grounds of courtesy
alone, honest questioning is justified as a form of
social interaction, but it remains to be seen how it may
be justified specifically as a form of interaction in
the classroom.
Honest Questioning as Teaching
So far,

I have argued that honest questioning is a

way to find out where a student is,
would be hard
so,

then,

indeed,

to find a better way to do so.

if it could be shown empirically,

that it
If this is
that, for

example, students learn more when the teacher finds out
where they are before she begins teaching than when
teachers do not do so, honest questioning would be
justified.

However, I am not interested in justifying

honest questioning in this way, because I am not
proposing· that honest questioning is a preliminary to
teaching but that it is a

teaching technique, and it is

this claim which must be justified.
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I

first presented and defended honest questioning

as a way for the teacher to achieve what she is likely
to accept as a useful short-range goal,
out where the student is.

that of finding

But I now present and defend

honest questioning as a way for a

teacher to achieve

what I will assume is her long-range goal,
bringing her students to knowledge.

that of

That is her

long-range goal, but it is not the one on which she must
focus.

The goal the teacher must focus on is her

immediate goal of finding out where the student is.

She

must learn how to achieve that goal, and the way to do
so is by learning how to ask honest questions.

There is

nothing unusual in suggesting ·that a person concentrate
on short-range goals, as a comparison with other
practices will show.

For example, a

tennis player's

long-range goal may be to play well enough to win
matches.

But that long-range goal, if it is achieved at

all, is the outcome of a series of small tasks properly
understood and properly performed.
of the tennis player is

The immediate goal

to hit the ball, and she must

find a way to do that consistently.

In order to

accomplish this goal, she must learn the technique of
keeping her eye focused constantly on the ball.

Hitting

the ball may not be the whole of the game of tennis, but
it is an essential part of it.

Finding out what the
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student believes and why he believes it is not the whole
of teaching, but, I

intend to show,

it is central to

that process, just as hitting the ball is central to
tennis.

A teacher can no more teach in the classroom by

thinking of her long-range goal--bringing her students

io

knowledge--than a

tennis player can play tennis on

court by thinking of her long-range goal--winning games.
The analogy can be worked out a little further.
There are a

limited number of techniques a

may use to help her to hit the ball.

tennis player

The use of

electronic devices and over-sized racquets would violate
ethical principles and the principles of the game as it
is now defined.

Similarly,

the teacher is limited in

the techniques at her disposal for finding out where the
student is.

Her techniques must violate neither general

ethical principles nor the principles of teachin~.

I

make the assumption that the cardinal ethical principle
governing any form of social interaction is

that it do

no harm to the other's capacity for rationality, and the
cardinal ethical principle of teaching is that no harm
must be done to the student's capacity to know.

In what

remains of this chapter, I will begin to show that
honest questioning, fostering as it does
rationality and his capacity to know,

the student's

is amply justified

on ethical grounds as a teaching technique.
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To say that a technique is justified on ethical
grounds is to say, at least,
rational action.

(9)

that it can be seen as a

Teaching itself as a practice can

only be justified if it is a practice which promotes the
rationality of the students.

Perhaps no one could be

found to dispute this: what teacher would deny that she
wished her students to be rational?

However, I

do not

think that all teachers have the rationality of the
student as

their explicit goal, and of those who do, I

do not think that all either have a clear sense of what
they mean by rationality, or mean what I mean by it.
Stated in the most general way possible, I
identify that action as rational which is undertaken for
the sake of ends in themselves.

What are ends in

themselves are persons and practices.

It is consistent

with the thinking of Kant to say that an action towards
a person is rational if undertaken in recognition of the
fact that that person is an end in himself and must be
treated as such.

(10)

It is consistent with the

thinking of Michael Oakeshott to say that an action is
rational if it is part of a practice and undertaken for
the sake of the end of that practice.

(11)

I accept

Oakeshott's position, with the qualification that such
an action can be considered rational if and only if that
practice as a whole recognizes that others are ends in
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themselves .

It may be that this qualification would be

. unnecessary given an adequate description of the concept
of practice.

But lacking that, I

include it, since

otherwise, an action undertaken in war,

to give one

example, could be considered at one and the same time to
be rational from the point of view of Oakeshott's
principle, but not from the point of view of Kant's
principle.

It is true that an action within the

practice of war might be undertaken for the sake of
warfare itself, but since that practice is an expression
of an inability to treat others as ends in themselves,
that is, as rational beings,

then one must,

if one

accepts both criteria, either define practices in such a
way that destructive behaviors are excluded from the
definition, or, as I

have done, qualify Oakeshott's

criterion so that destructive
considered rational.

(12)

prac~ices

cannot be

Actions are appraised first

of all in terms of their rationality because rationality
is the human end.

(13)

It follows from the claim that

rationality is an end in itself, and from the description of rational actions,

that to treat others as ends

in themselves is itself a human end or good, and to
engage in practices for the sake of the ends of those
practices is also in itself a human end or good.
What it means

to treat other persons as ends in
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themselves I

shall try to say below.

what it means

First I

shall say

to engage in a practice for the sake of

the ends of the practice.

Perhaps this idea can be

understood by considering the question "Why are you
doing that?" which may be asked of any action.
question has at least three interpretations.

The
It might

be a question asked from the point of view of practice,
to find out why a person is doing that specific action.
It might be a question asked about the agent,

that is,

why that person is engaged in that practice, asking,
other words, why it is a good for him or her.

in

Thirdly,

the question might be about the contribution of the
practice to human

goo~.

last question than it is

It is easier to answer this
to answer the first two.

The

answer to the question, "How does this practice
contribute to the human end or good?" is that human
rationality is a good in itself, and any practice,
providing i t recognizes other persons as ends in
themselves,
therefore,

is an expression of human rationality,
the practice is a good in itself.

To answer the second question:
baking a

If asked why

!

am

loaf or two of bread, a reasonable answer might

be that bread provides great nourishment for my family.
If the question is why

!

became a professional baker, a

reasonable answer would be because I

enjoy the practice
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of bread baking and know that good bread contributes to
human welfare.

These would be good reasons, and, given

normal circumstances, my bread baking would be considered rational action.

If I

said I

baker strictly as a way to make money,
would be irrational.

then my action

It would be irrational first of

all on the grounds that I
means (money)

became a bread

seemed to have mistaken a

for my end, and it would be irrational on

the grounds that I was using the practice for an end
outside the practice.

I was not engaged in that

practice for the sake of that practice, that is, for its
proper end, which is the end intrinsic to it.

It is,

says Aristotle,

the proper end of the flute player to

play the flute.

(14)

Writing, not money making,

is the

proper end of the practice of writing, although one may
hope to make a living at it.
The interpretation of rationality offered here
differs greatly from some modern interpretations, of
which Rawls' might be taken as an important example.
Rawls gives as a definition of a rational plan that plan
which advances a person's interests and says that "it
will generally be rational .
mature capacities.
exercise of these.
formal

• to realize and train

" since human beings enjoy the
(15)

Stated as it is,

in purely

terms, Rawls' definition of the rational not in
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terms of practices or activities, but,
of means

(rational plans)

rather, in terms

to ends (a person's interests)

appears to be consistent with that "technical rationality" referred to by Crittenden in which "we decide
upon the goal to be achieved and then devise the most
appropriate means for achieving it." (16)

Crittenden is

employing Oakeshott's analysis of what the latter sees
as the prevailing and mistaken notion of rationality.

I

have already cited Oakeshott on the nature of rational
conduct.

In the same place he says that the quality

which distinguishes rational conduct is its "faithfulness

to the knowledge we have of how to conduct the

srecific activity we are engaged in." (17)
rational if it contributes
is a part.

An action is

to the practice of which i t

From Oakeshott's point of view, not only is

rational conduct in the modern sense of means end
reasoning not truly rational, it is impossible.

Any

action which is intelligible is part of a practice and
may be described in the terms of that practice.

Which

brings us back to the first interpretation of the
question, "Why are you doing that?"
If a person is mixing warm water and yeast, a
reasonable response to the question "Why are you doing
that?" is that the water dissolves the yeast and starts
its growth.

If the mixture does not start to bubble in
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a few minutes,

then I

conclude the yeast is not viable.

ihe response suggests

that the question might as well

have been phrased "What are you doing?"
is proofing the yeast.

What I

am doing

And if the person who asked the

question next asks why the yeast starts to grow,

then

that person is no longer asking a question within the
practice of bread baking, but one within the practice of
botany.

The question "Why are you doing that?" asked of

the person who is mixing yeast with water could also be
answered, "I am baking bread."

If the questioner

persisted, asking why I was mixing yeast with water, an
appropriate answer wouid be, "Because that is how you
bake bread, that is what bread baking is."

(If I knew

you were bread baking, and I knew how to bake bread,
then it would be silly to ask why you are mixing yeast
with water, unless I knew that you intended to make an
unleavened bread.

And under that circumstance my

question might be rhetorical.)
wishes to make,

if I

The point that Oakeshott

interpret him correctly, is that my

mixing of yeast with water is not just a matter of means
end reasoning.

I

do not mix the yeast and water "in

order to," but rather "for the sake of."

I

and this is part of the practice of baking.

am baking,
He seems to

be saying, much as Aristotle does with respect to the
good life,

that the means and the end are one.

(18)

At
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least for the person who is faithful to the practice,
there is no distinction between means and ends, no
instrumental thinking.

The person who is a cook

faithful to the practice of cooking, cooks for the sake
of the practice.

A cook may indeed think of better ways

to conduct that practice, but unlike the person who
simply uses the practice, a cook would understand when,
for example, a search for "efficiency" might be
destructive of the practice.

I

take it that the action

of the person who paid his secretary to "personalize"
his Christmas cards and mail them out for him would
exemplify the irrational, since it demonstrates
belief,

typical of instrumental reasoning,

can be separated from end.

the

that means

(19)

Oakeshott's remarks are made from a point of view
within the framework of the practice.

He does not,

apparently, see practices nested or subordinated one to
the other in the way that Aristotle does.

One could,

however, ask of my engagement in the practice of bread
baking whether it is a good for me.
be asked for a variety of reasons.
at least,

The question might
For example,

today

that practice might not so readily be seen to

be part of another practice known as household economy.
Or, even if bread baking were

to be seen as a part of

the practice of household economy,

the question could be
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asked

whether~

bread baking does make a contribution

to that practice.

It may be that the local baker bakes

a bread which is better for health and cheaper than
mine, and that my talents can be more effectively used
elsewhere.

(20)

To summarize, a rational action is one

which is guided by knowhow, and is undertaken for the
sake of the end of person or practice.
directed toward persons,

If it is action

then it must have been under-

taken for the right motive,

(21) which Oakeshott says is

the "habit of affectiori." (22)
Having said what I mean by rationality, I must now
spell out in greater detail what I mean

~hen

I

honest questioning is itself rational action.
questioning is itself rational action,

say that
If honest

then it is a way

of treating persons as ends in themselves, and it is a
part of a practice, contributing to it.

If honest

questioning is a way of treating persons as ends in
themselves,

then it is a way of treating persons as

rational beings.

If honest questioning is a part of

teaching practice,

then it contributes to the end of

that practice, which is growth in the students'
knowledge.
To treat another as an end in himself is to
another in terms of his end,
of rationality.

treat

that is, as a being capable

It is to treat others as if they were

118

capable of recognizing and acting on behalf of proper
ends.

At the level of discourse,

end in himself is shown as

treating another as an

the obverse of being willing

oneself to give reasons for belief and actions.
to say,

That is

treating another as an end in himself is

manifest as a willingness
and is able

to assume another has reasons

to recognize what constitute good reasons

for belief or action.

(23)

A good reason for an action

or a belief is tha·t it is acceptable within the
framework of a practice.

An intelligible answer to a

request for a reason accounts for the action or the
belief within the terms of a practice.

The honest

questioner is acting on the assumption that the student
has reasons for his beliefs and actions and that these
may be good reasons, or,

if they are not,

reco nize that they are not.

that he will

Honest questioning

satisfies one condition of rational action.
If an action is rational,

then it is not just the

right action (justifiable as part of a practice), it is
done for the right motive (for the sake of the practice).

I

said earlier that the honest questioner was

finding out what the student believed and why he
believed it, and that it was likely that she would find
out not just his substantive beliefs, but his affective
beliefs.

Re-stating

that in the light of what I

have
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said about rationality, I am saying that the honest
questioner, who is finding out what the student believes
and why he believes it,

is finding out whether the

student can justify his beliefs and actions as part of a
practice and whether his actions are undertaken for the
right motive.
Obviously the honest questioner will only learn of
both aspects of the student's rationality if she
understands her questions to have reference to both
aspects.

"Why do you believe or do that?" can be a

request for justification within the framework of the
practice, or a request for justification of a choice of
a practice.

A teacher who asks a student why he thinks

so and so is such a bad writer (having learned that he
does think so) might be on the way to learning of the
student's motives for his presence in the course.

From

the student's answers the teacher may learn that he
believes literature is boring and is taking the course
only to fulfill a requirement.
as means to end.

He is using the course

If the student's action,

enrollment in a course,

is rational,

say his

then he understands

it to be part of a practice (or a necessary condition
for engagement in that practice)
committed.

to which he is

Unfortunately, as I have already noted in

footnote 4 of this chapter, and as is attested to by the
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transcript, I have more often than not avoided dealing
with what may be referred to as

the student's

attitudinal beliefs about the subject or course in which
he is enrolled.

It is evident from the transcript that

I did not ask students "Why are ~ doing this (i.e.,
taking this course)?" (24)
affective means is that I

What this avoidance of the
fail

to treat students fully

as persons capable of rationality,

since I do not ask

them either to consider themselves as ends or to
consider the ends of the practice with which we are
engaged.

There are consequences of this avoidance of

questions of motive.

In avoiding questions of motive

and confining my honest questions to questions about the
content of the course, I

restrict myself to promoting

one part of the student's rationality,

the part which

recognizes beliefs or actions as justified insofar as
they are acceptable within given practices.
It remains for me to show,

then, that honest

questioning may be seen as rational action in the sense
that it contributes to the end of the practice of
teaching and specifically that it promotes the
rationality of the students by bringing them to know
more about a practice.

(I use the word

"practi~e"

instead of the word "discipline,'' considering
disciplines in a narrow sense to be a subset of
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practices.)

Since one cannot engage in a practice for

the sake of the end of the practice unless one knows how
to engage in the practice,

the teacher must teach

students how to engage in a practice.
another way of saying that knowing,
knowing,
117.)

(That is but

in some sense of

is a condition of rationality.

See above, page

The question to be answered is, "Is it the case

that discussions of substantive beliefs lead toward
knowledge of a practice?"

Is it the case that the

effect of the teacher trying to find out what the
student believes and of the student trying to make
himself understood is that the student comes to know?
It is certain that at some time during such discussions
the teacher will think she understands what her student
said but reveal by her paraphrase or example that she
does not.

It can happen that the teacher who does not

understand and knows she does not asks
paraphrase or give an example.

The student can or

cannot give a paraphrase or an example.
the teacher,may understand.

the student to

If he can,

If she understands,

then

then

she gives a paraphrase or an example or a counterexample.

The student may or may not accept the

paraphrase or the example.

He may recognize that the

paraphrase is equivalent, or that the example fits,

but

may decide that what he said is not what he meant.

He
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may qualify his position.

He may, in the face of the

teacher's counterexample, abandon his position
completely.

The teacher may not be able to think of a

counterexample, and may conclude that the student has a
good reason for his belief.

The list is not exhaustive.

Other sorts of situations can occur, most of them
causing some puzzlement to student or teacher.

There is

no assurance that the student will see that he has not
said what he meant or that he overlooked facts of his
own experience, since it is possible that his position
is coherent.

But it can be said that insofar as

student and teacher are well cast in their roles,
the teacher will,

the~

then

through honest questioning (her effort

to understand his position), more often than not bring
the student to recognize that he is not sure what he
means or how to say it,

that what he said was not true

or that he has no good reason to believe it.

(25)

He

cannot account for his beliefs in terms of a practice,
and,

therefore,

student finds
about.

they are not rational.

In short,

the

that he does not know what he is talking

Given the fact that it is the end of teaching to

bring the student to know,
ignorance,

if this, awareness of

is the outcome, honest questioning does not

seem ·to have much to recommend it.

But it will be shown

in Chapter VI that this technique, although it produces
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doubt and uncertainty as its first effects, does
subsequently result in the student's coming to know.
(26)

r
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1. Faint echoes of Aristotle hover about the
belief that the teacher ought to begin where the student
is.
Although Aristotle would not have agreed that this
was necessary for a teacher of "science," he understood
it to be necessary in certain situations, as in
discussions of ethics, which proceed not from but to
first principles.
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1095b.
2. John Frederick Herbart, Outlines of
Educational Doctrine, trans. Alexis F. Lange, annotated
Charles DeGarmo (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901).
The term analytic may be applied "wherever the pupil's
own thoughts are expressed first, and these thoughts,
such as they chance to be, are then, with the teacher's
help, analyzed, corrected, and supplemented." P. 106.
The first thing to be done, "in a school whe~e many
children are to be taught together, is to make the
children more alike in their knowledge.
To this end the
store of experience which they bring with them must be
worked over •
• " p. 112.
De Garmo comments that
"From being an end of schoolwork, therefore, analytic
instruction has passed to the realm of a useful means
for arousing the mental activity of the children
concerning the regular lessons of the schoolroom.
It
is, in modern terms, an apperceptive basis for all
instruction."
P. 117.
3. The usage here is very loose.
The teacher who
is trying to find out where the student is, is trying to
find out where he is with respect to some subject-matter
in particular.
She is trying to find out what he
believes about Bruner's theory, or chemical bases, or
the presidency.
Furthermore, when I say that if she
finds out what the student believes and why he believes
it she will find out what the student knows, I mean that
she will find out some of what he knows and some of what
he does not know about a given subject.
Another point.
If the student reveals his affective beliefs about a
subject, the teacher is finding out what does and what
does not interest him.
Nevertheless, if a student
claims that he has no interest in learning about the
presidency and the teacher invites him to (in effect)
say why, it is likely that the ensuing discussion will
be of interest to him, precisely because it is a
discussion of his beliefs.
4. Although I acknowledge that I do, in fact,
fail to demonstrate the effect of honest questioning on
those beliefs which reflect the student's feelings and
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values, I shall be arguing that the teacher must take
into account both sorts of beliefs if she is to promote
rationality.
This idea is related to one of John
Dewey's: "That man has two modes, two dimensions, of
belief, cannot be doubted.
He has beliefs about actual
existences and the course of events, and he has beliefs
about ends to be striven for, policies to be adopted,
goods to be attained and evils to be averted.
The most
urgent of all practical problems concerns the connection
the subject-matter of these two kinds of beliefs sustain
to each other.
How shall our most authentic and
dependable cognitive beliefs be used to regulate our
practical beliefs?
How shall the latter serve to
organize and integrate our intellectual beliefs • •
Man has beliefs which scientific inquiry vouchsafes,
beliefs about the actual structure and processes of
things; and he also has beliefs about the values which
should regulate his conduct."
Quest for Certainti, (New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, A Capricorn Book, 1960 , p.
18.
Had the teacher in Chapter III addressed the
students' values, their feelings about the subject, it
would not have been by direct questions, e.g. "How do
you feel about the subject (history of education)?" or
"Why are you here in this course?" Given the way
schools are presently organ~zed, and the kinds of
demands made on students, such questions could be very
difficult to tackle.
However, attitudes do affect
learning for better and for worse.
And a teacher must
recognize when a student or a group of students have
feelings which interfere with their learning.
Without
for a moment implying that a teacher should do
counseling with her students, or dwell exclusively on
feelings, I do suggest there are times when, for the
sake of an individual student, the group as a whole, and
for her own sake, those beliefs which are affective in
character must be acknowledged and their reasonableness
considered.
5. I make the assumption, which I will not
defend, that the student will reveal his beliefs to the
honest questioner.
To question that assumption is to
question the very possibility of communication.
Gilbert
Ryle's words: "if you do not divulge the contents of
your silent soliloquies and other imaginings, I have no
other sure way of finding out what you have been saying
or picturing to yourself •
. I find out most of what I
want to know about your capacities, interests, likes,
dislikes, methods and convictions by observing how you
conduct your overt doings, of which by far the most
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important are your sayings and writings." Concept of
Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, A Division of
aarper and Row, 1949), p. 61.
6. The choice of "non-honest" to contrast with
"hones t" needs a word of ex p 1 ana t ion •
"Non-hone s t" i s a
term I chose in lieu of "dishonest."
"Dishonest" suggests deliberate intent to mislead or to deceive.
I
have chosen to label those questions teachers ask to
which they do know the answers "non-honest" in order to
avoid making that false suggestion.
I first heard the
phrase "honest question" when it was used by a young
music teacher making a presentation at an National
Association of Independent Schools convention in Chicago
in the 1970's.
I do not remember her name, but I am
grateful to her for the idea.
Various observers have described the peculiarity
of teachers' questions.
c. J. B. MacMillan writes:
"Teachers' questions about the subject matter are not an
essential part of teaching.
Indeed, the teacherquestion-student-answer pattern of teaching has an
element of inauthenticity, for the information ~ teacher
generally seeks by asking a question is not the answer
to the question itself, but rather information about
whether the students know the answer."
"Questions and
the Concept of Motivation," Philosophy of Education
1968: Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Meeting of
the Philosophy of Education Society, 1968, (Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University), p. 248.
In S eech Acts
An Essa
in the Philoso h
of
Language
Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press,
1970) John Searle writes, "There are two kinds of
questions, (a) real questions, (b) exam questions.
In
real questions S wants to know (find out) the answer; in
exam questions,-S wants to know if H knows."
P. 66.
The literature on questioning-has a short history.
While some psychologists, philosophers, and a few others
with an interest in schooling have thought about
questions, their nature has only recently been the focus
of a great deal of interest on the part of philosophers.
Persons interested in acquainting themselves with
current thinking on the subject may find Questions, ed.
Henry Hiz, Synth~se Language Library, vol. 1 (Dordrecht:
D. Reidel, 1978) a useful, if technical, starting point.
7. There is an interesting asymmetry in the
questioning that goes on between teacher and student.
If a student asks a teacher a question, he is likely to
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ask a "What is •
." or a "Why is •
." question.
The
assumption appears to be that it is within the teacher's
capacity to explain the existence of the objects and
events of the world.
But when the teacher asks the
student a question, if he gives what is the accepted
answer, she may well ask him how he knew.
It is as if
the student is supposed to trust the teacher while the
teacher is supposed not to trust the student.
The
student is more likely to be called on to justify his
beliefs than the teacher is.
The premises of the
teacher's syllogism are likely to be taken as the
explanation of the occurrence referred to in the
conclusion, while the premises of the student's
syllogism are likely to be taken as the reasons for his
belief.
See R. Edgley, who discusses a related point
for a different purpose, in his article "Practical
Reason," R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters,
eds., Education and the Develo ment of Reason (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972 , pp. 303-319.
8. George Gusdorf describes the person who will
"be open to the speech of others • • • continually
striving not to reduce it to the common denominator of
banality, but to find in it something original."
It is,
Gusdorf believes, necessary that the teacher be open in
this way, for "by doing this •
• by helping, the other
to use his own voice, one will stimulate him to discover
his innermost need.
Such is the task of the teacher,
if, going beyond the monologue of instruction, he knows
how to carry the pedagogical task into authentic
dialogue where personality is developed."
Speaking,
trans. and ed. Paul T. Brockelman (Evanston, Il.:
Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 125.
I believe
that the only way one could be such a listener is by
recognizing, as the honest questioner does, how ignorant
one is of the other.
9. Cf. Israel Scheffler, who writes that reason
is "a moral as well as an intellectual notion,'' and that
the general notion of rationality is "theoretically
applicable to both the cognitive and the moral spheres."
Science and Subjectivity, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis,
Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 2.
See
also John Dewey, who would object to the equation of the
moral and the rational if rational were taken in its
narrow sense, as divorced from experience, but not if
reason is understood in what he believed was a modern
sense, as "the ability to bring the subject matter of
prior experience to bear to perceive the significance of
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the subject matter of a new experience."
Democracy and
Education (New York: The Free Press, A Division of the
MacMillan Co., 1966), p. 343.
Dewey identifies intellectual qualities and moral qualities, for example
"open-mindedness, single-mindedness, sincerity, breadth
of outlook, thoroughness, assumption of responsibility
for developing the consequences of ideas which are
accepted."
Ibid., pp. 356-7.
And in James McClellan one finds "The terms
'logic' and 'ethics' are used throughout this book
(though not, I think, by most logicians and moral
philosophers) to designate those most general canons of
rational thought and action discernible at our present
level of cultural de~elopment."
Philosophy of
Education, Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy
Series (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1976), pp. 2-3.

10. "Man and every rational being exists as end
in itself, not merely as means for arbitrary use by this
will or that; but he must in all his actions •
• be
regarded at the same time as an end."
Immanuel Kant,
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 428 Ab. 46.
The
demand for consistency is part of the demand for rationality.
It accords with the demand for consistency that
I must regard others as ends in themselves, since fo do
so is to act in accord with a universalizable precept.
It is inconsistent to act on precepts I would not
willingly universalize.
11. Oakeshott writes that rational conduct is
"acting in such a way that the coherence of the idiom of
activity to which the conduct belongs is preserved and
possibly enhanced."
Rationalism in Politics (London:
Methuen, 1962; University Paperback, 1981), p. 102.
The
parallel idea in Alisdair Macintyre's thought is
expressed thus: "For all reasoning takes place within
the context of some traditional mode of thought,
transcending through criticism and invention the
limitations of what had hitherto been reasoned in that
tradition;
"
After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 206.
12. War, for Aristotle, was an activity engaged
in not for its own sake, but for the sake of peace.
While warlike acts may exhibit practical virtues, war is
not an exhibition in itself of human rationality.
"Warlike actions are completely so (for no one chooses
to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at
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war: any one would seem absolutely murderous if he were
to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about
battle and slaughter);
"
Aristotle Nichomachean
Ethics 1177b5.
I do not need here to deny that there
may be good reason not to regard others as capable of
exercising rationality.
I do, however, assert that
rationality is inherently social, meaning that the
rationality of one is dependent on the rationality of
others.
(This is different from, although it is
compatible with, the common claim that reason is public
in character, as public character is described for
example in R. S. Peters' "Reason and Passion:~ "It is
public, not just in the sense that its vehicle is
language whose concepts and rules of syntax are a public
possession, but in the further sense that, even when it
takes place in the individual's head, it is an internalization of public procedures--those of criticism, the
production of counter-examples and the suggestion of
different points of view." R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst,
and R. S. Peters, Education and the Development of
Reason, p. 212.)
It may be that I have good reason to
believe that another is going to behave irrationally,
and, in particular, to behave irrationally toward me.
Irrational behavior is a greater or lesser threat.
I
may be greatly threatened and I acknowledge that in such
a situation the action which it may be necessary to take
in order to survive is less than fully rational.
To say
that any effort directed toward survival is, therefore,
perfectly rational, is to obscure the concept.
Absurd
action may be required if I am to survive.
But this is
to admit the obvious--that the environment, especially
the human environment, can threaten and destroy our
capacity for behaving rationally.
13. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, ll77b-1178a.
In Alisdair Macintyre's interpretation: "In man's
exercise of his rational powers therefore the specific
human activity consists, and in the right and able
exercise of them lies the specific human excellence."
A
Short History of Ethics, (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1966), p. 62.
14. The function, or the good, of the flute
player is to play the flute.
Aristotle Nichomachean
Ethics 1097b25.
15. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge
Ma.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1971), pp. 428-429.
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16. Brian Crittenden, Education and Social Ideals
(Don Mills, Ontario: Longman Canada, 1973), p. 172.
17. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 102.
18. Again see Alisdair Macintyre's After Virtue:
"But the exercise of the virtues is not in this sense a
means to the end of the good for man.
For what
constitutes the good for man is a complete human life
lived at its best, and the exercise of the virtues is a
necessary and central part of such a life, not a mere
preparatory exercise to secure such a life."
P. 140.
19. I do not intend to suggest that the making of
cards, the designing of them, and the making of each
individually are properly parts of sending Christmas
greetings.
The practice of sending holiday greetings,
jf it has significance at all, is taken as a sign that
the sender spent a moment at least thinking of the
recipient.
It may be difficult to draw the lines
delineating a practice, but if none at all can be drawn,
there is no practice.
If someone does design and make a
card just for one person, it is likely to be received
not simply as a greeting card, but as a very personal
gift, and the sender has engaged in the practice of gift
giving.
Oakeshott refers to the instrumental mind "as, in
some respects, the relic of a belief in magic."
Rationalism in Politics, p. 93.
At the conclusion of
Reason and Nature, Morris R. Cohen writes that "it may
not be unfair to claim that only a rationalistic
naturalism can liberate us from false alternatives
between means and ends.
It does so by showing that
logically the end or aim of any rational conduct is not
something outside of our activity itself but a character
or pattern of life itself.
If the end is thus a whole
which includes the necessary means, it is to be judged
and justified (if at all) by the means which it
involves."
2nd ed. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press,
1953), p. 446.
20. Macintyre, A Short History of Ethics, p. 74.
And also, John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle, pp.
268-269: "the function of the intelligent or 'prudent'
man .
(is) to make the very best he can out of every
situation." (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960).
21. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1105 17a-18b,
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interpreted by Sir David Ross as: "Aristotle here lays
hiS finger with precision on the distinction between the
two elements involved in a completely good action--(a)
that the thing done should be the right thing to do in
the circumstances, and (b) that it should be done from a
good motive."
Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen,
1964), p. 194.
22. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 61.
23. Cf. R. S. Peters: "A reasonable man is one
who is prepared to discuss things," "Reason and
Passion," in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S.
Peters, Education and the Development of Reason (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 212.
And in
particular, a rational ~an honors "demands for relevant
reasons," Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, p. 2.
In her discussion of conversation, Ruth Saw
writes, "If we accept some form of Kant's maxim, 'Be a
person and treat others as persons', we must not add,
but, some creatures having the human form are not worthy
of the name 'person'.
It is safer to assume that any
creature having the human form is a person, is to be
treated as such, and is to be found worthy of being
engaged in rational enterprises, including that of
conversation."
"Conversation and Communication."
Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children 2 (May,
1980):62.
24. Ideally, students who fail to see the point
of taking a course would not enroll in it in the first
place.
Such students are unlikely to deriv~ much
benefit from it and are wasting their own time and that
of their teachers.
If by some mischance they do enroll,
the teacher ought to be permitted to counsel them out.
As the situation stands, the efforts of many engaged in
schooling appear to be misguided by the belief that it
is up to the teacher to "motivate," and the belief that
the way to do this is by some version of behavioristic
conditioning or by techniques which rely on instrumental
reasoning.
Jane Addams described the results of similar
efforts on the part of teachers at the turn of the
century: "The one fixed habit which the boy carries away
with him from the school to the factory is the feeling
that his work is merely provisional.
In school the next
grade was continually held before him as an object of
attainment, and it resulted in the conviction that the
sole object of present effort is to get ready for
something else.
Democracy and Social Ethics (New York:
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Macmillan, 1902), pp. 188-9.
Dewey speaks of the
"continuity of ends and means" on page 323 and elsewhere
in Democracy and Education.
25. See Chapter III, items 22, 23, 28, 30, 115,
after 121, 140 for specific instances.
But specific
instances do not tell the whole story.
What is more to
the point is that by the end of the discussion all the
students had become less certain of some of their
previous beliefs.
Students do find that in the course of honest
questioning they are likely to contradict themselves.
This result leads some students to identify honest
questioning with "the Socratic method."
There are
resemblances between the techniques, and the resemblances are not accidental.
But the techniques are not
identical.
A careful consideration of similarities and
differences would be lengthy.
It could properly include
a history of dialectic before Socrates, and would
certainly note the changes undergone by dialectic
throughout the dialogues of Plato.
No complete account
could fail to outline the arguments of the commentators
trying to say once and for all whether Socrates'
professions of ignorance were sincere.
The various uses
of dialectic would be described and the evaluations of
these by Plato and Aristotle would be noted.
A large
amount of space would be devoted to a presentation of
the views of Plato and the views of Aristotle on the
relationships between dialectic and knowledge and
between dialectic and teaching as these views are
interpreted by numerous modern commentators.
26. By way of anticipating later arguments, and
also by way of summarizing this chapter, I quote from
Ernst Cassirer's Essay on Man: "Only by way of
dialogical or dialectic thought can we approach the
knowledge of human nature.
Truth is by nature the
offspring of dialectic thought--it cannot be gained
except through a constant cooperation of the subjects in
mutual interrogation and reply: it is not an empirical
object; it must be understood as the outgrowth of a
social act.
We may epitomize the thought of Socrates by
saying that man is defined by him as that being who,
when asked a rational question, can give a rational
answer.
Both his knowledge and his morality are
comprehended in this circle.
It is by this fundamental
faculty, by this faculty of giving a response to himself
and to others, that man becomes a 'responsible' being, a
moral subject."
(New Haven: Yale University Press,
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1944), p.

6.

CHAPTER VI

BRINGING STUDENTS TO KNOW

In this chapter I want to show that honest
questioning does lead the student to "knowing that" and
to "knowing how," and does so despite the fact that its
immediate effects are likely to be puzzlement and
uncertainty on the part of the student, who cannot say
why he believes what he does, and cannot even say
exactly what he means.
questioning leads
how," I

In order to show that honest

to "knowing that" and

to "knowing

will have to say what I mean by those phrases.

Any teaching technique reflects a

theory of

knowledge, whether or not that theory is explicitly
recognized by the teacher.

For example,

that students remember what a

the requirement

teacher says or what the

book says, when it is the centerpiece of practice,
suggests

that a

teacher thinks of knowledge as

information, of knowing as a matter of remembering
134
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words,

or that she thinks of remembering what is said as

a condition of knowing which must precede understanding.
(1)

Those suggestions may not in fact represent the

teacher's notion of knowledge,
reflects a

for although a

theory of knowledge,

theory of knowledge.

This is

technique

i t may not reflect her

to say that while a

teacher inevitably has S?me ideas about the nature of
knowledge,

these may not be the ideas reflected in what

she does.

A teacher's ideas may not be well thought

and their relationship to

~ut

technique may not be well

It is not to be expected that teachers

understood.

appreciate the subtle problems with which epistemologists wrestle, much less

that they delay their

teaching until those
problems are resolved.
\
less,

if a

teaching

technique is

Never the-

to be justified,

then

it must be shown that the knowledge i t is intended to
lead to is knowledge in some acceptable sense of the
word.
However,

because an adequate definition is as yet

unformulated, whatever acceptable sense of
"knowledge" a

teacher chooses,

approximate.

What follows does not pretend

i t will be partial and

justification of honest questioning from
of a complete theory of knowledge.
factory complete theory.

Thus,

the word

I

to provide a

the perspective

There is no satistry

to justify honest
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questioning by describing connections between it and
those ill-defined concepts which are traditionally taken
to be the conditions of propositional knowledge.
According to that definition, knowledge is justified
true be 1 i e f •

( 2)

It is a definition that has never been

without its detractors.

Plato rejected the idea of

knowledge as justified true belief on the ground that it
is circular and regressive.
regressiveness,
proposed, having

To cope with the problem of

self-evident necessary truths have been
i~tellectual

intuition as

their source.

At the opposite end of the scale are those basic
contingent statements which refer to firsthand
experiences.

But if these two possible forms of

knowledge are excluded, what can be called derivative
knowledge is left, and it is

that knowledge which is

defined by the conditions of belief,
evidence.

truth, and

(3)

For reasons of pedagogy, a teacher may be forgiven for ignoring the question of ultimate truth and
intuited knowledge.

If there are absolute first truths

which must be intuited,

then they cannot be taught.

Nor

can basic contingent truths be taught, although if there
are such truths, students can perhaps be put in their
way.

What a teacher will be concerned with primarily

are not absolute first truths, but those which are
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relatively prior and with derivative knowledge.

(4)

A

teacher works in the middle ground, and if she knows
what she is about then she understands

that "knowledge

is rational because inquiry is a self-corrective process
by which we gradually become clearer about the
epistemological status of both our starting points and
conclusions." (5)
Given the traditional definition of knowledge,
is obviously

nec~ssary

it

that the teacher concern herself

in some way with the students'

beliefs:

if students

believe nothing,

then, assuredly,

they know nothing.

an earlier time,

it might have been taken for granted

In

both that the students would believe what they were
taught, and
students

that a

teacher should try to get her

to believe.

Today, however,

would think it presumptuous to

some teachers

try to affect students'

belief systems, and some students would object if they
suspected that a
their beliefs.

teacher was in any way trying to affect
Undoubtedly there are good reasons for

both teachers and students

to be cautious, and undoubt-

edly there is confusion as well as caution.

Both

teachers and students resist what they might take
efforts

to propagandize, as well they should.

may also not understand

to be

But they

that belief and knowledge have a

relationship to each other,

that is,

they may not think
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They

of belief as a necessary condition of knowledge.

may think of belief as referring solely to matters of
religion, politics, or values in general.

Furthermore,

they may think that the only way beliefs are affected by
others is by efforts which must be propagandistic.
Students often do not include sound argument when they
suggest the ways beliefs are formed

(perhaps because

they have been exposed to so little of it).

But even

without the confusion on the matter, difficult-toresolve questions, both ethical and pedagogical,
surround the matter of the formation of belief.

(6)

Fortunately,

the honest questioner need not address

them, since,

in her effort to try to find out where the

student is,

she is not trying to persuade him to accept

new beliefs but is trying to learn what he already
believes.
If
knows,

(7)
the teacher is

to find out what a student

then she must be able to evaluate the truth of

his beliefs and be able to assess whatever justification
he gives on their behalf.
also may seem obvious that,
student's belief false,
he believes it.

This may seem obvious, and i t
if the

teacher judges a

she will not need to ask him why

But to conclude so would be mistaken.

The teacher will ask the student why he believes what he
believes,

regardless of whether she believes what he
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believes, and she will do so for several reasons.

There

is always the possibility that she is mistaken herself,
or that she has misunderstood, which she does not know
until she hears him out.

On the assumption that the

student is capable of rationality,
chance to state his reasons.
however,

she will give him a

The most important reason,

for the teacher to ask for reasons even for

beliefs which are in fact mistaken,

is that the student

must follow them where they lead in order to discover
their inadequacies.
easily:

Beliefs do not relax their grip

i t is possible that neither a

teacher's oppo-

sition nor her evidence will be sufficient to break
their hold.

It is also imperative that a

teacher ask

the student to account for those beliefs which she
accepts as

true:

she wants to find out what he knows,

and true belief is not knowledge.
But to put the matter as I

(8)
have put it above is to

put it as if truth and justification existed apart from
each other.

That this is the case is likely to be the

assumption of most teachers.

However,

to be the assumption of philosophers,

i t is

less likely

some of whom take

the different position that truth is defined in terms of
the justification condition.

(9)

Consider the first possibility,

that we do justify

our beliefs independently of their truth or falsity.
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,, T r u t h" i n t h i s c a s e i s

take n to r e f e r

to s om e s t a t e o f

reality which exists regardless of human awareness of
it.

That is

the commonsense version of truth.

according to it,

our beliefs are

And

true or false regard-

less of whether we can or cannot justify them.

If this

is so then we can say "my belief is justified and it is
true , " b u t not "my be 1 i e f
true."

is j us t if i e d ,

therefore ,

i t

is

But we could also say "my belief is justified

and it is false,"

for the criteria of truth or falsity

are taken to be something apart from
justification.

the means of

(The naive may say that a belief is

justified because i t is

true, but there is no need to

dissect that position here.)

(10)

The honest questioner

could take 'this position on the relationship between
truth and justification, in which case,
evaluate a student's belief as

she would

true or false.

Practically speaking, what she meant by true or false
would be what is or is not received opinion.

Justifying

a belief would not be a matter of the student

ascer~

taining its
to it.

truth or falsity,

but of defending his right

The teacher could not expect the student to

discover the falsity of a belief in the course of trying
to justify it,

since falsity exists independently of our

ability to justify.
means

to justify,

Given my understanding of what it

to be discussed below,

this position
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is incoherent;

that is,

I

cannot conceive of truth and

justification in ways which allow me to see them as
independent.

(I am not, of course, denying that there

is a "reality" which exists independently of human
knowledge of it, but am asserting

that, by definition,

human beings cannot conceive of it.)

It may well be

that an argument for honest questioning could be
construed by someone who can see truth and justification
in this way, but I

cannot, and so must make my argument

on the assumption that truth and justification are not
independent.
The main alternative to the common view that truth
is independent of our ability to justify it,
we can justify a belief,
provisionally true:
mean by true.

is that,

if

then we will consider it

being able to justify!! what we

James McClellan briefly notes benchmarks

in the evolution of this position:
When Descartes says that he will accept no proposition as true that doesn't meet his tests for clear
and distinct ideas, he is saying in effect that
'true' means 'having been examined and found to be a
clear and distinct idea.'
With Kant, and more
particularly with Dewey, this redefinition of ends
in terms of procedures is made more explicit. (11)
In the interpretation of the pragmatists, we decide the
truth or falsity of our empirical beliefs according to
whether we can or cannot justify them according to some
physical

test: a warranted assertion is

true.

We have
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no criteria for determining truth apart from
of inquiry by which we justify a belief.
inquiry is

the methods

The object of

the knowledge that our propositions are or

are not warrantable.

True beliefs, understood to be

provisionally true, are those beliefs we can justify at
the present moment.

(12)

At this point, a distinction must be made.

I

have

accepted the traditional definition of knowledge as
justified true belief and said that a

teacher need not

concern herself with absolute first truths or principles.

And that is

true.

But, as already suggested,

an honest questioner will have to concern herself with
relatively first truths and this

is because the )eliefs

expressed by the student will not all be derivative,
a posteriori.

or

The student's beliefs will necessarily be

divisible into those which are a posteriori, and thus
empirical, and

those which are analytic a priori or

function as such.

The pragmatists'

description of the

relationship between truth and justification applies
only to a posteriori, or empirical propositions.
then,

is to be said regarding

What,

the relationship between

truth and justification in the case of a priori
propositions?
The beliefs the student has which reflect his way
of categorizing the events and objects of the world are
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They are those beliefs which are

hiS a prioris.

functioning for him as definitions, which describe his
concepts.

I

do not wish to take the position that

definitions are simply stipulations, or that they must
lead backwards

to ostensive definitions and ultimately

to sense data.

I

do not wish to take an empiricist

position on the matter of definitions,

(13) nor do I

wish to commit myself to an idealist view that
definitions are of essences.
about a priori propositions is

All that I

intend to say

that they describe

concepts and can be appraised as adequate or inadequate,
if not as

true or false.

concepts,

to say that they are adequate or inadequate is

to say, at least,

In the case of an individual's

that they are publicly acceptable:

the

language is not being used in a wholly idiosyncratic
fashion.

(Logical coherence must be a criterion of the

adequacy of any set of concepts.

It is likely that the

set ?f public concepts does not yet form a completely
coherent network, nor yet does any subset.
for example,

Consider,

the subset of concepts associated with the

concept of education.)
Whatever position one takes on the relationship
between truth and justification, or of the criteria by
which concepts are judged adequate or inadequate, both
sorts of belief,

those expressible as a priori and

those
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expressible as a posteriori propositions, must be
And whatever one takes to be the object of

justified.

knowledge as such--a picture of the world as it is, or
the more modest objective of the pragmatists,

the

knowledge that propositions are warranted--the methods
of justification will have important characteristics in
This claim is true, despite the fact that a

common.

priori and a posteriori propositions are distinguished
from each other precisely in the way their "truth or
falsity" come to be known.

A posteriori propositions

are those the truth of which can be determined by experiment and observation, by the skillful employment of all
the paraphernalia and
But the

equip~ent

of scientific inquiry.

tools of inquiry include, at least,

tool known as logic.

I

the powerful

say, "at least," since Dewey

argued for the identity of inquiry and logic.

Logic was

not to be

tool to

taken as it had been taken, as but a

demonstrate the truth of what was already known.
believed, as Newton and Bacon believed,

Dewey

that rules of

reasoning were "legislative of procedures as well as
demonstrative of the truth of •

• conclusions." (14)

Dewey enlarges the concept of logic,
the entire process of inquiry.
emphasize is

The point I wish to

that logic, reasoning

of, not the formal study of), is

identifying it with

(meaning the practice

the means of coming to
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know.
Now, by definition, a prioris cannot be put to
empirical test.

How would a student try to justify the

proposition, for him an a priori, "education is
everything that a person learns?"

He could be asked

whether his concept is consistent with others'
of education,
examples.

these to be suggested

concepts

to him by way of

His concept can be tested by presenting

hypotheses derived from it in the form of examples,
see if he can use the concept consistently.

to

If he can,

then he can say that learning to murder is a part of the
education of a person who learns

to murder, and he

cannot say that education is necessarily improving.

One

would want a person to justify an idiosyncratic concept,
for example, a concept of knowing that does not include
the truth condition (in some sense of truth), by showing
that it is preferable on the grounds of consistency.

In

short, a prioris, whether idiosyncratic or public, are
to be tested by means of the techniques of concept
analysis, and concept analysis, as much as experiment,
is an exercise of reasoning skills.

It is in this

perfectly obvious sense that I mean that a prioris and a
posterioris are to be justified using some of the same
methods.

Both sorts of proposition rely on the use of

reasoning skills for

their justification.

That claim

146
should cause no objection whatsoever, and yet it bears
elaboration.
i t is still not clear what is meant by justifying,
and it will not help to translate justifying as "having
evidence."

"Having evidence" does not seem to apply at

all when speaking of a priori propositions, and it is
not clear what it means when speaking of a posteriori
propositions.
What does it mean to have evidence?
can be had,

can it be given?

the evidence, does he have it?

If evidence

If the student memorizes
Scheffler comes to this

formulation:
In every case where evidence is required for the
right to be sure, knowing involves not merely having
adequate evidential data but also appreciating their
value as data, in the light of an appropriately
patterned argument •
• But what is it now to have
such an argument?
• Certainly he (the stude~
must do more than produce an accurate physical
replica of the original proof (argument) he has
seen; he must understand the proof, see its point.
(15)
What we now have is a claim that if I
evidence for an a posteriori proposition, I

have
understand

the relationship between the proposition which states
the evidence and the proposition being defended to be
the relationship "reason to believe."
is a logical one.

The relationship

If a person can place a proposition

in the context of an argument which serves to demon-
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strate the meaning of the proposition and at the same
time to show how its
tained,

truth or falsity may be ascer-

then that person can be said either to under-

stand that proposition or to know how,
least,

to justify that proposition.

in principle at

For example,

understand the proposition "Chicago is a
to be able to place it as

to

large city," is

the conclusion of an argument:

"If a city is inhabited by at least one million persons,
then it is a large city.
latest census figures)
million persons.

Chicago is (according to the

inhabited by more than one

Therefore, Chicago is a

large city."

Taking the proposition "You'll get better teachers if
you pay teachers better" to be an untested hypothesis,
one might ask the speaker either "What do you mean by
that?" or "How would you know that, or how could you
know that?" and might receive in answer to either
question (from a sophisticated student)
hypothesis is true as stated,

that "If the

then it could be shown

that, other things being equal, of two groups of
teachers,

those in the group having the higher salaries

will be better teachers

than those in the group having

lower salaries, according

to some criteria which,

agreed, will indicate better teaching."
proposition can be understood,

it is

If an empirical

then it has meaning.

Scheffler's paraphrase of Peirce, "To have meaning

In
.
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it must embody conditional predictions
senses," (16)

testable by the

an acceptable formulation if "it" is

taken

to refer only to empirical propositions.
If to understand an empirical proposition is to be
able

to place it within

th~

framework of an argument

which specifies the conditions of its justification,
what does it mean to understand what functions as an a
priori, a definition of a concept?

Understanding of a

proposition which functions as an a priori is a matter
of seeing what follows from it, of seeing it as a
premise of an argument.

What follows from it serves to

test the adequacy or inadequacy of that concept by
showing the relationship between it and other concepts,
as can be seen in the case of the example of the concept
of education proposed above.
If I

have evidence for

the truth of an empirical

proposition or can present the case for the adequacy of
a proposition functioning as definitional,
understand

the proposition.

to be a necessary,

then I

Understanding is thus shown

though not sufficient, condition of

justifying a belief, and a necessary,
sufficient condition of knowing.

though not

Justifying is linked

to understanding, and understanding is linked to
in te 11 i g i b i 1 i ty.

If the student understands

proposition in which his belief is expressed,

the
then he
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can place it within the context of argument, and

that is

to say he can speak intelligibly, in a strong sense of
intelligibly.

(17)

Speaking intelligibly is,

therefore,

also a prior condition of propositional knowledge, by
which I mean to say that the discovery of knowledge is
not the accomplishment of some sort of non-verbal
process of inquiry which results in a belief which may
then be justified in words.

The struggle to know, or

discover, cannot be distinguished from the struggle to
.communicate, or justify.
Dewey refers

As has already been noted,

to true propositions as

justified, which are,

that is,

tested through experiment.

those which can be

found warrantable when

But Dewey suggests an

alternative way of characterizing true propositions,
which emphasizes the social nature of truth.
Peirce's as

one

He cites

the best definition of truth: "The opinion

which is fated

to be ultimately agreed to by all who

investigate." (18)

Kennedy interprets Peirce and John

Dewey to be saying that
the 'truth' as here conceived implies that the
processes of investigation, if pushed far enough,
will give one certain answer to every meaningful
question.
In actual practice, however, many
inquiries are interminable and the truth value of
any particular belief must depend upon the
indefinite prolongation of that inquiry.
Characteristically, applications of the method of science
do not result in certainty but in progressive
approximations to an eventual consensus.
(19)
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consensus is

the key word.

The inquiry process is not a

private affair, for "No isolated individual, however
intelligently he applies "scientific method," can be
sure of his results." (20)

Knowledge is public in the

sense that it is a joint or collective creation of
All inquiry presupposes a "social or public

mankind.

context that is

the medium for funding the warranted

conclusions and norms for further inquiry •

• Inquiry

both requires such a community and helps to further the
development of this community." (21)
are true,

they are fated

intelligible.

If propositions

to be agreed on and they are

The world of knowledge is public and

sharable, and the struggle to speak intelligibly is a
condition of entrance into it.
Honest questioning can be seen as

the effort to

understand by a person who has, at least, an intuitive
feeling for what it means

to understand.

The teacher

who is willing to acknowledge that a student may have
good reasons for his beliefs and gives him a chance to
express these has a better chance of promoting
intelligibility than the teacher who quickly concludes
that she does understand and judges that he is right or
wrong.

The teacher as honest questioner demands greater

explicitness of the student and of herself.
conversations,

In ordinary

participants do not demand of each other
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explicitness, at least until
have not,

in fact,

they recognize

that they

A responsive

been commmunicating.

listener sometimes supplies adequate support for a
proposition, and gives the speaker credit for speaking
intelligibly even though he is not doing so.
listener may, being unable

An obtuse

to supply the necessary

supports, accuse the speaker of not making sense when
perhaps the speaker simply thought the supporting
premises too obvious to mention.
may not recognize what i t means

A credulous listener
to support a propo-

sition, will accept any proposition as stated, and
cannot be said to understand at all in a strict sense of
understanding.
equal,

It may be true that,

other things being

the greater the listener's abi.lity to evaluate

the speaker's argument,

the more likely her questions

will be to reflect her understanding of
process and

thus

the inquiry

the more effectively she will promote

intelligibility, but that is a matter I
take up.

do not wish to

I am content to say that the effort of a

teacher to find out what the student believes and why is
an effort to understand what he says,
questioning,

and that honest

itself a form of inquiry,

is well-adapted

to that end.
In answering honest questions,
find out what?

the student will

It has already been said

that he finds
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out, often,

that he is not saying what he wants

does not know what he wants

to say, and so on.

to say,
In the

case of beliefs which have empirical content, he may
find

that, on the basis of what he already recognizes as

evidence, he must modify a belief or contradict himself.
occasionally he will convert a belief to knowledge,
finding

that he can justify it.

It is not being claimed

that the efforts of a student to respond to honest
questioning will be sufficient to enable him to justify
his a posteriori beliefs.

A student may come to

understand what he believes, and that means

that he

knows what would count as evidence for it.

One outcome

of discussion might be a proposal for an experiment.

In

the case of those beliefs which function as a prioris,
honest questioning alone can be sufficient to enable the
student to recognize their inadequacy or adequacy,
although it may not be sufficient to enable him to
discover a more adequate concept to replace a

less

adequate one.
Some "knowledge that," may be one outcome of a
discussion, but this, however valuable,
important outcome.
how" which results.
that" depends on

is not the most

More important by far is

the "know

I t was said earlier that "knowing

understanding~

I

restate that claim

here in a more general, and a decidedly ambiguous form:
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"knowing how" is prior to "knowing that."

In one sense,

that means that knowledge of how to justify precedes
propositional knowledge.

The student may not,

as a

result of honest questioning, be able to justify a
particular belief, but he will learn how to justify.
That is

the sort of "know how" towards which honest

questioning leads, and I

shall say why it is a more

important outcome than "know that."
First,

the student has beliefs, as all persons do.

He may be able to convert a small portion of his beliefs
to knowledge new to him or new to the human race.

But

he cannot possibly convert all of his beliefs to firsthand knowledge.

All of us are dependent on the knowl-

edge of others.

If the species is to accumulate

knowledge,

then individuals must be able to trust others

and know when not to suspend belief until i t can be
converted to knowledge.

If we are to "share" knowledge

then we have to be able to evaluate the propositions of
others.

We do this in two ways,

first by evaluating the

trustworthiness of others in a moral sense--would they
intend to deceive?--and second by evaluating their
trustworthiness in an intellectual sense--are they
competent inquirers?

We can participate in knowledge

only to the extent that others are trustworthy.
are not,

then we are foolish

If they

to believe what they tell
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us and wise to suspend belief until we know.

(22)

Knowledge is a social product in every sense of the
It is generated collectively as a result of

phrase.

social interaction, and it is generated in an individual
through social interaction.

It comes into being as the

effort is made to share it, or,

in other words,

result of the attempt to justify beliefs.

as

the

Our chief

means of evaluating the intellectual trustworthiness of
others is our own skill at evaluating argument.
human being must,

Each

if he is to "share'' in knowledge be

able to evaluate the arguments of others, and if he is
to be able to "share" his knowledge with others, he must
be able

to place his beliefs within the framework of

argument.

He must,

in short, know what it means

how to justify beliefs.
If what I

to know

(23)

have said is true,

if "knowing that"

depends on knowing how to justify and if knowing how to
justify is of such individual and collective importance,
then the teacher should teach students how to justify
beliefs.

But the ability to justify depends on

understanding, so one must ask how the teacher can bring
about understanding.

In fact,

although we sometimes do

speak of the teacher making a student understand, we are
as likely to speak of the student's understanding as a
condition of his learning.

It is certain that we do not
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speak of teaching a student to understand.

(It would

sound as odd to ask how one could teach the student to
understand as
hear.

to ask how one could teach another to

Hearing can be trained, but only if there is some

prior capacity to hear.)

But it is the case that what

goes on between teacher and student can affect the
student's sense of what it means
particular,

to understand.

In

the teacher's effort to understand what the

student says prompts the student's understanding of what
he says.

Put another way,

the student learns

justify, by trying to justify.

to

(24)

That sounds like a psychological claim,

one that

ought to be dealt with in subsequent chapters.
sense, it is, and so it will be.

So,

i~

But it is also a claim

about the relationship between "knowing that'' and
''knowing how," conceived as a relationship between
theory and practice, which is not the way i t has
previously been discussed in this chapter.
Think, John Dewey describes

In How We

the process of thinking or

problem solving as a matter of suggestion, converting
felt perplexity into a problem, forming of hypotheses
and gathering of data,

the elaboration of ideas, or

reasoning in the narrow sense, and the testing of
hypotheses.

(25)

a

Perhaps the more accomplished one is

as a thinker the more one approaches

that idealized
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version, but if Dewey had intended that model as a
prescription for thinking,

then the same comments could

be leveled against it that Ryle levels against the rules
of logic:
Rules of correct reasoning were first extracted by
Aristotle, yet men knew how to avoid and detect
fallacies before they learned his lessons, just as
men sin'ce Aristotle, and including Aristotle,
ordinarily conduct their arguments without making
any internal reference to his formulae.
They do not
plan their arguments before constructing them.
Indeed if they had to plan what to think before
thinking it they would never think at all; for this
planning would itself be unplanned. (26)
Dewey did not intend his model to be a prescription, but a description, idealized, of how thinking
proceeds.

And he certainly did not think he was

proposing an instructional model.

Dewey well understood

the distinction between the order of knowledge and
order of learning.
Dewey on this point.

I

the

am consistent with Ryle and with
I maintain that learning how to

justify is one kind of learning how and

that it is

learned as other learnings how are learned: by practice.
Ryle describes "knowing that" as

theorizing, and

theorizing as but a kind of practice learned by
practice.

He echoes Vygotsky when he writes

that "this

trick of talking to oneself in silence is acquired
neither quickly nor without effort; and it is a necesary
condition of our acquiring it that we should have
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previously learned to talk intelligently aloud and have
heard and understood other people doing so." (27)
sal

that the

propo~ition

that'" is ambiguous.

"'know how'

precedes

I

'know

Besides meaning that knowing how

to justify this particular proposition precedes my
knowing that this proposition is

the case, i t means

that

knowing how to justify precedes my knowledge of the
principles of justification,

that is,

precedes any

explicit knowledge that these are principles of
reasoning or inquiry.

(28)

This is to echo Dewey,

echoing Aristotle: "while inquiry is
cognoscendi of logical forms,

the causa

primary inquiry is itself

causa essendi of the forms which inquiry discloses."
(29)

A few paragraphs above I

said knowledge comes into

being as a result of an effort to justify our beliefs.
It is also true that on an individual and on a
collective level our effort to know brings into being
our ways of knowing.
In this chapter I
questioning does

have argued that honest

lead the student to knowing.

I

have

ar ued by showing what is meant by "knowing that" and by
showing the ways in which it may be said that "knowing
how" is a condition of "knowing that."

In making

"knowing that" dependent on understanding,

I am making

it dependent on ability to use the language.

But
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"knowing that" is propositional knowledge and
o~ropositional

knowledge is knowledge that can be

expressed in linguistic symbols.

The distinction

implicit in the chapter is one which

i~

aptly paralleled

in the distinction between learning to say rules of
grammar and learning to use the language.

Why the

distinction is important, and hence, why honest
questioning brings
questions

the student to know, are the

to be taken up in the next chapter.
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1. It will already be obvious that I wish to
distinguish knowing from remembering, although
remembering may be a condition of belief and, therefore,
a condition of knowing that.
It would make no sense to
speak of someone with no ability to recall anything
whatsoever of his past experience as knowing anything.
But remembering is not synonymous with knowing.
That
there is a distinction between the two is apparent to
students who are required to memorize masses of material
which make no sense to them, although the distinction is
sometimes ignored by the teachers of those students.
The practice of teachers who ignore the distinction
between remembering and knowing exemplifies what is
called the "transmission of information model of
teaching/ learning."
Israel Scheffler criticizes this,
which he refers to as the impression model of
teaching/learning, in both its sensory and verbal
variants.
He does so because the student is "heir to
the complex culture of belief built up out of
innumerable creative acts of intellect of the past, and
comprising a patterned view of the world.
To give the
child even the richest selection of sense data or
particular facts alone would in no way guarantee his
building up anything resembling what we think of as
knowledge much less his developing the ability to
retrieve and apply such knowledge in new circumstances."
"Philosophical Models of Teaching" Harvard Educational
Review 35 (Spring 1965):134.
2. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Knowledge and
Belief," by Anthony Quinton.
I understand that what is
meant by each of these conditions varies according to
whether a philosopher is rationalist, empiricist,
pragmatist, positivist or other.
A teacher may wish to
find a position of safety with respect to knowing, in
territory over which epistemologists no longer dispute,
but if there is no such territory, perhaps she can be
forgiven for jumping borders if she can show that an
irresponsible eclecticism is not her goal.
An alternate
solution to the problem is offered by David Harrah: "The
difficulties with the concept of knowledge are very
deep.
No one has yet produced a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for knowledge--a definition that
works in all cases and is not subject to counterexamples.
The best that a teacher can do, if the
tea her insists on using the notion of knowledge, is to
instill in the student some caution about making
knowledge claims.
The safe locution is 'I believe that
~ is true, and I have good reasons for believing i t ' .
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Correspondingly, instead of analyzing questions in terms
of 'make me know', it might be better to analyze in
terms of 'make me believe, and have good reasons for
believing'.
There are many problems that still have to
be resolved concerning the notion of good reason, but we
are much more likely to obtain a satisfactory theory of
good reasons than we are to obtain a satisfactory theory
of knowledge."
"What Should We Teach about Questions?"
Synthese 51 (1982):27.
One easily accessible
colllection of papers on the problem of knowledge as
seen by twentieth century philosophers is Knowledge and
Belief, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths, Oxford Readings in
Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
3. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Knowledge and
Belief," by Anthony Quinton.
4. Aristotle may not have agreed.
On occasion at
least, Aristotle distinguished didactics from
dialectics: "Of arguments in dialogue form there are
four classes: Didactic, Dialectical, Examination
arguments, and Contentious arguments.
Didactic
arguments are those that reason from the principles
appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions
held by the answerer (for the learner should take things
on trust): dialectical arguments ~re those that reason
from premises generally accepted, to the contradictory
of a given thesis •
." Aristotle On Sophistical
Refutations 165b.
But H. Tredennick writes that
"Clearly Aristotle is thinking of 'dialectic,' as a
means of instruction distinct from science (which seeks
only to discover and demonstrate the truth)
"
Aristotle Posterior Analytics, trans. H. ~redennick.
Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard
University Press, 1960), p. 24, fn. b.
5. John Dewey, Quest for Certainty, p. 383.
6. The educational literature, most of which
emerges from the field of psychology, says little about
the formation of belief.
Perhaps philosophers of
education are more willing to deal with the matter.
Israel Scheffler does and is sure that the teacher ought
to affect the student's belief.
Although he is writing
from the position of one who believes that knowledge is
transmitted from the teacher, what he writes can be read
as partial endorsement of honest questioning: "It is
crucial that we recognize not only the ramifications of
belief in conduct but also the influence of motivation
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and social climate on verbal expression.
If we aim to
engage the student's belief and not simply to shape his
verbal output, we need to be able to communicate with
him.
For this to be possible, we need to create an
atmosphere of security, so that verbal expression may
approximate genuine belief.
Such an atmosphere itself
would seem to require an emphasis on rational discussion
free of constraint and free of propagandistic tendencies: this emphasis underlies the common or standard
sense of teaching."
Conditions of Knowledge, Keystones
of Education Series (Glenview, Il.: Scott, Foresman,
1965), p. 90.
7. There is plenty of research to substantiate the
belief that prior beliefs can interfere with the acquisition of new beliefs.
See, for example, the now
classic RemembeTing by F. C. Bartlett.
The interference
can occur in the form of the distortion, or assimilation
to schema noted by Bartlett and by Piaget.
If prior
beliefs can interfere in this or other ways, the teacher
has an additional reason to find out what the student
believes before she tries to implant new beliefs.
This
is a psychological matter and will be dealt with, indirectly, in the next chapter.
Psychologists, however,
are not the only ones to recognize the pedagogical value
of beginning with those beliefs a student has.
Scheffler's reference to Poincar6's essay, "Mathematical
Definitions and Education," is relevant here if one can
accept the comparability of "images and intuitions" to
"beliefs."
"Poincare' suggests the importance •
• of
respecting the initial (faulty) images and intuitions of
students in the process of mathematical education.
If
we reject these images and intuitions prematurely and
force upon the students our superior formal
constructions resting upon premises that 'seem to them
less evident than the conclusion, what will the wretched
pupils think?
They will think that the science of
mathematics is nothing but an arbitrary aggregation of
useless subtleties •
• ' Poincar~ counsels initial
encouragement of the pupils' intuitions and images so
that, working with them, the pupils will begin to
realize their inadequacies of themselves, at which point
our formal demonstrations will be welcome and
beneficial."
Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, p. 71.
8. As may be seen in the transcript, there are
many ways to ask a student why he believes what he
believes.
One doesn't always ask for reasons in those
words, although one sometimes might.
Ryle says that the
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question "Why do you believe?" is a question about
motive, not a request for a reason or evidence.
Concept
of Mind, p. 134.
Strictly speaking, Ryle may be
correct.
But however it is phrased, I do not think the
question is so taken.
I have never known anyone to
respond that they believe out of fear, or because a
belief suits their purposes or makes them feel good, and
if anyone were to make such a response, I would think it
odd, or not to be taken seriously.
People cannot always
give a reason, but they interpret the question as a
request for one.
9. The correspondence theory claims that there is
some one to one correspondence between propositions and
the world as it really is.
Whatever that means, we
cannot get outside ourselves to see whether there is
such correspondence.
Presumably, however, if we are to
survive in the world, our beliefs should correspond to
our experience of the world.
If we stick our fingers in
the fire, we will get burned.
And we will get burned
whether we do or do not believe it.
Our recognition of
the effects of our actions is a condition of our
survival, a necessary, but not a sufficient condition,
for we may after all choose not to survive.
According
to one interpretation of the coherence theory, the truth
or falsity of a statement is determined as it is or is
not "a member of system whose elements are related to
each other by ties of logical implication."
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Coherence Theory of
Truth," by Alan R. White.
It is plain that it is
possible for humans, individually and collectively, to
produce systems of beliefs which are internally
consistent but have no reference to the world, e.g.
mathematical structures.
Therefore, if truth is
expected to have some reference to the world, coherence
is not a sufficient condition of truth.
And yet it
seems also obvious that coherence must be a condition of
truth.
What can it mean to say so?
First, it is
sensible to recognize that consistency has two
dimensions.
It can refer to our efforts to categorize
the things and events in the world in some way.
Certain
phenomena which warm my body, burn it if I get too
close, are to be categorized as similar and conveniently
labelled "fire." Adequate classification schemes are
the foundation of knowledge, and categorization is our
chief and most difficult intellectual task.
It is not
one I can perform alone.
My consistency is judged by
others, and it is judged not simply by observing my
actions, but by observing my language, that is, my
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efforts to symbolize my experience.
Coherence is a
condition of communication and refers to interhuman
intelligibility.
And it may be that there is a
relationship between coherence and the description of
correspondence given above.
While we can devise a
coherent set of propositions bearing no relationship to
our experience, in practice we usually do not do so.
As
human beings we are not compelled to act but are free to
symbolize action.
Coherence does not guarantee truth,
but is a test of truth: if we disagree with ourselves,
or with others, at least one of our propositions is
wrong.
The test of coherence itself doesn't tell us
which proposition fails to correspond, and we must test
each against other propositions, or against actions.
This position is in part close to Hamlyn's:
"Interpersonal agreement provides the criterion for the
concept of truth, the point of application through which
the concept of truth becomes intelligible, and without
which truth is impossible."
The Theory of Knowledge,
Modern Introductions to Philosophy, ed. D. J. 0 1 Connor
(London: The MacMillan Press, 1970), p. 142.

.

10. It may be that most of us speak in ordinary
conversation as if we accepted the position that truth
is independent of justification.
But perhaps we do not
always do so.
We may believe that truth is independent
of our ability to justify it, but not that the ability
to justify is independent of the truth.
We may be
inclined to believe that a particular belief cannot be
justified because it is not true.
Another view of the
relationship between justification and truth is
exemplified when the reply "Because it's true," is
offered to a "Why do you believe x?" question.
The
multiplicity of positions on the relationship between
truth and justification indicate that there may be as
many lay views of truth itself today as there are
professional views.
One I find to be common amongst
students is the view that truth is entirely relative to
the believer: a belief can be true for one person but
not for another.
11. James E. McClellan, "Dewey and the Concept of
Method: Quest for the Philosopher's Stone in Education,"
School Review 67 (Summer 1959):222.
12. "Knowledge which is merely a reduplication of
ideas of what exists already in the world may afford us
the satisfaction of a photograph, but that is all."
John Dewey, Quest for Certainty (New York: G.P. Putnam's
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sons, Capricorn Books, 1960), p. 137.
Knowledge is
something else, something other than an acquaintance
with things as they really are.
Dewey wanted "a phil-·
osophy which holds that we experience things as they
really are apart from knowing, and that knowledge is a
mode of experiencing things which facilitates control of
objects for purposes of non-cognitive experiences."
Ibid., p. 98.
He argued that "the scientific way of
thinking about things does not give the inner reality of
things--it is simply an instrumental way of thinking
about things."
Ibid., p. 136.
Dewey's choice of the
word "control", echoing as it does both the idea of
man's claim to dominion over the earth and Bacon's
assertion that "knowledge is power," will not go
unchallenged in these times.
"Knowledge" may in fact be
used to control, but one can accept much of Dewey's
position without either defining knowledge as an
instrument of control or accepting control as its
purpose.
If humankind learns that fecal bacteria poison
drinking water, humankind can arrange to protect the
drinking water source from this form of pollution.
But
in this case, if control is being exerted, then it is
over man as much as nature.
If Dewey does not mean by
control "exploitation or manipulation of the
environment" in disregard of long range consequences,
then his idea that control is the purpose of knowledge
becomes acceptable.
The justification condition is sometimes referred
to as the evidence condition, and there are different
descriptions of it as the evidence condition.
Roderick
Chisholm's "the proposition must be one which, for him,
is evident," [Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 102.] may
not mean the same as Israel Scheffler's "X has adequate
evidence that Q."
(Conditions of Knowledge, p. 21.)
Leaving the question unanswered, and the differences
between Chisholm and Scheffler unanalyzed, I shall make
the assumption that, adequately interpreted, "having
evidence," "being evident," "warrantable," and
"justifiable" would not be inconsistent with each other
and would at least overlap in meaning.
13. As the quotation cited on pages 132-3 indicates, Dewey took "first principles" not as absolute
truths, but as hypotheses.
For discussion, see his
Logic, A Theory of Inquiry, especially Chapter VIII.
It is a bad example that McClellan chooses, but I
think it may be figured out from it what Dewey meant by
concept or definition: "When Dewey argues that the
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statement "This table is real" takes its meaning from
the concrete operations by which we adjust ourselves and
other objects to this table, it is clear that he means
for method to define reality and not vice versa.
This
contrasts with the common-sense notion of the chemist,
let us say, who would think that his procedures of
quantitative analysis were good to the extent that they
told him what the table was really composed of, while
Dewey is saying that the statement "The table is really
a molecular structure of form F" means that certain
concrete operations, themselves subspecies of general
philosophical method, were performed on the table."
"Dewey and the Concept of Method •
," School Review
67 (Summer 1959):222.
It is an odd example, because the
table is not defined simply as wood.
The predicate does
not define table although it may be a fruitful
hypothesis about wood.
14. McClellan, "Dewey and the Concept of •
,"
School Review 67 (Summer 1959):215.
By making reasoning
a part of or synonymous with inquiry, the illusion that
the boundary between the context of discovery arid the
context of justification can be clearly demarcated is
destroyed.
15. Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, p. 70.
In
discussing the question of the evidence, or justification condition, and a person's knowledge of his own
feelings (physical sensations and emotions), Scheffler
concludes that we must grant that individuals know that
they have a headache even though we do not require them
to offer evidence: "It would seem, then, that the
evidence condition is too strong a general requirement
for propositional knowledge.
For in such cases as we
have lately considered, a person may indeed know that Q
without having adequate evidence that Q."
Ibid., p. 60.
There are various grounds on which to differ with
Scheffler on this point.
One may admit that in some
sense of know individuals know what they feel.
One may
say with Dewey that neither direct experience of things
as they are, nor reports of things as they are, are what
we mean by knowledge.
If one is a teacher, one may
si estep the matter altogether.
A headache is a private
experience whether one does or does not want to speak of
awareness of it as knowledge, and teachers should be
primarily, if not exclusively, concerned to initiate the
student into not private but public knowledge.
Scheffler has distinguished several kinds of
knowings.
It is in consequence of this distinction that
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Scheffler writes that "While, however, there may indeed
be contexts in which knowing X conveys the connotation
of understanding X, i t does not seem plausible to make
the proposed general reduction.
A person may say
without contradiction, 'I know the doctrines of the
existentialists, but I don't understand them.' Or we may
say of a child, 'He knows Newton's laws (or Shakespeare's plays) but doesn't yet understand them.'"
Ibid., p. 17.
The knowing that Scheffler refers to here
is remembering.
While remembering may be a condition of
knowledge, it may not be a temporally prior condition.
It is not necessary to remember a bit of information
before coming to know it.
I insist that teachers should
keep the distinction between remembering and knowing in
mind, and would say with McClellan that if the student
cannot know in the strong sense, which does include
having evidence, and therefore understanding, he ought
not be required to know in the sense of remember.
At
page 70 Scheffler appears to take a position which
includes that of McClellan: "being evident" in
McClellan's terms must be close to what Scheffler means
by 'appreciating their value as data.'
See also Ryle,
Concept of Mind, p. 54: "Understanding is a part of
knowing how."

16. Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, p·. 42.
And elsewhere he writes: 11 it does not follow that the
student will know these new facts simply because he has
been informed_;____
• knowing requires something more
than the receipt and acceptance of true information.
It
requires that the student earn the right to his
assurance of the truth of the information in question.
New information, in short, can be intelligibly conveyed
by statements; new knowledge cannot .
• To know the
proposition expressed by a sentence is more than just to
have been told or to have grasped its meaning, and to
have accepted it.
It is to have earned that right,
through one's own effort or position, to an assurance of
its truth."
Scheffler, "Philosophical Models of
Teaching," Harvard Educational Review 35 (Spring
1965): 137
0

17. McClellan, "Dewey and the Concept of •
"
School Review (Summer 1959):228.
Although we do speak
of understanding the world on those occasions when we
can predict events, we do not in fact understand the
world, nor is it intelligible.
Predictability is not a
sufficient condition of intelligibility.
The motions of
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the planets are predictable but that is not the same as
saying that the motions of the planets are intelligible.
If we insist on such an equation, we are then committed
to saying that those forms of psychopathic behavior
which are predictable are intelligible.
To deny the
intelligibility and, therefore, the understandability of
the world is to quarrel with John Dewey (Quest for
Certainty, p. 210 and Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v.
"John Dewey.") if he meant that the world is literally
understandable, literally intelligible.
Perhaps most
people would take Dewey's side.
Nonetheless, it cannot
be the case that the non-human world and the speech of a
human being are understandable or intelligible in the
same way.
If the world is understandable, it is
predictable by man.
If what a person says is
understandable, it is coherent, not merely predictable.
It is when we speak of human beings as being
understandable that we approach the core of the meaning
of the concept "understand," yet further distinctions
must be made.
For sometimes we understand how another
feels and sometimes we understand how another thinks and
our understandings may not be of the same kind.
Even
the phrase "understand how you feel" is ambiguous.
For
example, we may say we understand another person when we
mean that we know or think we know what his feelings
are, perhaps even sympathize, but nevertheless say that
there is no reason to feel that way.
But in this sort
of case the word "understanding" is being pushed into
service beyond the borders of its core meaning.
I say
this not because understanding in a strict sense can
have no reference to matters of feeling.
It is well
within the boundaries of the core meaning of understanding to say that we understand how another feels
when we know why that person feels as he or she does and
believe they have good reason to do so.
We commonly,
and I believe correctly, make the assumption that people
do have reasons for feelings, and if a person has no
good reason that we can see for feeling as he or she
does, we say we do~ understand those feelings.
If we
say we understand how someone feels and mean that we
acknowledge that person has a reason to feel as he or
she does, then our usage is consistent with what I take
to be the central meaning of the word "understanding''.
We may also say that we understand when we see how
And we mean that we can see
a person made a mistake.
how they thought and can perhaps explain to them what
they didn't understand.
In a strict sense we didn't
understand their position, since in a strict sense it
was unintelligible.
But we say we can understand when
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we can reconstruct some argument so that we see how, if
they took this as the premise, they got there, or, see
bow, if they didn't know this or mistook x for y, their
reasoning followed.
When:-hOwever, a person's
procedures appear to have been quite without reason,
then we are baffled and neither understand nor know what
to do to help.
I would like to say that it is not persons we
understand but what persons say when they speak
intelligibly.
If I cannot make a case strong enough to
sustain that position, then I will retreat to the
position that the words "understand" and "intelligible"
are homonymous.
York:

18. John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry,
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), p. 345n.

(New

19. Gail Kennedy, "Dewey's Logic and Theory of
Knowledge," in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo
Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Il.: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1970), p. 83.
20. Ibid., p. 82.
21. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "John Dewey"
by Richard Bernstein.
22. Scheffler: "What seems indubitably more
appropriate in all these cases of knowing is an emphasis
on the processes of deliberation, argument, judgment,
appraisal of reasons ~ and con, weighing of evidence,
appeal to principles, and decision-making,
. It is
in terms of such principles of deliberation, or the
potentiality for it, rather than in terms of simple
vision, that the distinctiveness of knowing is primarily
to be understood."
"Philosophical Models of Teaching,"
Harvard Educational Review 35 (Spring 1965):138.
William James is quoted by Gail Kennedy as having written
"thinking is one mode among others--a peculiarly
efficient one--of adapting to an exigent environment."
"Dewey's Logic and Theory of Knowledge," Guide to the
Works of John Dewey, p. 63.
And John Dewey wrote: "By
means of symbols, whether gestures, words or more
elaborate constructions, we act without acting.
That
is, we perform experiments by means of symbols which
have results which are themselves only symbolized, and
which do not therefore commit us to actual or existenial
consequences.
If a man starts a fire or insults a
rival, effects follow; the die is cast.
But if he
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rehearses the act in symbols in privacy, he can
anticipate and appreciate_its result.
Then he can act
or not act overtly on the basis of what is anticipated
and is not there in fact.
The invention or discovery of
symbols is doubtless by far the single greatest event in
the history of man.
Without them, no intellectual
advance is possible; with them, there is no limit set to
intellectual development except inherent stupidity."
Quest for Certainty, p. 151.
23. "Those educators who stress so-called discovery and problem-solving methods in schooling may, in
fact, be operating upon the general presumption that
such methods lead to strong knowing as an outcome.
An
emphasis on teaching, with its distinctive connotations
of rational explanation and critical dialogue, may have
the same point: to develop a sort of learning in which
the student will be capable of backing his beliefs by
appropriate and sufficient means."
Scheffler,
Conditions of Knowledge, p. 10.
"We can see the whole
course of a child's education as involving the
progressive incorporation, and increasingly au~onomous
use, of these standards
• The implicit appeal to
standards of adequacy in knowledge attributions means
that, in an important sense, these attributions have a
normative function as well as a descriptive one: They
attribute belief in "Q" and affirm the truth of "Q,"
but they also appraise-the believer's grounds fo_r____
belief, in the light of assumed standards."
Ibid., p.
58.
24. The claim that the student's efforts to win
the teacher's understanding will result in the student's
coming to speak more intelligibly is not as much at
variance with ordinary experience as one might at first
think.
Although the roles are reversed, it is a claim
which finds support in the anecdote of the professor who
reported that he looked up, having said what he had to
say, and saw a sea of blank faces.
He paraphrased what
he had said and still looked out on a sea of blank
faces, and so he paraphrased again.
This time, he
reported, wrily, he understood what he had said.
Such
experiences are not unusual.
A further reason why the
student should do the talking and in particular should
talk about his beliefs has to do with what might be
thought of a motivation.
John Passmore skirts my
meaning when he writes that "A child will be encouraged
to be critical only if he finds that both he and his
teacher can be at any time called upon to defend what
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they say--to produce, in relation to it, the relevant
kind of ground.
This is very different from being
called upon, on a set occasion, to produce a case in
favour of one side in a debate."
"On Teaching to be
Critical," The Concept of Education, ed. R. S. Peters
(New York: Humanities Press, 1967), p. 198.
I would go
much further than that, saying that the student cannot
reasonably be expected to defend what he has read or
heard if he doesn't believe it, and then I would say
that, therefore, if the student is not encouraged to
defend his own beliefs, it is unlikely that he will
learn to be critical in the desirable sense.
I suspect
that one reason why teachers often fail to get students
talking in class is that they are asking students to
talk on matters about which they have no opinions
whatsoever, i. e., about what the teacher has asked them
to read.
25. John Dewey, How We Think (Boston:
1933), p. 107.
26. Ryle,

Concept of Mind, p.

D.

C. Heath,

30.

27. Ibid., p. 27.
See Lev Vygotsky, Thought and
Language, trans. and ed. Eugenia Hanfmann and Gertrude
Vakar (Cambridge, Ma.: The M.I.T. Press, 1962).
I hope
that what I have said will not be seen to be contradictory to this: "The force of the evidence condition
may be illustrated historically by reference to St.
Augustine's theory of teaching.
Augustine argues
against the idea that the teacher transmits knowledge
through words.
Words are signs referring to reality, he
says, and knowledge is not a matter simply of having the
words.
It requires also a personal confrontation with
the reality to which the words refer.
Without such
confrontation, the student may, at best, acquire belief,
but not knowledge."
Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge,
p. 55.
28. Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 41.
A discussion of
the possibility of reducing "knowing that" to "knowing
how" with reference to Hartland-Swann and Jane Roland
would be useful here, but I must forego it for now.
A
propos of the point I am making: "for it is only in the
practice of an activity that we can acquire the knowledge of how to practise it," and the whole of the essay
from which that quotation is taken, Michael Oakeshott's
"Rational Conduct," Rationalism in Politics (London:
Methuen, 1962), p. 101.
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29. Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, p. 4.

CHAPTER VI

HONEST QUESTIONING AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

I would like now to show some relationships
between honest questioning and Piagetian theory.

I

shall make no effort to summarize Piaget's work.

Taken

as a whole his
many critics,

theory is complicated, and, according to
it is seriously flawed.

some of the flaws in my discussion as I

I

shall mention
try to fit

honest questioning into the Piagetian framework, but I
leave open the question of the stability of that
framework as a whole.
accepted by all,

Since Piagetian theory is not

it might be asked why one would choose

it as a point of reference.

An answer to that question

is that it is sensible to try to show one's own
relationship to a major figure,

in order to locate

oneself;

one chooses as points of reference major

figures,

such as Aristotle or Kant, not their critics.

Critics have challenged Piaget's position at its
foundations:

on the source and nature of "structures,"
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an

on the relationship between language and thought,

yet it seems likely that much of what Piaget has
proposed--what he has proposed, for example, on the role
of activity and cognitive conflict in development--will
endure.

Points of Contact with Piagetian Theory
There are, briefly, four points I

shall make.

First, I will try to say how i t is that I
sort of relationship
opment.

to a

can claim any

theory of cognitive devel-

My effort may be seen as quixotic given that

the effects of honest questioning

("knowing that" and

"knowing how") do not seem to be effects which Piaget
would identify as cognitive development.

Second, I will

show that, while I agree with Piaget that words cannot
substitute for action in cognitive development, action
on words can be genuine action.
this point is

The significance of

that the student engaged in answering

honest questions is active, not passive.
point I

The third

will argue is that honest questioning is a form

of social interaction representative of the kind of
social interaction which is, according to Piaget,
necessary for cognitive development.
will make is related to the third:

The fourth point I

it is

that honest

questioning leads to cognitive conflict, which is
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necessary if development is

to take place.

If I

can

make these points, I will have shown that honest
questioning is justifiable from a Piagetian point of
view on the grounds

that it is likely to foster

cognitive development, and I may also have shown how the
effects of honest questioning might be explained in
terms of Piagetian theory.

Whether I

have been able to

do the latter depends on whether one accepts Piaget's
account, on whether one accepts knowing how as dependent
on or as implying cognitive development, or on whether
one accepts

that two different phenomena, i.

e.

cognitive development and knowing how can be explained
in the same way.
I will not dwell long on the first point.

I

cannot begin to establish that what Piaget means by
cognitive development is the same as what I mean by
knowing how.

By cognitive development, Piaget is

referring to the development of logico-mathematical
thinking, best exemplified by scientific thinking.
Piaget distinguishes development from physical knowledge
of the world, which includes,

for example, knowledge of

the shapes, colors, weights of objects.

(1)

By knowing

how, I am speaking in particular of knowing how to
justify, and

that means, knowing how to reason, how to

place propositions within the framework of an argument.
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Knowing how to justify is a skill dependent on, at
least,

if not identical with,

language.

the ability to use

It is a skill which clearly does include the

ability to think hypothetically, and this ability to
think hypothetically,

to reason on symbols,

is the mark

of the person who has reached the formal operational
stage of thinking.

This, according to Piaget,

highest stage of thinking.

is the

Perhaps it would be safe to

say that the way one goes about trying to justify a
belief is an indicator of one's level of cognitive
development.

It may be, but I

am trying to show that

cognitive development will be promoted by honest
questioning, which is to say that it can be promoted by
the use of words.
Piaget speaks of logico-mathematical knowledge as
discovered, or constructed, and, as is well known, he
claims that these discoveries precede language.

This is

one of the basic issues on which critics challenge him.
Piaget is claiming that logico-mathematical knowledge is
essentially non-linguistic, while others claim the
contrary.

Brian Rotman argues

that Piaget misun-

derstands "the nature and status of proof,

seeing it as

a relatively unimportant part of mathematical thought
subsidiary to the invention or discovery of structure."
(2)

Rotman, a mathematician himself,

says that there

176
are parts of mathematics,

the calculus being just one

example, "where the method of argument and not the
creation of new strutture is central." (3)
separated, mistakenly,

Piaget has

the context of discovery from the

context of justification.

"Contrary to the assump-

tions of Piaget's structuralist outlook, an important
part of mathematical creativity consists of using
mathematics as a language; a language for talking about
parts of the mathematical world itself." (4)
the efforts of Rotman and others,

Despite

the debate over the

relationship between language and thought will continue,
and hence

the question whether cognitive development is

the same as "knowing how" cannot yet be resolved.
shall assume the worst case,

I

that the two are not the

same and argue my case from that point of view.
As I

have already acknowledged, it might seem that

if cognitive development is not the same as "knowing
that" and "knowing how," then i t is absurd for me to try
to lean on Piaget for support.

The situation appears

to

be analogous to that of a farmer arguing that particular
methods of cultivation will produce firm apples on the
grounds that someone else claims they will produce juicy
peaches.

But the situations are not analogous.

I

am

claiming that honest questioning effectively initiates
individuals into public modes of knowing, and I

have
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previously shown why it may be said to do so.

It seems

highly unlikelr that one can be so initiated unless one
has achieved a high level of cognitive development, but
I

do not need to say any more about the matter.

claim in this chapter is

All I

that given the conditions of

cognitive development as Piaget describes

them, honest

questioning, which does further the growth of knowledge
in the student, also seems likely to further cognitive
development.
My second point could also be dealt with
briefly, unless one wishes, as I

do,

to discuss the

concept of activity.

The brief way to deal with the

point is as follows.

Honest questioning is a way of

using words, a way which,
cognitive development.

I claim,

is likely to promote

But Piaget emphasizes the

necessity of the child's own activity for development.
It may again,

therefore, seem odd to look to Piaget to

find support for honest questioning.

However, my

emphasis on the linguistic interaction is not intended
to imply that action on the part of the student is not
necessary for development.

The classroom environment,

especially of the young child,

should be rich in objects

of interest that invite activity, and the students'
activities ought to be the focus of attention in the
classroom.

It is these activities, past, present, or
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future, which are

to be talked about, which must be

talked about for the sake of maximum cognitive
development.

Piaget emphasizes the activity of the

student, and my main concern is
known as social interactivity,

that form of activity
in particular,

inter-

activity between teacher and student, which necessarily
manifests itself as an oral transaction.

My emphasis

reflects a belief that the kind of talk which takes
place between the teacher and the student will to some
extent determine the nature of the experience that
results from that activity, or will,

in other words,

determine to some extent what is learned.

Whether

Piaget would agree with this formulation is,
fortunately,

immaterial.

It is enough for me to say

that I accept Piaget's position that activity on the
part of the student is necessary for development.
I wish to note, however,

that it is not

entirely clear what Piaget means by "activity."

Irving

Sigel and his co-authors note that the "theoretical and
empirical characterization (of the concept)
much too vague." (5)

has been

Furth's effort to clarify--action

"is generally synonymous with behavior"--is not helpful.
(6)

The infant's grasping scheme is

the repeatable,

organized aspect of his behavior and it is that aspect
which constitutes the action.

However,

i t should not be
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understood from this
overt.

that an action is necessarily

An action may be wholly internalized and appear

to lack any physical component but it is an action
nonetheless.

(7)

As Barbel Inhelder and her colleagues

put it, "being cognitively active does not mean that the
child merely manipulates a given type of material;

he

can be mentally active without physical manipulation,
just as he can be mentally passive while actually
manipulating objects." (8)

That activity is not limited

to physical activity is a significant qualification to
the concept, and one of which I
are other considerations

shall make use.

There

to be kept in mind, but they

may be understood best in the light of Piaget's position
on the role of language in cognitive development.
As is well-known, Piaget's position is

that

those general structures through which we organize
behavior (those logico-mathematical forms of thought
such as causality, order, number, class, hierarchy)
antedate language, at least in their primitive form.
And even after language is acquired, as new structures
develop,

they result at all levels of development from

the child's actions on the world.

What is not so

well-known is that Piaget does grant that language makes
a contribution to development.

Barbel Inhelder and

Annette Karmiloff-Smith have tried to set Piaget's
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record straight.

They refer to his first book, The

Language and Thought of the Child, wherein Piaget w~ote
that "language first accompanies action as if it were a
very part of it, whereas with the gradual process of
decentration,
(9)

language can replace effective action."

Since Inhelder was closely associated for many

years with Piaget,

it may be safe to conclude on the

basis of this article that he had not entirely renounced
what he had written in this early work.

Even if it is

not safe, Qne can draw on Piaget's own later material
for support of the point that he does not wholly reject
a role for language in cognitive development.
Inhelder and Karmiloff-Smith,

in the same article

from which the above citation was made, say that the
child must go beyond the here and now, "which is only
possible through representation--in other words,
development of the semiotic function." (10)

through

For the

sake of development it is vital that a person be able to
represent reality to himself,
personal symbols, or language.

through images, objects,
If he could not, he

would be confined to the sensorimotor level of intelligence.

And so Piaget concedes that

(it) is quite possible that language is a necessary
condition for the achievement of logical structures.
But this does not by itself make it a sufficient condition of logical formation, even less
as far as the more elementary logico-mathematical
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structures are concerned.

(11)

piaget has little to say about the function of language.
in development prior to the stage of formal operations,
but, once they are achieved,

language

profoundly transform(s) thought by helping it to
attain its form of equilibrium by means of a more
advanced schematization and a more mobile abstraction •
• language indefinitely extends the power
of these operations and confers on them a mobility
and a universality which they would not have
otherwise. (12)
An example may illustrate the ability of language to
confer power on the operations of thought.

(13)

It is

possible for a concrete operational child, using Dienes
2.

blocks,
(x+l)

3

to solve the equations (x+l)
==

,

through 10.

3x + 1.

substituting any number from 2

He can use the blocks to build models:

But unless

the symbols,

or

==

the child can begin to operate on

discerning the pattern by formal

abstraction, he cannot solve equations of the general
f 0 rm

(X

+ 1 )I'\

w h ere x i s grea t er th an t en an d n i s

greater than three.
Piaget's point--that regardless of whether
language develops prior to logic or logic prior to
language,

language appears

to be, at least, a

tool

without which our logical capacities cannot develop
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fully--may be more fully appreciated by way of an
analogy.

A person may possess good balance walking on-

the ground.

But if he learns

to walk a

tightrope, he

may develop his skills of balancing to a much greater
Furthermore, unless a person's innate capacity

degree.

to balance is severely limited,
developed

that capacity cannot be

to the utmost without a

equivalent.

tightrope or its

In the absence of tightropes or other tools

more challenging than the ground, one could not notice
great differences in balancing abilities: a sidewalk
smoothes out variations in more than one way.
tightrope,

The

in contrast, by permitting the development of

capacity, amplifies differences in capacity.

So,

too,

the child's elementary operations, his rudimentary
logical structures, are developed in his encounters with
the environment.

But those logical structures may be

developed to their utmost only if he is given good
tools.

(14)

And yet,

the matter is still stated in a

somewhat misleading fashion.

For we do give children a

multitude of tools, but usually not to develop skills
unrelated to their use.

Normally, we do not give the

child a bicycle in order that his balance may be
improved.

We give him a bike so that he may learn to

ride a bike, and we give him a bike because it is
best tool we have for learning to ride a bike.

the

Piaget
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is willing to concede that a vital tool for developing
logico-mathematical structures
language.

to their highest level is

Most of us would perhaps value the capacity

to use language for the sake of its own ends.

But,

in

any case, Piaget, emphasizing the necessity of the
child's own action, would have to concede that the best
tool for developing the capacity to reason with language
is language, unless he wants

to say that learning to

reason with language is comparable to learning the
physical characteristics of the world,

that is

to say,

comparable to learning arbitrary relationships.
Language is a convenient system of notation or
representation, and some such system of notation is
necessary for the fullest development of formal
operational thought.

(15)

The person capable of formal

operational thought can operate on representations.
can, for example, operate on linguistic signs.

He

However,

it is not the signs themselves, but the student's
actions on them that will nourish his thinking, a point
deserving of amplification.
Piaget insists

that the verbal sign must not be

mistaken for the structure, and he has good reason to
insist.

Adults are only too ready to make the

assumption that their provision of a definition of a
word suffices for the child's understanding.

They are
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ready to make the assumption that words must precede the
child's efforts to learn some new skill, such as bicycle
riding.

But if the child is to learn to ride a bike,

then he must get on the bike and try to ride it.

(16)

Similarly, if the child is to acquire a concept, of
which the word is but the representative sign, he must
act.

(17)

Obviously,

the child cannot acquire his

action schemes except by his own actions.

His knowing

how to ride a bike is quite independent of any knowledge
he may have of a verbal description of riding a bike.
This point is obvious, even though it is often ignored
by parents and by teachers.
point to be made explicit.

But there is a less obvious
If the child must himself

try to ride a bike to learn to ride a bike, so,

if the

child is to learn how to represent his experiences in
language,

then he must try to represent his experiences

in language.

The adult cannot substitute his words for

the child's experience, and

this implies that he cannot

substitute his representation of experience for the
child's efforts to represent his experience.
objects and we act on signs.

We act on

We cannot substitute our

words for another's actions on either objects or signs.
I have now presented my second point.
ipated that the objection could be made that,

I anticsince I am

proposing a way of talking with students and making
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claims about their resultant use of language,

it is

absurd for me to begin to compare my position to
I am talking about words and Piaget is

Piaget's.

talking about actions.

To summarize, my first way of

dealing with the objection is

to take the term

"activity'' as signifying physical and mental activity on
objects, and to say that I

do not deny the necessity of

such activity for development.
with the objection is

My second way of dealing

to show the vagueness of the

concept of activity in Piaget's work.

Once one admits

that by activity Piaget does not mean simply physical
activity,

i t is easy enough to extend the concept to

cover .the activity of using language to represent
experience, and to say,

therefore,

that, since using

language qualifies as an activity, using language may
make some contribution to cognitive development in
Piaget's sense.

(18)

But it is not necessary to work

this hard to establish a claim that language contributes
to cognitive development.
point.

Piaget himself concedes

the

He acknowledges the necessity of language at

least for the development of formal operational thinking
capacities.
The least that can be said for honest questioning so far is

this:

the student must learn to represent

his own experience if he is

to be able to achieve the
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level of formal operational thought, which is characterized by the ability to operate on signs.

Given the

assumption that the student can only acquire the concept
of representing his own experience in signs (in a
Piagetian sense of "acquire the concept of •
through his own efforts to do so,

.

")

then, if he is to

achieve the level of formal operational thought, he must
make the effort to represent his own experience in
signs.

Honest questioning may be described exactly as a

means of stimulating the student to perform the action
of representing his own experience.
The third point I wish to make is that honest
questioning is the kind of social interaction which
Piaget says is necessary for cognitive development.
Piaget himself neither defines "social interaction,"
which one might have expected him to do given that the
word "action" appears in the phrase, nor, alternatively,
does he explicitly distinguish between forms of social
interaction which do and those which do not contribute
to cognitive development.

Although Piaget does not say

what he means by social interaction, he does describe
some characteristics of social interaction which promote
development, and I

shall list these after I

summary of his argument for the hypothesis

present a
that social

interaction is a necessary condition of cognitive
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development.
Social interaction is one of the four factors
which contribute to development.
maturation, activity, and

(The others are:

equil~brium.)

(19)

The

specific contribution of social interaction is

that it

results in decentering and as a result of decentering,
thought becomes more objective.
inverse of egocentrism, which,

Decentering is the
in turn, is described as:

nothing more than lack of co-ordination, a failure
to 'group' relations with other individuals as well
as with other objects.
There is nothing here that
is not perfectly natural; the primacy of one's own
point of view,
• is merely the expression of an
original failure to differentiate, of an assimilation that distorts because it is determined by
the only point of view that is possible at first.
(20)
Egocentrism ebbs and flows as development progreases,

reasserting itself as the individual enters

each new period of development, subsiding as the child
masters each new stage, but never wholly disappearing.
(21)

It is unavoidable, yet it is undesirable,

described as,

in the quotation above, an "assimilation

that distorts," or as an excess of accommodation:
child may, for example,
he is doing so.

a

imitate without recognizing that

Egocentrism always results in a

disequilibrium between assimilation and accommodation,
that is

to say, a failure of adaptation.

Since thought·

which is not fully adapted is not fully operational,
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egocentric thinking is not fully operational.
individual,

The

thinking egocentrically, is unable to

coordinate his own actions.

In a social context,

egocentric thinking is thinking which is not fully
cooperational,

that is to say,

the individual,

thinking

egocentrically in a social context, cannot coordinate
his point of view with that of others.

Fully decentered

thought would be formal operational thought and fully
operational thought would be equilibrated thought.

A

state of equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation is the goal,

the end point without which such

changes as occurred in the individual as a result of
maturation, physical and social experience could not be
considered development.

"The most profound tendency of

all human activity is progress toward equilibrium." (22)
Movement towards

this given

~oal

of equilibrium,

and thus to objective thought, depends on the ability to
decenter, and if decentering is to occur,
interaction is necessary.

(23)

Neither maturation nor

activity (on objects), each necessary,
produce it.

then social

is sufficient to

The actions of the child on objects may not

promote decentering since children can and do "readily
distort physical experience to fit pre-existent schema."
(24)

It is instead social interaction which prompts

decentering, which "changes the very structure of the
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individual." (25)

"Without interchange of

co-operation with others

thought and

the individual would never come

to group his operations into a coherent whole:
sense,

therefore, operational grouping

social life." (26)

Piaget refers

in this

presupp~ses

to operational thought

as thought in its logical aspect and to cooperational
thought as thought in its ethical aspect.

Both of these

depend on the decentering which results from social
interaction.

It is social interaction which leads

to

the "control and exercise of the critical spirit, which
alone can lead the individual to objectivity and

to a

need for conclusive evidence." (27)
What is particularly interesting from

the point of

view of my effort to defend honest questioning is
Piaget's suggestion that the greater power of social
experience compared to physical experience derives from
the fact that it is mediated.
media--"language ~signs),

Employing the three

the content of interaction

(intellectual values) and rules imposed on thought
(collective logical or pre-logical norms)" (28)--social
interaction compels recognition of facts,

provides a

ready-made system of signs which modify his thought;
presents the individual with new intellectual values
(the content of thought), and imposes on him an infinite
series of obligations.

The "infinite series of
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obligations" are the obligations to abide by the rules
of logic if cooperation is

to be achieved.

requires common rules or norms;

it is

"Logic

the morality of

thinking imposed and sanctioned by others." (29)
The child who wishes

to communicate with others

cannot assimilate reality wholly to his own fantasies.
If social interaction is

to be sustained,

then the

interactors are constrained by conventions of the media
which must be learned and observed.

It is inevitable

that social interaction will produce conflict, and
conflict is itself a necessary condition of development.
"All development is composed of momentary conflicts and
ineompatibilities which must be overcome to reach a
higher level of eq~ilibrium." (30)
results from

The conflict that

the effort to communicate can in turn lead

to a restructuring of thinking, although this is not
always

the result.

Many times conflict leads

decentering for any of the persons involved.

to no
Thus,

the

assertion must be qualified to read that social interaction can lead to decentering if the interpersonal conflicts so generated lead to awareness of intrapersonal
conflicts.

It is not disagreement with others but

consciousness of the shortcomings of our own thinking
which moves us

to develop intellectually.

Theodore Mischel has

(31)

tried to show that little
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more needs

to be said to explain why, when an individual

experiences such intrapersonal conflict, he is likely to
try to resolve it and is likely to do so in the direction of greater equilibrium.
transitions

The explanation for the

to be found in development "coincides with

their justification--it consists in exhibiting the
'failures and insufficiencies' of the earlier way of
thinking,

the greater coherence,

'reversibility,'

etc.,

which thinking achieves at the next stage • • • " (32)
Mischel summarizes his interpretation of

P~aget

on

motivation with the observation that to say that formal
operational thought is more logical than concrete
operational thought is both to justify movement in the
direction of such thought and

to explain it.

Points of Contact: Piaget and Classroom Practice
I now want to tease out from the masses of his
material what Piaget has said about the forms of
interaction which do promote cognitive conflict,
especially within a school setting, and to show that
honest questioning has such a form.

Piaget has not made

a systematic effort to study the effects of various
forms of interaction on cognitive development and his
comments are scattered throughout his work.

Never-

theless, what he has written is consistent with his
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position on the function of language for development and
on the nature and function of activity, or, at least, -it
is consistent with my interpretation of his position on
these topics.
In Piaget's opinion, peer interaction is more
effective at promoting the appropriate sort of conflict
than interaction with adults is.
greater effectiveness is

The reason for this

the reciprocity which charac-

terizes interaction between peers.

Productive of

conflict as they are, exchanges with peers can be
frustrating, but they effect movement to "multiperspective reversibility" and hence to more logical
thought.

(33)

I

interpr~t

Piaget to be making a claim

about what is but not about what must be.

It cannot be

the case that peer interaction is necessarily more
effective than interaction with adults.

Lt would simply

make no sense to say that an individual's intelligence
necessarily develops better as a consequence of contact
with persons of the same level of development.
theless,

in view of the fact

Never-

that, as has already been

noted in this chapter, adults frequently use words
ways which are inappropriate,
to substitute for action,
Piaget has a point.

in

in particular, use words

it must be admitted that

It is obvious

that the quality of

reciprocity is lacking in many adult/child social
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interactions,
student.

including those between teacher and

But although many adults are inept,

it does

not follow that they must remain inept when it comes to
stimulating cognitive conflict.

Piaget himself has

provided rough guidelines, noting some features of a
reciprocal relationship between a

teacher and student.

Piaget has provided a theoretical framework
describing cognitive
its occurrence.

devel~pment

and the conditions of

It is possible to justify honest

questioning by showing that it is a form of social
interaction characterized by reciprocity and stimulating
cognitive conflict.

That is,

it is possible to justify

honest questioning solely by reference to the theoretical framework.

But another way to test the claim that

honest questioning finds support from Piagetian theory
is to see how closely it fits with whatever relatively
specific suggestions for pedagogy Piaget himself made in
consequence of that theory.
of these suggestions,

There are not a great many

for Piaget did not write

extensively on education.

Many of his suggestions took

the form of criticisms of current practices, and I

shall

note these first.
Generally speaking, Piaget's

targets are the

methods which place the student in a passive role.
lecture is one such method.

So,

The

too, are some of the
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methods designed to compensate for the shortcomings of
the lecture.

(34)

The demonstration by the teacher,

the

assigned experiment performed by the student, audiovisual aids, and programmed materials, all fail to
require genuine activity on the part of the student.
Teachers make demonstration experiments as if "it were
possible to sit in rows on a wharf and learn to swim
merely by watching grown-up swimmers in the water." (35)
If the sole object of instruction was that the
student memorize the facts of a discipline,

then, of the

methods mentioned in the preceding paragraph, programmed
instruction is the most defensible: "if the ideal of
that method is merely to elicit correct repetition of
what has been correctly transmitted,

then it goes

without saying that a machine can fulfill
tions correctly." (36)

these condi-

But memorization of facts is not

an appropriate end for education (though some memorization may be justifiable as a means).
of education is, properly,

The general aim

the formation of intelli-

gence, of individuals "who are capable of production and
creativity and not simply repetition." (37)

Schools

cannot be places which concern themselves merely with
the transmission of information.

They must concern

themselves with education, for without education "the
individual would not know how to acquire his most basic
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mental structures." (38)

If the individual is to be

able to adapt to his surroundings
learn and must, most likely,

then what he must

learn in school are the

standards of logic and of ethics.
The more modern methods,

(39)

such as demonstration,

laboratory work, programmed learning machines,

fail as

the old methods did in so far as they "foster associations without giving rise to genuine activities." (40)
New methods or old,
and this is

the approach is essentially verbal,

true of audio-visual aids,

a verbalism of the image just as
the word." (41)

for "there

e~ists

there is a verbalism of

If intelligence is

to be developed,

then active methods must be employed so that the student
may rediscover for himself the fundamental
methodology of the field.

truths and

"It is not by knowing the

Pythagorean theorem that free exercise of personal
reasoning power is assured;

it is in having rediscovered

its existence and its usage."
old,

the approaches fail

And new methods or

to promote social interactivity

characterized by reciprocity.
develop,

(42)

If intelligence is

to

students must be permitted to work together.

"No real intellectual activity could be carried on in
the form of experimental actions and spontaneous
investigations without free collaboration among the
students

themselves .

"

(43)

Piaget distinguishes
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this "free collaboration" from those "collective exercises •

• in reality no more than a mere juxtaposi-

tion of individual work carried out in the same place."
(44)

However, in addition, if reasoning activity is to

be established in the child, it is necessary that the
. not merely

"surrounding social structure entail •

cooperation among the children but also cooperation with
adults." (45)
In The Psychology of Intelligence

P~aget

writes

that "in order to teach others to reason logically it is
indispensable that there should be established between
them and oneself those simultaneous relationships of
differentiation and reciprocity.which characterize the
coordination of viewpoints." (46)

The burden falls on

the teacher if anything resembling such a relationship
is to be created.

Piaget gives but a few hints

to help

her do this, hints which serve to describe honest
questioning, partially, if not completely.
teacher is

If the

to establish a relationship characterized by

reciprocal interaction,

then she must (and Piaget quotes

Rousseau approvingly on this point) begin by studying
her pupils whom she surely does not know.

(47)

That is

to say that she must herself be a decentered listener.
She must not assimilate what the student says to her own
structures.

She must learn to speak "to the child in
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his own language before imposing on him another readymade and over-abstract one" (48} providing "counterexamples that compel reflection and reconsideration of
over-hasty solutions.
teacher cease being a

What is desired is that the
lecturer,

satisfied with

transmitting ready-made solutions;

his role should

rather be that of a mentor stimulating initiative and
research." (49)
There is nothing radically new in Piaget's
criticisms of or proposals for reform of teaching
practices.

Educators from Comenius on have urged that

somehow sheer verbalism be eliminated and that
instruction be made more meaningful to the child.
Permitting the child to be, in some sense, more active,
has been suggested frequently.
are familiar

Piaget's recommendations

to students of education.

His way of

justifying those recommendations is somewhat different,
but it is not wholly unique.

For example, Piaget's

emphasis on the necessity of cognitive conflict for
development finds precedent in the Socratic dialogues
and in the work of John Dewey, and in one form or
another the concept of cognitive conflict plays an
important role in the theories of many contemporary
writers,
Bruner.

amongst them John McVicker Hunt and Jerome
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I

set out to deal with four separate points, and

now, having done so, I

find

that I

findings into two conclusions.

can collapse my

First, I can say that

honest questioning is a form of activity requiring the
student to represent his own experience in symbols.
Since representing experience in symbols is necessary if
the student is

to achieve the level of formal opera-

tional thought, honest questioning is justified on the
grounds that it is a way to satisfy a condition of
formal operational thought.

Second, I do not try to say

that the end result of honest questioning,

learning how

to justify, is the same as cognitive development in
Piaget's sense.

But I can say that this form of social

interaction does lead to cognitive conflict, and that,
therefore, honest questioning is justified since
cognitive conflict fosters cognitive development.
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1. Piaget does not dwell on the idea of concept
formation in the usual sense of concept formation.
His
concern is for logical concepts, such as the concept of
inclusion, subtraction, inside, and so on.
In The Moral
Judgment of the Child, an early book, Piaget does deal
with the development of concepts such as justice and
fairness.
But for the most part he shows little
interest in the development of such concepts as
conflict, explain, bicycle, justice, person, mother.
And in a strict sense of develop, Piaget might not think
of these concepts as developing.
(But see note 17
below.)
These concepts are surely not identical with
the physical characteristics their referents possess, if
they possess any.
Nor can they be considered identical
with any logical relationships which may be used as
partial illustration of their meaning.
In his paper
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self-regulation." Journal of Research in Science
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incommunicable.
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of egocentric thinking and Piaget makes the point by
referring to an experience many people have had.
It is
common to come upon a solution to some problem in
privacy, not recognizing the inadequacies of the
solution until the moment it is exposed to the public.
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'demand' the child to separate [sic] himself/herself
mentally (via representation) in space or time from the
ongoing observable field.
• (Distancing behaviors
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This is not to imply .
that the student ought to be permitted to do anything he
wants to in school but is to recognize that, like any
other person, a student "is an active being whose
action, controlled by the law of interest or need, is
incapable of working at full stretch if no appeal is
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44. Jean Piaget, Science of Education and the
Psychology of the Child, p. 174.
John Passmore distinguishes between problems and exercises: "wherever
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The Concept of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (New York:
Humanities Press, 1967), p. 206.
John Dewey makes a
similar point many times over.
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the genuine problem, of concern to the child, which the
child knows he has solved, and the teacher imposed
exercise.
In the case of the teacher imposed exercise,
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right answer."
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(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) p. 146 and
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50. Piaget's preferred method of observation is
the clinical interview, in which the experimenter asks
subjects questions about apparatus of various sorts.
The technique is, in essentials, like that of honest
questioning.
The interviewer does not try to correct
the subject, but tries instead to get him to give
reasons for his answers.
Piaget and Inhelder themselves
recognized that the clinical interview might be pressed
into the service of teaching.
The clinical interview,
with or without materials, may have an effect on the
child's thinking if it brings him up against "something
which surprises him or causes him to recognize a
contradiction." Margaret Donaldson, Children's Minds
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), p. 156.
When the child
is at a transition point, it is possible to create
situations and to ask questions which will generate
conflict.
It is not easy to learn to ask questions in
this manner.
Researchers at the Geneva Institute must
be trained for a year in the use of questioning
techniques before they are allowed to conduct
experiments on their own.
Howard Gardner, The Quest for
Mind: Piaget, Levi-Strauss, and the Structuralist
Movement (New York: Knopf, 1973), pp. 67-68.

CHAPTER VIII

TEACHING AS A HELPING RELATIONSHIP

Introduction
Education as a whole is supposed
student's intellect or,

if one prefers

phrasing, his cognitive development.

to affect the
the alternative
Some would say

education ought also to ~ffect the student's emotional
development.
not,

Whether one agrees that it ought to or

it is a fact that the quality of the interactions

between student and teacher has its effect on the
student's feelings.

And this is important to recognize

whether one is concerned with the consequence of those
feelings for his emotional development or is primarily
concerned with the consequence of those feelings for his
cognitive development.

While no one kind of teacher

behavior will affect all students in exactly the same
way,

it is likely that particular methods will be

distinguishable in terms of the emotional effects they
are most likely to have.

A teacher must consider the
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likely emotional effects of her teaching style and must
evaluate these in turn according to the likelihood

that

they will make possible the sort of learning she hopes
for.
In this chapter, I will show why it is

that the

emotional effects of honest questioning are likely to be
those that will permit learning to take place.
ically, I

Specif-

shall show to what extent honest questioning

may be said to-be compatible with Carl Rogers'
description of a helping relationship,

and to what

extent honest questioning is not compatible with this
description.

There are several reasons why a comparison

with.Carl Rogers' work is appropriate.

In Chapter V I

said that the teacher was obliged to treat the student
as a potentially rational person, and
treating him as an end in himself.
of Carl Rogers'

that this implied

A chief attraction

clinical practice is

that it is grounded

in the belief that one must "treat the client as an end,
• not as a means for alteration to fit some
preconceived pattern of what he takes to be normal or
healthy, or "better." (1)

Treating persons as ends in

themselves is what Rogers means by ethical behavior.
(And ethical behavior is,

in Rogers' view, not a means

to an end but an end in itself.)

Another reason to

place honest questioning in relationship to Rogers'

work
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is that this work is known to many educators, and even
teachers who do not know it directly testify to Rogers'
influence when they speak of the "facilitation of
personal growth,'' of the importance of "not judging
others" and of being "open to experience." (2)

Rogers

himself has declared that the conditions which he names
as those necessary and sufficient to a

therapeutic

relationship are the conditions of any helping relationship and in particular are the conditions of any
relationship which promotes what he calls "significant
learning."
But the fact that Rogers' work is grounded in
ethical principles and is well known does not guarantee
the soundness of all his proposals.

Some of these

appear to be based on mistaken assumptions which may be
tacitly shared by many of those who place their faith in
Rogers.

Precisely because Rogers speaks for so many,

his assumptions need to be carefully examined.
follows,

I will sound very critical of Rogers,

In what
since I

will be calling attention to a number of difficulties,
especially to various instances of a lack of conceptual
clarity.

I

hasten to say that my analytic approach does

not indicate a failure

to appreciate what Rogers has

done.
Rogers himself did not care that he "lacked formal
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clarity." (3)

Lack i t he certainly did, and i t may be

that he chose the wrong mode of expression for his
ideas.
tion,

His informal style, with its stabs at definiits references to clinical experience and to

empirical tests,

is not successful as science writing.

On the whole, Rogers' work reads more like inspirational
literature and might read better if expressed in
avowedly poetic language.

(4)

Conditions of a Helping Relationship
First of all I
honest questions

shall try to show that in asking

the questioner is likely to be

satisfying a number of the conditions of a helping
relationship.

(5)

Whenever Rogers states the set of

conditions for a helping relationship, whether he is
referring specifically to the therapist/client
relationship or to the teacher/student relationship,
set of conditions is
this is

the same.

the

The one exception to

that the condition listed first below is

sometimes omitted.

By "helping relationship" Rogers

means a relationship in which at least one person "has
the intent of promoting the growth, development,
maturity,

improved functioning,

life of the other." (6)

improved coping with
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These are the six conditions as given in Rogers'
"systematic statement of his developing theory" (7):
1. (Sometimes omitted) That two persons are in
contact.
2. That the first person, whom we shall term the
client, is in a state of
incongruence, being
vulnerable, or anxious.
3. That the second person, whom we shall term the
therapist, is congruent in the relationship.
4. That the therapist is experiencing
unconditional positive regard toward the client.
5. That the therapist is experiencing an empathic
understanding of the client's internal frame of
reference.
6. That the client perceives •
• the
unconditional positive regard of the therapist for him,
and the empathic understanding of the therapist.
The emphasis throughout is Rogers'.
condition, I will include,

As I

discuss each

if Rogers has provided them,

definitions of the emphasized constructs.

(8)

Each of the conditions offers challenges to the
understanding.

Rogers'

attempts to define his concepts

are rarely successful: perhaps

that is why the

definitions have been changed from

time to time.

While

the first condition is stated straightforwardly enough,
its meaning is not clear because the meaning of
"contact" is not clear.
helpful:

Rogers'

definition is not

if persons are in contact,

then "each person

must make a perceived or subceived difference in the
experiential field of each other." (9)

(A "subceived

difference" is a difference of which one is not
consciously aware.)

This effort to be precise is not
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satisfactory.

How could one show that one person did

not make a "subceived difference'' in the experiential
field of another and what is an "experiential field?"
Perhaps,

if one thinks of "contact" as some sort of

acknowledgment of the other,

then one can accept Rogers'

interpretation that it is some sort of relationship,
the condition then amounts

and

to a statement that if there

is to be a helping relationship then there must be a
relationship.

Rogers does not say that the relationship

must be a good one.
sometimes fail

And although teachers must

to establish a good relationship with a

student, although it may be possible that a given
teacher will not be making even a subceived difference
to a given student, I

think it can be taken for granted

that almost any teacher makes at least that--a subceived
difference--to the student.

At any rate,

i t would be

very difficult to show that no relationship and,
therefore, no contact of any sort exists between a
teacher and her student.

Thus,

I

said that no special effort needs
that the

think it can be safely
to be made to show

teacher who uses honest questions is in contact

with her students.
The third condition on Rogers'
that I

shall discuss,

list and

the second

is the condition of congruence.

In a helping relationship the person known as the helper
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"is congruent in that relationship."
as will be seen,

It is difficult,

to figure out exactly what that means.·

The work from which the conditions were quoted was
published in 1959.

There Rogers writes that in order to

be congruent "the therapist's symbolization of his own
experience in the relationship must be accurate." (10)
By "accurate symbolization" Rogers means that "the
hypotheses implicit in the awareness will be borne out
if tested by acting on them." (11)

Rogers had put it

differently, and more simply, in 1958 when he wrote
that, when the therapist is congruent, he "is freely and
accurately aware of what he is experiencing at this
moment in the

rela~ionship

incongruence fits

.

"

(12)

An example of

the description: "if he is experi-

encing threat and discomfort in the relationship, and is
aware only of an acceptance and understanding,
is not congruent in the relationship." (13)
later formulation, Rogers writes

then he

But in a

that the concept of

congruence "may be still further extended to cover a
matching of experience, awareness, and communication,"
(14) and he draws a distinction between two kinds of
I

incongruence.

He refers

to incongruence between

experience and awareness as defensiveness, and the
incongruence between awareness and communication as
falseness or deceit.

(15)

Rogers'

use of "defensive"
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concurs with standard psychoanalytic usage insofar as he
applies i t to internal conflict.
wants

But he apparently

to restrict it to such conflict,

extension by psychoanalysts

leaving out its

to include "techniques for

dealing with external situations which evoke objective
anxiety." (16)

In ordinary usage the term "defensive"

does refer to ways of dealing with what is perceived to
be a

threat from

the outside and is applied when it is

believed that the threat is merely imagi.ned or that it
is being responded to inappropriately.
this discussion is

that if I

The upshot of

am being defensive in this

ordinary sense but aware that I am being defensive,
then,

in Rogers'

defensive,

sense of the term, I

but am,

on the contrary, being congruent.

If, on the other hand,

I

am displaying defensiveness (or

any other emotion), but deny that I
(or •
is

) ,

to say, I

then I

am not being

am being defensive

am defensive in Rogers'

sense.

That

am defended against perceiving my own

defensiveness, which perception would presumably be
threatening

to me.

It is not too difficult to understand what Rogers
means by congruence between experience and awareness.
It is more difficult,

for me at least,

to understand

what he means by congruence between awareness and
communication,

or rather to understand exactly what this
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requirement entails.

Rogers himself shows some

uncertainty over what this absence of falseness either
is or implies.

As an example of falseness,

Rogers cites

the case of Mrs. Brown who was bored by the party but
says to her hostess, "I enjoyed this evening .!2.. much."
( 17)

A discrepancy exists between her awareness and her

communication, and she is,
Rogers,

false.

clear whether,

That is clear enough.
to be congruent,

saying what is false,
feeling.

therefore, according to
But it is not

the helper must avoid

or must say whatever it is she is

"Should she also express or communicate to the

client the accurate symbolization of her own experience?" Rogers asks.

(18)

He partially answers

the

question by saying that if the helper found herself
persistently focused on her own feelings rather than
those of the client,
feelings.

then she should express those

If the therapist is focused on her own

feelings and communicates what she is feeling,
is being congruent in that relationship.
however,

then she

In this case,

the feelings on which she is focused or perhaps

the direction of her focus

interfere with her ability to

satisfy another condition of the helping relationship,
that of empathic understanding.
I

shall take it that the helper is

to be congruent

in a relationship in the two senses of not being
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defensive and not being false,

acknowledging that I am

not sure what "not being false" means or entails.

If

the honest questioner is

to be shown to satisfy the

condition of congruence,

then she must be shown to be,

as honest questioner, neither defensive nor false.
would be hard

to prove,

It

but it may be that the ability

to be congruent in the sense of non-defensive is a
condition of the ability to ask honest questions.
least it is

true that the honest questioner must be

capable of accepting the fact
understand.

At

That is

about her own failure

that she does not

to say, she must not be defensive
to understand:

she must not deny

it to her own awareness, and defend herself by, for
example, blaming the student for not making sense.
understanding is

Not

threatening to many people, and perhaps

most especially to teachers, who are "supposed to know."
If,

in order to be congruent, Rogers will allow that one

must be aware of feelings, "feelings" being generously
interpreted to include experiences which are the source
of those feelings
standing below),

(see discussion of empathic underthen the question, "if she asks honest

questions is she congruent?" can be rephrased:

"if not

aware of what she is experiencing (not congruent) could
she ask honest questions?"

Specifically, could she ask

honest questions if she denied

that she doesn't
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understand?
Though it may be unlikely that one could question·
honestly yet be defensive,

just as it may be unlikely

that a woman who married for money could sustain the
fiction that she loved her husband,
ceivable that it could be done.

it is not incon-

But it is logically

impossible for a person to ask honest questions and be
false.

What could it mean to say that in asking a

question she was expressing what she did not feel?

If

she is asking, she is asserting nothing, and so she is
not saying what she does not feel.

If a

teacher asks a

student why he thinks chemistry is useless but does not
want to listen to his answer,

she may be said to be

being false--her way of asking the question may imply an
interest she does not feel--but in that case her
question could not be classified as honest.
That honest questioning is indicative of congruence within a relationship may be shown another way.
Rogers claims

that the person whose communication is

congruent with his awareness and experience cannot say
things

like, "He is stupid," or "He is intelligent."

The reason why one cannot make these sorts of remarks is
because one cannot have direct experience of another's
stupidity or intelligence, and if one is
one must refer to one's own experience:

to be congruent
"If the person

219
is thoroughly congruent then it is clear that all of his
communication would necessarily be put in a context of
personal perception." (19)

As a consequence of this

more inclusive interpretation of congruence-as-absenceof-falseness, Rogers rejects

the use of the declarative

sentence in which the other is

the subject.

So does the

honest questioner, for whom the reference point is
always
know,

the context of personal perception.
in effect,

She wants to

if this is what the student meant,

she has understood,

if

if he could help her understand.

If

the necessary and sufficient conditions of congruence
are lack of defensiveness,

lack of falseness (inter-

preted to mean communication expressed as personal
perception),

then it is fair

to say that the honest

questioner is congruent.
Unfortunately,
has been,

lengthy though the diicussion of it

the concept of congruence cannot yet be

disposed of.

If those conditions are necessary,

are not sufficient.
into account.

they

The self-concept has to be taken

"The state where the self-concept

embraces more or less all of your potentialities is
called congruence,

to signify that the self-concept has

not shriveled to only part of what you are and can be."
(20)

From this it follows

anger, of which I

that,

if I am angry and this

am aware and which I

communicate
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verbally, conflicts with my self-concept,

I

am not

congruent but incongruent, since my self-concept fails
to include at least some of my potentialities,
case,

the potential for anger.

I

in this

have no desire to show

that the honest questioner is congruent in this sense
and would not have chosen to add to the confusion if it
were not that it is

this interpretation of congruence on

which the concept of incongruence,

to be examined next,

is founded.
When Rogers states
relationship is

that a condition of a helping

that the client be "in a

state of

incongruence, being vulnerable, or anxious" he means
that the client is

to'sense a "discrepancy between the

self as perceived and
organism." (21)

I

the actual experience of the

shall take it that either the vul-

nerability or the anxiety result from

the incongruence.

It is preferable that the client be in a state of
anxiety rather than mere vulnerability,

for "anxiety is

a state in which the incongruence between the concept of
self and

the total experience of the individual is

approaching symbolization in awareness." (22)

From this

it sounds as if Rogers sees incongruence as a necessary
condition of anxiety.

If he does,

Incongruence cannot be more
anxiety has many sources .

he is wrong.

than a sufficient cause,

( 23 )

for

I may be anxious if you
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threaten my person,
self-concept.

though your threat is not to my

That is a minor quibble.

It is

true that

in a classroom situation, students often experience
anxiety and that the source of this anxiety is a
to their seLf-concept.

threat

The anxiety students experience

in a classroom is triggered by the fear

that they may

not know what they are supposed to have learned, by the
constant exposure to the risk of failure,

by the

constant exposure of their own ignorance.

(24)

The

honest questioner does not intend to threaten the
student's self-concept.

And yet her questions do

provoke in him an awareness of incongruence, since, as
she expresses her failure

to understand the student, he

becomes aware that he isn't making sense to her or to
himself •nd this experience is almost sure to be
incongruent with his concept of himself as a person who
does make sense.

If the experience of incongruence is

sufficient to cause anxiety,

then the student who is

asked honest questions is likely to experience the
anxiety which Rogers considers a condition of a helping
relationship.
A fourth condition of a helping relationship is
the condition of unconditional positive regard, which
the therapist is

to feel for the client.

Rogers claims

that "to feel unconditional positive regard

toward
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another is

to

'prize' him," (25) and it is from Dewey

that he borrows

the word "prize" used in this way.

In·

Democracy and Education Dewey wrote that
"to value means primarily to prize, to esteem; but
secondarily i t means to apprize, to estimate.
It
means that is, the act of cherishing something,
holding it dear, and also the art of passing
judgment upon the nature and amount of its value as
compared with something else." (26)
It is valuing in the sense of apprizing that implies
evaluating, writes Dewey, and it is this sort of valuing
that Rogers wishes

to avoid.

Unconditional positive

regard "means an outgoing positive feeling without
reservations, without evaluations." (27)
prizes a person without apprizing him,

Thus,

if one

then one recog-

nizes his intrinsic value as a person and does not
evaluate his worth in relationship to others'

worth.

Unconditional positive regard implies not only not
comparing one person with another.

It implies not

comparing a person's various behaviors with one another.
Directly after his reference to Dewey, Rogers writes
that a parent "prizes his child,

though he may not value

equally all of his behaviors," (28)

from which one might

conclude that a parent could be showing unconditional
positive regard

toward a child if she prized him but

disapproved of his unkind behavior toward his grandmother.

But in the next paragraph Rogers

totally
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excludes such apprizing of behavior if the condition of
unconditional positive regard is
prize another is
towards

to be satisfied.

To

to show "unconditional positive regard

the experiences of which the client is fright-

ened or ashamed,

as well as toward the experiences with

which the client is pleased or satisfied •
At this point problems arise.

. "

(29)

Why should the

helper show unconditional positive regard for,

that is,

prize,

those experiences of which a person is fright-

ened?

If a person is afraid of his own violent temper

why ought the helper prize that violence?
wishes

If a person

to become less violent, does that not imply he

has himself apprized that violence?

A person may wish

not to be shamed for his feelings of violence, may want
the helper not to gloss over his feelings of violence,
and may want the helper to accept his self-report as
true.

That is not to say he wants

Rogers'

that violence prized.

discussion of the construct of unconditional

positive regard does not raise these sorts of questions,
and he provides too few examples
clarify for oneself.
Rogers'

to enable one to

(30)

formal definition of unconditional

positive regard reads:

"if the self-experiences of

another are perceived by me in such a way that no
self-experience can be discriminated as more or less
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worthy of positive regard than any other then I

am

experiencing unconditional positive regard for this
individual." (31)

Given the criteria, I

do not see how

anyone could satisfy the condition of unconditional
positive regard and I

can understand why Salvatore Maddi

was driven to write "Rogers does not literally mean that
every possible action must be approved,
the consequences
evaluation is

regardless of

to yourself and others." (32)

to be excluded if the helper is

And yet,
to achieve

empathic understanding and if she is to communicate
congruently.

Later in the chapter I will discuss

inadequacy of Rogers'

the

interpretation of the concept of

evaluation and the consequences of his rejection of
evaluation for his educational proposals.
It has already been stated that the honest
questioner does not evaluate the students'

responses as

wrong or right, and she certainly does not evaluate them
or the student as good or bad.

If this sort of

non-evaluation is sufficient to show unconditional
positive regard,
the condition.

then the honest questioner satisfies
However, Rogers chose prizing as a

synonym for unconditional positive regard and prizing is
an attitude, not simply a form of speech.
to justify honest questioning,
V,

it was said,

In attempting
in Chapter

that the honest questioner treats others as if
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capable of being or becoming rational.
questions is
that is

To ask honest

to treat another in terms of his own ends,

to say, as if he had intrinsic value.

To treat

someone in terms of his own ends cannot be wholly
inconsistent with having unconditional positive regard
for him.
The fifth condition of a helping relationship is
no less
been.

troublesome to deal with than the others have
This is

the condition that the therapist

"experience empathic understanding of the client's
internal frame of reference." (33)

This definition of

Rogers is referred. to in Lauren Wisp''s article on
sympathy and empathy in the International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences.

Wispe gives as his own brief

definition the following:

"the self-conscious awareness

of the consciousness of others." (34)

The Oxford

English Dictionary Supplement definition of empathy is
"the power of entering into the experience of or
understanding objects or emotions outside ourselves."
(35)

This is not far from Rogers'

descriptions of the

empathic helper "who can sense the client's private
world as if it were (his) own,
'as if'

quality." (36)

but without losing the

But when Rogers adds that the

empathic helper "can both communicate his understanding
of what is clearly known to the client and can also
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voice meanings in the client's experience of which the
client is scarcely aware," he extends
empathic understanding considerably.

the meaning of
(37)

Empathic understanding is, as Rogers admits, a
condition difficult to achieve.

Given that empathic

understanding is a condition of a helping relationship,
But fortunately,

this is unfortunate.

Rogers is able to

conclude on the basis of research that "'understanding'
the client's meanings and feelings

is essentially

the attitude of desiring to understand." (38)

But to

say that understanding is desiring to understand is
false.

If Rogers is playing on two meanings of "under-

standing," he merely hints by way of single quotation
marks

that he is doing so, and he leaves the reader with

an unresolved paradox.

Furthermore,

if Rogers means

that "desiring to understand" is empathic understanding,
then he has moved far from the original meaning of
empathy.

According to Lipps, who is credited with

coining the word which is

the German equivalent,

"Einfilhlung," and with articulating the concept, and
according to the dictionary definition cited above,
empathy was

the power of entering into the experience of

another, not the desire
another.

Worse yet,

to enter the experience of

in saying that understanding is

desiring to understand, Rogers contradicts his own claim
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that the empathic helper has

the ability to communicate

his understanding.

Could Rogers possibly mean that the

empathic helper has

the ability to communicate his

desire

to understand?
It may further

the effort to make sense of the

construct of empathic understanding,
example given by Rogers himself.

if one looks at an

A therapist might say

to a client, "You resent her criticism," and in so
saying might be demonstrating that she does in fact
understand

the client's meanings and his feelings about

his mother.

Therefore, according to Rogers'

description,

the therapist has demonstrated empathic

understanding.

However, Rogers·denies

understanding was demonstrated.

own

that empathic

Rogers rejects the use

of the declarative statement on the grounds

that it is

unlikely to be perceived as an expression of empathic
understanding.

A declarative statement is

likely to be

perceived as "an evaluation, a judgment made by the
counselor, who is now telling the client what his
feelings are." (39)

The client feels

that her condition

is being diagnosed, not that she is understood.
suggests

Rogers

that the therapist form his responses differ-

ently; as for example,

"If I

understand you correctly,

you feel pretty resentful towards her criticism.
that right?"

Ordinary experience confirms Rogers'

Is
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suggestion that a response expressed in this hypothetical form is likely to be less
client.

The person who sees

threatening to the

that you're irritable today

and says so may be quite correct, but,
shows a failure to understand
didn't say so.

in saying so,

that you would prefer she

It seems that a generous or complete

empathic understanding would include the understanding
that people have feelings about not being understood,
about being misunderstood, about not being able to make
themselves understood, and also have feelings--possibly
ambivalent ones--about being

underst~od

itself.

In the

therapeutic situation many of the feelings expressed
directly or indirectly by the client are going to be
feelings about which he has feelings.

The form which

Rogers proposes for the expression of empathic understanding--a hypothetical phrased as a question--conveys
recognition of this fact

tactfully.

It looks as if Rogers'
consists of 1)

the desire

empathic understanding

to understand and 2)

ability to communicate that desire
It is quite

true that

the

to understand.

(40)

the honest questioner may be

described as one who has

the desire

communicates

to understand.

that desire

to understand and
It is also true

that the questions she asks in her effort to understand
conform to the model of communication proposed by
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Rogers.

Therefor~ it would seem safe to say that the

honest questioner demonstrates empathic understanding.·
But I

think it is not safe to come so quickly to this

conclusion.

There is some difficulty over the concept

of understanding.

There is understanding as an

emotional response, and there is understanding as I
described it in Chapter VI, which is an effort to
understand in terms of a public language, a public
context.

If it were to be shown that the honest

questioner demonstrated empathic understanding then it
would have to be shown first

that she could not very

well ask honest questions that were perceived as honest
unless she were sensitive to students'

feelings and

second that empathic understanding also depended on or
inc uded an ability to communicate one's effort to
understand in terms of public language and context.
this point I

At

can only admit that it is not possible to

show that the honest questioner invariably satisfies the
condition of empathic understanding, even though my
personal experience leads me to believe that most
students do accept honest questions as expressions of an
effort to understand, which leads

to the next point.

The sixth and final condition of the helping
relationship is

that the client perceive that the helper

does have both empathic understanding of him and
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unconditional positive regard for him.
cannot control another's perception.

The helper
But if in fact the

helper does have empathic understanding of and
unconditional positive regard for the client it is
likely that the client will perceive it.
cannot recognize it cannot be helped.

The client who

Similarly,

if the

student is capable of perceiving empathic understanding
and unconditional positive regard,

it is likely that he

will perceive the ~onest questioner as demonstrating
these qualities, and if the student is not capable of
such perception,

then it is likely that the student is

capable of learning in only the most minimal sense of
learning.
I cannot show conclusively that the honest
questioner, as honest questioner,
conditions which,
satisfy.

can satisfy all the

according to Rogers,

However, as I

that the person who,

have said, I

in fact,

a helper must

think i t likely

can habitually ask honest

questions will satisfy most of them.

If so,

the honest

questioner is likely to establish something close to
what Rogers describes as a helping relationship.
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Helping Relationships and Learning
Rogers claims

that within a helping relationship

significant learning occurs (41) and that all learning
should be significant.

Rogers appears

to be thinking of

significant learning both as process and product.
the process sense,

In

learning that is significant is

characterized by the personal involvement of the student,

is self-initiated, is pervasive,

and is meaningful to the learner,

is evaluated by

(42) and in the

product sense, significant learning results in a more
fully functioning person.
learning within a

In consequence of significant

therapeutic situation:

The person comes to see himself differently.
He
acc~pts himself and his feelings more fully.
He
becomes more self-confident and self-directing.
He
becomes more the person he would like to be.
He
becomes more flexible, less rigid, in his perceptions.
He adopts more realistic goals for
himself.
He behaves in a more mature fashion.
He
changes his maladjustive behaviors, even such a
long-established one as chronic alcoholism.
He
becomes more acceptant of others.
He becomes more
open to the evidence, both to what is going on
outside of himself, and to what is going on inside
of himself.
He changes in his basic personality
characteristics, in constructive ways. (43)
Presumably,

significant learning in the classroom

would have similar results.

Rogers characterizes such

learning as learning which makes a difference,
functional,
(44)

and pervades

is

the person and his actions.

Because this sort of learning is not the sort that
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commonly occurs in schools, Rogers is critical of
classroom practices, critical in particular of the
imposition of knowledge by teachers who often think of
themselves principally as lecturers and who are constantly evaluating.

In his opinion,

cannot lead to significant learning.
sympathy with Rogers'

objection to

these practices
Certainly I am in

the definition of

knowledge as information and to constant lecturing by
teachers.
inadequate.

But his proposals for reform seem to me to be
They are inadequate partly because they are

based on an inadequate interpretation of significant
learning, which in turn derives from an inadequate
interpretation of a cluster of concepts,
subjective, objective,

including

conflict and evaluate.

In this

section, as in the previous section, my objections are
objections to Rogers'
If it is

concepts.

true that a helping relationship results

in significant learning,
questioning satisfies

then,

to the extent that honest

the conditions of a helping

relationship it results in significant learning, and no
more need be said.

But I

have not been able to show

that honest questioning does necessarily satisfy the
requisite conditions of a helping relationship.

The

honest questioner knows that she may not understand what
the student says, and since, in that case,

she can
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hardly be said to prize what he says,

it is difficult to

attribute to her unconditional positive regard.

Fur-.

thermore, whether her way of dealing with her uncertainty of understanding does or does not demonstrate
empathic understanding depends on which of

~ogers'

definitions of empathic understanding one is using.
Nevertheless I

claim that honest questioning does result

in significant learning, and intend to show that this is
plausible by showing how Rogers' concept of significant
learning is inadequate.
Rogers claims that "significant learning occurs
more readily in situations perceived as problems." (45)
One sort of problem is a state of incongruence which is
the result of the student becoming aware of the gap
between self-concept and self-experience.

For example,

a student engaged in the process of significant learning
may learn that he is prejudiced, which fact may conflict
with his self-concept.
student in some way.
learning.

(46)

This learning changes the
That is what makes it significant

Rogers also writes that "significant

learning takes place when the subject matter is perceived by the student as having relevance for his own
purposes." (47)
asks us

To exemplify this sort of situation, he

to think of two students taking a course in

statistics, one of whom is fulfilling a course re-
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quirement, while the other is learning what he knows he
needs

to complete a research project.

The latter

student finds his learning meaningful, as any student
does when he is learning what will help him solve his
problems.

Rogers offers no examples of other kinds of

problems which might lead to significant learning, which
does not mean he does not think there are other kinds.
And of course other sorts of problem can be sources from
which significant learning can spring.

A third sort of

problem can arise for a student when he is confronted
with different theories.

Suppose a student has read

Rogers and read Skinner and is bewildered.

He wants to

believe Rogers, yet is unable to refute Skinner.

This

is not the sort of problem that will drive a client to
therapy, yet it can produce painful tension and may be
vrounded in incongruence.

The student may find Rogers'

ideas more in keeping with his deepest beliefs about
man, and

thus about himself and,

therefore,

the fact

that Skinner cannot be easily refuted is threatening to
his self-concept.

There is at least a fourth kind of

problem which engages students' attention, and this is
the kind of problem which is like a puzzle, one in which
the self-concept may not be at all at risk.

Rogers

omits from his characterization of problems "puzzles''
undertaken for the sheer pleasure of trying

to solve
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them,

simply out of an urge to understand or exercise

one's capacities, but the resultant learning is no more
inconsequential than is

the learning that results from

the play of young animals.
significant learning is
variety of problems
important,

My first conclusion about

that it can arise from a wider

than Rogers specifies.

That is

since it may be that a variety of problems

requires a variety of conditions for solution, and also
that there will be differences in what counts as a
solution, as significant learning in the product sense.
First, under what conditions can persons deal
effectively with problems?

Rogers has one answer,

"learning, particularly. if it is significant,
threatening thing." (48)

Certainly when the outcome of

significant learning is greater congruence,
the case

that learning is threatening.

to become more congruent,

it must be

If a person is

then he must recognize his own

incongruence and that recognition is
says Rogers,

is often a

threatening.

But,

the threat from external sources can be and

must be minimized if significant learning is to take
place and this is exactly what the conditions of the
helping relationship are intended to do.

The helper who

provides empathic understanding and unconditional
positive regard satisfies the others' need for
acceptance and

thus

the level of threat may be kept
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within the range at which significant learning can
occur.

(49)

Keeping threat to a minimum, says Rogers,

is all i t takes to make significant learning possible.
Furthermore, one can do no more than this.

(50)

The

helper cannot assist or speed up the process of significant learning by telling the other what to do or what
to think.

To support this point, Rogers cites both his

own clinical experience, and research by Heine, who
found

that in therapeutic situations, clients perceived

the therapist's direct advice to be unhelvful.

(51)

advice is unhelpful, and i t is quite unnecessary,

The

for

the fact is that given the conditions of a helping
relationship,

learning occurs and that learning is

progressive, not retrogressive.

(52)

While I would agree with both Rogers (and with
Piaget)

that it is probably futile,

and possibly hurtful

to point out to the student inconsistencies between
beliefs, or beliefs and actions,

or actions and actions,

since he may fail to recognize the inconsistencies or
may find

them too threatening, I do not think the

teacher must remain as passive as Rogers says a helper
should be.

Rogers,

himself, does recognize that there

are some differences between significant learning in
psychotherapy and significant learning in a school
setting.

For him,

the principal difference seems

to be
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that in a

school setting,

the student (unlike a client

in therapy) does not have all the data he needs
his problems.

to solve

But it is not up to the teacher to decide

when or what information he needs,

so Rogers casts the

teacher in the role of a resource person, who can make
information available to the student on demand.
role is still a passive one,

The

that of a kind librarian, a

non-threatening person who gives no advice unless it is
asked for.
this.

But I

What more

believe there is more to teaching than
there may be can be seen by considering

whether the various kinds of problems outlined can in
fact all be dealt with in the way Rogers proposes.
It may be that the sort of incongruence experienced by the client in therapy can best be resolved
using Rogers'
mirror."

approach, by talking

to a "reflecting

It may be that certain sorts of problems can

best be solved by doing in Rogers'

sense of doing, by

"placing the student in direct experiential
confrontation with practical problems, social problems,
ethical problems and philosophical problems, personal
issues, and research problems,

(which)

is one of the

most effective modes of promoting learning." (53)
the sort of problem referred to above,

But

in which the

student could not make a choice between Skinner and
Rogers, while it involves

the self-concept,

is resolved
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differently.

One thinks about it and one acquires

information, and one

talks, but not as if to one's

doting grandmother who smiles and nods her head.

When

considering a choice of principles, whether in the
physical or the social sciences, one talks with others,
exchanging views.

Even the fourth sort of problem,

the

puzzle sort, which may be thought of as presenting the
purest cognitive challenge,
problem,

~

that is, a reasoning

be solved more readily (see Chapter VII) as

a result of social interaction which brings with
other points of view.

~t

Rogers allows for the existence

of only two possible sorts of relationships between the
helper and the helped, one in which the helper is
authoritarian and

the helped is passive, and one in

which the helped is active and helper is passive.

He

does not consider the third possibility of interaction
between the helper and the one being helped.

(54)

About the "puzzle'' sort of problem another observation may be made.

It may be true that the more

serious a problem is

the more commanding of attention it

is.

But Bruner has suggested that if learning is to be

readily

transferable,

then it takes place in conditions

of playfulness and of freedom from excessive drive.

(55)

Rogers said that significant learning took place in the
context of problems, and his description of problems
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clearly indicates
trouble.

I

that to him problem is always a

have tried to show that significant learning

(learning that makes a difference)
variety of problems, and
characterized as

can result from a

that these cannot all be

troubles.

Rogers'

paradigm model of

the sort of problem that results in significant learning
is the problem of incongruence, and
some problem.

But Rogers has said

that is a

trouble-

that significant

learning is more likely to result when the student is
personally involved and his effort self-initiated.

And

that is another way of saying that significant learning
is more likely to occur in the context of problems, and
is at the same time another way, and a better one, of
defining the student's problem.
The honest questioner recognizes that the student
is likely to learn better when his attention is engaged.
Her questions are addressed

to his beliefs and

these

beliefs, about himself or about the world, are matters
of some concern to him and rather easily engage his
attention.

As

the

problems emerge.

teacher asks honest questions,
The student finds

that he has no good

reason to believe what he does, or finds

that some of

his beliefs are inconsistent, or that they do not quite
make sense.

Whether these problems will be

troubles or

puzzles or some other sort of problem depends on a
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variety of factors.

The point is that the teacher,

although she does not give the student problems, has an
active role in bringing those he has into awareness.
In his description of significant learning, Rogers
seems to have made a mistake parallel to one many
teachers make in our time, although the mistake was
called to the attention of the teaching community by
Dewey sixty years ago, and more recently by P. H. Hirst
and R. S. Peters.

The mistake concerns the most

important matter of interest.

Dewey distinguished

between three uses of ''interest:" as engagements or
involvements, as what touches or influences a person,
and as attitudes towards some object or other.

Dewey

wrote that the pedagogical problem is to "nurture his
(the student's) sympathetic interest in characteristic
traits of the world in which he lives" (56), and it is
clear that he objected to "making interesting by
extraneous and artificial inducements." (57)

Ideally,

the three interests would coincide, and it is part of
the teacher's problem to help the child to care about
and engage in what does

touch him.

P. H. Hirst and R.

S. Peters make a useful distinction between interest in
the psychological sense and interest in the valuative
sense.

(58)

The psychological interpretation of

"interest'' has motivational relevance,

since it refers
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to what catches

the child's attention.

interpretation of the notion refers
the child's interest.

The valuative

to whatever is in

Hirst and Peters do not think

that these two sorts of interest will necessarily
coincide in the child.

The pedagogical problem is one

of beginning with what interests the child and leading
him to recognize what is in his interest.
An enthusiastic follower of Rogers might say that
she wanted her students to learn what is significant to
them, failing

to notice that the word "significant" is

ambiguous in a way parallel to the way the word
"interest" is ambiguous.

Would she mean she wanted

students to learn about what they already considered
significant or that she wanted them to recognize the
significance of what perhaps

they did not want to learn?

In one sense significant learning is learning that
begins with what is already of concern or interest to
one.

In another sense, significant learning is

significance learning,
significant to one.

that is,

learning what is

This still does not sort out the

ambiguities well enough.

Consider the case of a person

who is wholly negligent of his diet, who learns about
the effects of that diet on his health.

Objectively,

this learning is significant, but unless he learns
care about what he learns,

to

that learning is subjectively
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insignificant.
learnin~

In the fullest sense, significant

would be that learning in which the sub-

jectively and the objectively significant coincide.
In other words, "significance " too, may be
thought of as having a psychological and a valuative
sense.

Of course Rogers wouldn't intend the valuative

sense of significant learning.

He makes very clear that

evaluation is a source of threat, one that should be
dispensed with, and in his mind it is closely linked to
the concept of control.

Rogers has no wish to control

and he does not wish to choose for others.

Rogers'

consistent refusal to choose for another explains some
features of his list of the outcomes of therapy.
page 231.)

(See

Not one of the outcomes is a specific skill

or a specific content.
goods for man.

Rogers acknowledges no specific

Fully functioningness is to Rogers what

rationality is for Rawls:

a purely formal concept.

But it does not follow from the fact that I
"ch'oose" others' goals for them,
fact as good as another.

(59)

ought not

that one goal is in

I may recognize that it is

objectively in your best interest to be healthy even
though I

ought not force you to take steps to protect

your health.

(60)

The difficulties

that Rogers has with notions such

as significant, evaluate, conflict, and control, are
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closely intertwined, I believe, with the difficulty
Rogers admits he has with the concept of objectivity.
In the paper "Persons or Science?
Question," (61)

A Philosophical

Rogers makes an effort to reconcile a

conflict in his own thinking.

For many years Rogers

assumed that an unbridgeable gap existed between
subjective knowledge and objective knowledge.

Subjec-

tive knowledge was based on feelings and could not be
communicated:

it was significant knowledge, charac-

terized by a feeling of oneness with what was known
(e.g. another person).

Scientific knowledge,

paradigm of objective knowledge,
other.

the

separated self from

The objects of knowledge were to be manipulated

and controlled, and that is to say manipulation and
control were the objects of knowledge!
of objective knowledge,

Given this view

it is no wonder that Rogers

considered objectivity in a relationship

to be

unethical, and insisted that within a relationship one
had to be subjective, meaning that the relationship had
to be based on feeling, not thinking.

In addition, it

is apparent why Rogers had a difficult time finding a
place for objective knowledge within significant
learning in his sense of the phrase,

that is,

the

psychological sense, for significant learning was
subjective knowledge.
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Rogers did manage to find a way to reconcile the
positions.

He recognized the subjective roots of

science in the passion of the scientist, in the source
of new -ideas,

in the readiness to believe evidence.

He

began to think of objectivity as those methods which
enabled one to check the reliability of either one's
subjective experience or one's reliability as observer
(Rogers says both).

The purpose of scientific method

was to provide one with more dependable belief or faith.
(62)

The reconciliation is based on a sketchy revision

of the concepts of subjectivitiy and objectivity and a
mere suggestion of a

theory of knowledge, but it is a

step in the right direction.

(63)

Rogers has not yet

worked out the implications of his reconciliation for
other areas of his thinking.
yet gone so far as

For example, he has not

to say that whether they are or are

not recognized subjectively,

there may be objective

goods for persons (more specific than those he recognizes to be consequences of significant learning).
does not,

He

for example, recognize rationality or

intelligence as universal goods.
the concept of evaluation.

Nor has he rethought

And this brings me to my

third major objection.
Evaluation has

traditionally been considered to be

a major task of the teacher, but it is obvious, given
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any of Rogers'

interpretations of the condition of

unconditional positive regard,
sible to reconcile Rogers'
it.

that it would be impos-

concept of evaluation with

Rogers is being consistent when he forbids

evaluation of any sort on the part of the teacher.

It

is one of the criteria of significant learning in
Rogers'

sense that it is evaluated by the learner and

only by the learner: a
way.

teacher must not evaluate in any

That a teacher must respond to students Rogers

understands, but, he says, a

teacher

can like or dislike a student product without
implying that it is objectively good or bad or that
the student is good or bad.
He is simply expressing
a feeling for the product, a feeling which exists
within himself. (64)
Without question one should not imply that the student
is good or bad on the basis of the work he has done or
the statements he has made.

But the quotation deserves

fuller discussion.
While it is reasonable to avoid suggesting to the
student that there are absolute standards--aesthetic,
ethical, or epistemological--it is quite unreasonable to
avoid informing the student, directly or indirectly,
about those public standards which do exist.

It is

unreasonable to withhold information about them and in
so doing to imply that there are no standards or that
standards are worthless.

It may, on the contrary, be
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one of the most important functions of the teacher to
teach students what the standards are and to teach them
how to evaluate the usefulness of these standards.

How

utterly useless for the teacher to express her feelings
about the work to the student without helping the
student see what in his work was creating that effect!
Perhaps,

in any case,

the teacher should express her

feelings only after she has ascertained what kind of
response the student is looking for.

It is possible

that a student might not particularly want to know how a
teache~

feels but does want to know her response as a

representative of an educated, knowing public.
As in the case of other concepts, Rogers appears
to see that,
right.
does

in some way, his formulation is not quite

Life, he acknowledges, does set conditions,

test.

life

The student will know "that he cannot enter

engineering school without so much math." (65)

And the

student will be faced with "the fact that he cannot join
the special literature section until he 'has shown
evidence of both wide reading and creative writing."
(66)

But what is

this life which tests?

Is it not a

someone who decides whether he has enough math or
whether his writing is in fact creative, and is this
decision not an evaluation?

Rogers writes as if he

thinks it is not, as if he believes these conditions
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(which are standards whether or not he sees this)

have

been established by some non-human agency, as if the
conditions were objective in the most naive sense of
objective.

Rogers again fails

distinctions and so he fails

to make conceptual

to see the difference

between responses which reflect sensitivity to
intersubjective standards, which are based on informed
feelings,
arbitrary.

and responses which are authoritarian and
For Rogers there is no such thing, appar-

ently, as educated feelings,

as developed sensibilities

and no such thing, apparenily, as a subjective response
which is indeed feelingful,
priate and unhelpful.

but is entirely inappro-

Rogers is fearful lest the

teacher's evaluative responses control the student.
Rogers'

commitment to allowing others to be is laudable.

But it does not follow from the fact that one ought not
control others that one cannot state the criteria which
provide the source of one's responses (feelings do have
sources), nor that one cannot stand in opposition to
others, nor that opposition is control.
I

think I

(67)

have now shown why the honest questioner

may not satisfy all of the conditions of a helping
relationship, especially those which have to do with
understanding and evaluating.
position on the nature of

The honest questioner's

signi~icant

learning and the

248

conditions of significant learning is different from
that of Rogers.

Certainly the student is or ought to·be

trying to solve a problem which is significant to him,
but "while the problem may be found introspectively, in
the private world of experience, it cannot be understood
or solved except in social and scientific terms." (68)
The honest questioner tries
often does not.

to understand, but knows she

She constantly evaluates in the sense

that she makes hypotheses about what the student says,
and not simply in terms of its psychological significance for him, but in terms of its public significance,
that is, against the standards of public intelligibility.
Human knowledge is intersubjective knowledge (69).
It is created through conflict, and it is possessed
through conflict.

Living in this century, one can

appreciate why Rogers and others abhor conflict and shun
it.

Conflict is so often destructive, but it need not

be.

And in any case,

make it go away.
Rogers

turning our heads from it will not

Those who would teach may learn from

to treat the student as a person who is an end in

himself, a person with feelings which must be respected.
But teachers can learn also from Dewey, from Buber, from
Piaget, and from all those who saw what Rogers could
not,

that students need to learn how to deal with
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conflict.

There is destructive conflict, which is

always the result of a breakdown in or a perversion of·
communication.

There is constructive conflict, which is

communication raised to the highest level, which is
grounded in the highest ethical standards of respect for
the person, in the deepest respect for and skill at
using the language, and which conforms to the rules of
reasoning and the rules of the methods of inquiry (which
in themselves represent mankind's moral victories).
Honest questioning is a way of teaching students how to
disagree, of teaching them how to engage in constructive
conflict,

something Rogers' helper could never do.

Rogers wishes
fitting

(70)

to avoid conflict and thus it is

that he values so highly his version of sub-

jective knowledge, which accompanies or is the result of
a feeling of oneness with the other.

To be the same as,

undifferentiated from the other, is a way to avoid
conflict.

But to become one with the other can be seen

as a regression to the world of the infant, and to be a
denial of the other.
this result, and yet I

Obviously Rogers could not intend
think this is a plausible

interpretation of his proposals and represents
dark side.

their

In trying to become one with the other,

in

denying or ignoring our differences by keeping silent
and confining ourselves to paraphrase,

like very clever
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parrots, we deprive ourselves and others of our greatest
source of growth.

(71)
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1. Joseph F. Rychlak, A Philosophy of Science for
Personality Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p.
150.
2. Richard W. Dettering began his article,
"Philosophic Idealism in Rogerian Psychology,"
Educational Theory V (October, 1955) with this sentence:
"The 'non-directive,' client-centered, student-centered
therapy and teaching of Carl Rogers and his followers
have begun to assume the proportions of a minor crusade
in this country."
P. 206.
In the concluding section of
the article, Dettering places the Rogerian emphasis on
the individual in historical context, observing that
when standards collapse, the individual turns inwards
for the source of authority.
It may be that the tide
has turned away from permissiveness today, but, judging
from the comments of the undergraduate students I talk
with, confusion about "values," "goods," "relativism,"
"subjective," "objective," and a host of other concepts
remains, and this confusion is "Rogerian" in character.
3. Salvatore Maddi, Personality Theories: A
Comparative Analysis, rev. ed. (Homewood, Il.: The
Dorsey Press, 1971), p. 91.
4. Thomas Szasz objects to regarding psychological
problems as illnesses.
In so far as Rogers objects to
the notion of cure (see footnote 60, this chapter),
there is that much similarity in the positions of the
two.
But Szasz further objects to the classification of
psychotherapy as a science.
It is, he says, an art, and
he proposes for it a new name, iatrologic.
The
iatrologician would be a "specialist in rhetoric and
logic."
The Myth of Psychotherapy (Garden City, New
York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1979), p. 216.
The
iatrologician works with the difficulties of the soul,
and these, according to Szasz, are largely disorders of
communication.
A critical reading of Rogers, even by
one who admires him, can lead one to think that Rogers
might have done better to acknowledge that his client's
problems were themselves ethical and spiritual in
origin.
If he had wanted to treat those problems, he
would not have had to pretend to be a scientist, and
perhaps then he would have been able to deal with the
disorders of his own communication.
Richard Weaver pinpoints some of the sources of
social scientists' and thus of Rogers' difficulties.
The social scientist often fails to recognize when he is
dealing with concepts and when he has, therefore,
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The social
scientist is trying "to characterize the world positively in terms which can be made good only dialectic- ·
ally.
He can never make them good dialectically as long
as he is by theory entirely committed to empiricism.
This explains why to the ordinary beholder there seem to
be so many smuggled assumptions in the literature of
social science.
It will explain, moreover, why so much
of its expression is characterized by diffuseness and by
that verbosity which is certain to afflict a dialectic
without a metaphysic or an ontology.
This uncertainty
of the social s~ientist about the nature of his data
often leads him to treat empiric.al situations as if they
carried moral sanction, and then to turn around and
treat some point of contemporary mores--which is by
definition a 'moral' question--as if it had only
empirical aspects."
The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1953), p. 189.
5. Throughout, I shall use the term "helping
relationship" rather than "therapeutic relationship."
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the therapist/client relationships as instances of
helping relationships, therefore, the use of the neutral
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6. Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p. 40.
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• " p. 207.
10. Ibid., p. 214.
11. Ibid., p. 199.
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The narrower definition provided by
Clara Thompson, Milton Mazer, and Earl Witenberg, eds.
An Outline of Psychoanalysis, rev. ed. (New York: Random
House, The Modern Library, 1955), p. 615, does not
contradict my claim that incongruence is not the only
source of anxiety: "a state of apprehension, with bodily
signs and symptoms, in which the danger is not
objective." George Mandler opens his article,
"Anxiety," with this sentence: "Anxiety has been
considered as a phenomenal state of the human organism,
as a physiological syndrome, and as a theoretical
construct invoked to account for defensive behavior, the
avoidance of noxious stimuli, and neurotic symptoms."
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
24. It is odd that in schools,

those places where

254
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threatened by his own ignorance?
School should be the
place above all where one can admit ignorance, which is
not to say that one should never feel threatened or
ashamed of one's own ignorance.
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29. Ibid.
30. Empirical studies do not always provide the
sort of support for his theories that Rogers might like.
For example, it has been shown that after therapy
conducted along the lines laid down by Rogers, clients
showed a smaller discrepancy between self and ideal.
Such a reduction is to be hoped for, however, as Maddi
writes, "it is not clear that the findings support
Rogers' viewpoint.
Certainly, the closer the person is
to fully functioningness, the smaller should be the
discrepancy between self and ideal.
To be sure, psychotherapy should bring people nearer to fully functioningness.
But statements of ideals are operational
representations of conditions of worth, and surely, the
function of therapy should be to remove these aspects of
maladjustment.
Ideals would be considered beneficial
from the standpoint of a perfection theory, but not from
that of an actualization theory.
In this context, it is
unfortunate for the Rogerian position that Butler and
Haigh found the reduction in self-ideal discrepancy
occurring as a function of therapy to be brought about
primarily by a movement of self-description toward
ideals."
Personality Theories •
p. 466.
Rogers
would have to reject Fromm's claim that we need both
"mother love," which is unconditional and "father love,"
which is conditional.
Erich Fromm, TheArt of Loving,
World Perspectives, vol. 9 (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1956), pp. 36-48.
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36. Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 284.
Oddly, Maurice S. Friedman, in Martin Buber: The Life of
Dialogue (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1955, Phoenix Edition, 1976) sees Rogers as a follower
of Buber, and tries to show similarities between their
teaching, but contradicts Rogers on this matter of
empathy.
Interpreting first Buber, he writes on page 88
that "'Experiencing the other side' means to feel an
event from the side of the person one meets as well as
from one's own side.
It is an inclusiveness which
realizes the other person in the actuality of his being,
but it is not to be identified with 'empathy,' which
means '·the exclusion of one's own concreteness, the
extinguishing of the actual situation of life, the
absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which
one participates.'"
Friedman interprets Rogers'
writings in such a way that they appear to be consistent
with Buber's: "For Rogers as for Buber it is important
in the process of the person's becoming that he know
himself to be understood and accepted, or in Buber's
terms made present and confirmed, by the therapist.
For
both men this means 'an active experiencing with the
client of the feelings to which he gives expression,' a
trying 'to get within and to live the attitudes
expressed instead of observing them.'
For both this
implies at the same time a certain distance and absence
of emotional involvement--an experiencing of the
feelings from the side of the client wihout an emotional
identification that would cause the counsellor to
experience these feelings himself, as counsellor."
P.
192.
So much for empathic understanding.
37. Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p.
38. Ibid., p. 44.
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39. Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (New
York: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p. 28.
Irving Sigel
writes that "Questions, irrespective of the benign
appearance of the content, convey latent as well as
explicit messages.
The speaker may not be aware of the
affective features of the message.
The affective
overtones of the interactions can be independent of the
actual verbalizations.
Questions can be characterized
as hostile, arrogant, 'put downs,' etc.
• Personalsocial considerations require sensitivity not only to
emotional tone and manner of the inquiry, but also to
the readiness of the receiver to engage in a social
interaction dialogue."
Irving E. Sigel, David M.
Brodzinsky, and Roberta M. Golinkoff, eds. New
Directions in Piagetian Theory and Practice-rHillsdale,
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981), p. 211.
40. If this is the definition Rogers intends, it
differs greatly from the definition given in the Oxford
Dictionary, according to which, if I sensed the hostility of another, I would have an empathic understanding
of that person's state, if in fact that person did feel
hostility, and I would have that understanding regardless of whether I did or did not express my accurate
perception.
41. Ca~l R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 280.
42. Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus,
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1969), p. 5.
43. Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, pp.
280-81.
44. Ibid., p. 281.
45. Ibid., p. 286.
46. I am not quite sure what the significant
learning consists of.
Take the case of the person who
learns that he is prejudiced.
Is learning that he is
prejudiced the significant learning?
Or is the ensuing
greater congruence the significant learning?
The
congruence could come about in one of two ways.
Having
learned that he is prejudiced, he is more congruent if
.he acknowledges that he is prejudiced at the time he
displays prejudice.
However, most of us would incline
to think that the really significant learning would come
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after he recognized that he was prejudiced, and learned
not to be prejudiced.
But that is because we have a
predetermined set of goals.
See footnote 30, this
chapter.
47. Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn, p. 158.
48. Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p.
390.
49. Rogers does not say why threat should be kept
to a minimum, why it is that beyond some unspecified
point threat hinders learning, but other psychologists
have dealt with the problem of the relationship between
motivation and learning and what some of them have said
provides indirect support for Rogers' position.
Jerome
Bruner reviewed some of the literature on the effect of
motivational level and learning and concluded that very
high or very low drive lead to an increase in concreteness of cognitive activity~
"There is a middle state of
drive level that produces the strongest tendency toward
generic learning." Jerome Bruner, Beyond the Information Given, ed. Jeremy M. Anglin (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1973), p. 227.
Rogers is not writing
spe~ifically about the transferability of learning,
though there is ~o reason to deny that he would expect
significant learning to be transferable.
The studies to
which Bruner refers were making a point which is more
easily translated into Rogers' claim.
Highly motivated
rats learned less quickly than the less highly motivated
rats.
Ibid., p. 227.
The comparability of the claims
of Rogers and Bruner depends in part on whether one will
allow that high motivation brought on by deprivation of
food for thirty-six hours is comparable to the
motivational level of a human being experiencing threat
from an external source.
If one looks at Rogers' list
of outcomes, it is not far-fetche~ to suppose that
significant learning secures what Robert White refers to
as a "flexible, knowledgeable power of transaction with
the environment."
Robert W. White, "Motivation
Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence," Psychological
Review 66 (1959):326.
Such learning occurs, says White,
in periods of less intense motivation.
White uses the
example of an infant to make his point.
It is when
needs are satisfied that the "infant can attend to
matters of lesser urgency, exploring the properties of
things he does not fear and does not need to eat •
generally accumulating for himself a broad knowledge and
a broad skill in dealing with his surroundings." Ibid.,
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50. Rogers has said more than once that he does.
not value teaching much.
"It seems to me that anything
that can be taught to another is relatively inconsequential, and has little or no significant influence on
behavior.
• I have come to feel that the only
learning which significantly influences behavior is
self-discovered, self-appropriated learning.
• As a
consequence of the above, I realize that I have lost
interest in being a teacher.
• Hence I have come to
feel that the outcomes of teaching are either
unimportant or hurtful."
Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a
Person, p. 276.
It is tempting to say that, in view of
the fact that Rogers has "disparaged the need for
intellectual prowess to help others" (Rychlak, A
Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory, p~ 194) it
is no wonder he takes such a dim view of teaching.
What
Rogers says may describe what is often true of teaching,
but I do not think it is necessarily true.
Obviously my
entire dissertation is an indirect response to Rogers'
claim.
51. Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 43.
52. About the second prong of Rogers' two-pronged
account of the dynamics of learning I have little to
say.
In an effort to explain why people do move forward
on their own, Rogers presents the following three conclusions about the human organism.
First, individuals
have a capacity to recognize, to become aware of, the
incongruence between self-concept and totality of
experience.
Second, individuals possess the capacity
and tendency to reorganize their self-concept in such a
way as to make it more congruent with the totality of
their experience.
Third, these capacities and this
tendency are released in a helping relationship.
Rogers
admits that his explanation of the effects of a helping
relationship is sketchy.
It consists of only two
components: the reduction of threat and the innate
capacities and tendencies of man, but he believes the
account is satisfactory as far as it goes.
Somewhat confusingly Rogers refers to these
tendencies towards actualization of potentialities as
"conclusions'' and as "hypotheses."
They are his
conclusions based on his work with clients and he is
quite sure of them, but presumably they have not been
subjected to rigorous empirical tests, and, therefore,
he is willing to recognize that from the point of view
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of science, they are yet hypotheses.
See Carl R.
Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, •
" p. 221
and Salvatore Maddi, Personality Theories •
• pp.
86-87.
Rogers' account of the fully functioning personality is not the account of a perfectionist.
But his
account does appear to depend on a tacit assumption of a
"'pre-established harmony' between various persons'
fields in order to account for socialization." Richard
Dettering, "Philosophic Idealism in Rogerian Psychology," p. 423.
Perhaps Dettering finds this assumption
not credible.
Richard Hofstadter remarks that the same
point was made against Dewey: "To believe that Dewey's
synthesis was successful required a certain credulity
about the pre-established harmony between child nature
and democratic culture which not everyone could share."
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Random
House, Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 386-87.
But is it
impossible that there be no germ of truth in the idea?
I wouldn't suggest that there is a pre-established
harmony between any individual nature and any social
order.
But it is not absurd to suggest as thinkers
from Aristotle through Kant to Piaget have done, that
principles of rationality are perhaps a part of the
species' biological equipment, in which case a tendency
to become rational is p~rt of our nature, and it would
not be absurd to say that the more rational the
individual, the more social he is.
53. Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn, p. 162.
54. Jurgen Ruesch takes a different approach to
therapy.
He lists a number of therapists' attitudes
which he thinks are particularly helpful to patients.
Amongst them he includes unaggressive directness:
"In
spite of insufficient information, the therapist should
draw some conclusions and make some interpretations in
order to force the patient to clarify some of the
confusion •
. the patient discovers great relief when,
through the therapist's pinpointing, some of the fog
begins to lift.
The unaggressive directness of the
therapist teaches the patient that he himself has to
clarify contradictions in his existence.
As soon as the
doctor has made a statement, the patient can agree with
it or oppose it.
In either case, he clarifies an
issue."
Therapeutic Communication (New York: Norton,
1961), p. 132.
Ruesch's position derives partly from
his conception of psychopathology as, in essence a
disturbance of commmunicative behavior so that
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"therapeutic efforts should be directed at correcting
faulty communication.". Ibid., p. xiv.
55. Jerome S. Bruner, Toward a Theory of
Instruction (Cambridge, Ma.: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 134.
See also
footnote 49.
56. John Dewey, The School and Society, rev. ed.
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1943), p.
141.
57. John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 127.
58. P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters, The Logic of
Education, Students Library of Education (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 36.
59. As Salvatore Maddi points out, "on reflection,
i t becomes apparent that any behavior--some act or its
opposite--can express fully functioningness.
As we
recognized before, such a position is elastlc, post hoc,
and quite untestable.
One cannot determine whether it
is true or false."
Personality Theories •
• p. 319.
It is true, however, that Rogers admits that the
qualities of the direction of the good life as lived by
a fully functioning personality may have a certain
universality.
On Becoming a Person, p. 187.
60. "When someone begins getting the urge to cure
others, this goes in opposition to his ethic, and
therefore we find Rogers getting very uneasy with such
therapeutic goals." Joseph F. Rychlak, A Philosophy of
Science for Personality Theory (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1968), p. 190.
If, as Thomas Szasz has said,
the medical model is inappropriate and mental illnesses
are not illnesses, but sufferings of the soul, then it
would indeed be inappropriate to speak of therapists
curing people.
One can see why Rogers would object to
the urge to cure on several grounds: the idea is
associated with control, authority, and with the notion
of a specific goal.
61. Carl R. Rogers, "Persons or Science?
A
Philosophical Question," On Becoming a Person, pp.
199-224.
62. Ibid., pp.

218-223.
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63. Rogers admits that he used to think of science
as "something out there."
That is no doubt a common
view, though a naive one.
The following quotation from
Maurice Friedman's book on Buber can be taken as support
for this early position of Rogers, but I think it can
also be seen to undermine both it and Rogers' effort to
cast the teacher in the role of reactor rather than
interactor: "As Marjorie Reeves has shown in her
application of Buber's !-Thou philosophy to education,
the whole concept of the 'objectivity' of education is
called in question by the fact that our knowledge of
things is for the most part mediated through the minds
of others and by the fact that real growth takes place
'through the impact of person on person.'"
Martin
Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 178.
Rogers quotes Buber, and refers to him in the essay
"Persons or Science?" but, if Friedman's interpretation
of Buber is correct, Rogers misunderstands or chooses to
ignore some at least of Buber's position.
"One of these
(approaches to the problem of propagandizing and legitimately influencing) is the desire to safeguard the
student by demanding of the teacher an illusory objectivity, as if the teacher has no commitment to a certain
field of knowledge, to a method of approaching this
field, and to a set of attitudes and value assumptions
which are embodied in the questions which he raises •
• The true alternative to false objectivity and to
standards set from the outside is not, of course, that
subjectivity which imprisons the teacher within his own
attachments or the absence of any value standards.
It
is the teacher's selection of the effective world and
the act of inclusion or experiencing the other side, to
which Buber has pointed." P. 181.
64. Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn, p. 106.
65. Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 290.
66. Ibid., p. 291.
67. Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of
Dialogue, writes: "This means that no real learning
takes place unless the pupil participates, but it also
means that the pupil must encounter something really
'other' than himself before he can learn."
P. 177.
And
a few pages later: "The mark of our time, writes Buber,
is the denial that values are anything other than the
subjective needs of groups.
This denial is not a
product of reason but of the sickness of our age; hence
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it is futile to meet it with arguments.
All that the
teacher can do is help keep awake in the pupil the pain
which he suffers through his distorted relation to his
own self and thus awaken his desire to become a real and
whole person.
The teacher can do this best of all when
he recognizes that his real goal is the education of
great character." Pp. 181-82.
Friedman is concerned to
point out the similarities between Rogers and Buber, but
the differences, illustrated in the above quotations,
are more striking to me.
68. Richard W. Dettering, "Philosophic Idealism in
Rogerian Psychology," p. 419.
69. Dettering's critique of Rogers is in part an
effort to show that contrary to what Rogers might think,
the differences between himself and Dewey are great and
outweigh the similarities.
In summarizing, Dettering
says that "one opposition which seems to run through all
these differences we have discussed is between an
intersubjective and an introspective concept of knowledge.
Here we must especially remember Dewey's criticism of the 'introspectionist' view that 'consciousness or experience is the organ of its own immediate
disclosure of all its own secrets'--a view, he says,
which arose with Descartes and Locke and was 'foisted on
psychology from without.'
On this issue above all,
Rogers must part with Dewey.
Whereas Dewey relied
ultimately on the consensus of the scientific community,
Rogers rests on the process of self- disclosure."
P.
420.
The quotations from Dewey are taken from
Philosophy and Civilization (New York: Minton, Balch and
Co., 1931), p. 261.
70. In referring so often to reasoning skills and
methods of inquiry, I fear I will seem to have excluded
the various arts as important ways of knowing.
I do not
intend to do so.
This is not the place to discuss it,
but I would not wish to be thought of as making vulgar
distinctions between the arts as irrational and the
sciences as rational.
I wish to make a point here, not related to the one
above, about the way honest questions might be used.
Dorothy Heathcote is an English woman, well-known in
educational circles for her method of using improvisational drama with students of all ages, and in a broad
variety of subjects.
Her efforts are explicitly
directed to the end of significance, in both senses of
the term.
What is of especial interest to me is that
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Ms. Heathcote uses what I call honest questions in her
work.
Betty Jane Wagner, in her book Drama as a
Learning Medium, refers to them as real questions.
(Washington, D. C.: National Education Association,
1976)
Using real questions, Heathcote gets children to
think very hard indeed about what they mean, and how
they can show what they mean through actions.
Her way
is a dramatic one, if the pun may be forgiven, of doing
concept analyses and thought experiments.
71. Maurice Friedman: "in conversation the tension
between the meaning which the word I use has for me and
that which it has for my partner can prove itself
fruitful and lead to a deeper personal understanding,
• " Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 174.
And
from Richard W. Dettering, "Hegel's dialectical process
mingled with the Darwinian struggle for survival to
furnish the basis for Dewey's concern with conflict and
challenge as a necessary factor in self-development."
"Philosophical Idealism in Rogerian Psychology," pp.
418-19.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

In this,

the conclusion, I will present the

briefest possible restatement of the argument for honest
questioning, will note the limits of its usefulness,
discuss

the problems of evaluation of the technique,

and, finally, will make a few observations about the
practicality of the model, and about ideals.
Honest questioning functions on several levels,
much the same way as good literature does.
present it,

in

I chose to

initially, in its humblest function,

as a

way for the teacher to find out where the student is.
It is surely credible that honest questioning is equal
to that task.

And it is no less credible that honest

questioning is a fine

tool for the teacher who wishes to

use discussion in her classroom, since most people do
like to talk about their beliefs.

(1)

Amongst the

functions of honest questioning are these solutions to
some immediate problems of the teacher.
264

They, however,
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would not be enough to justify it as a teaching technique.

If honest questioning is to be justified as a

teaching technique,

then it has to be shown to promote

the end of the practice of teaching, which is bringing
the student to know, and since teaching is a practice
which deals directly with persons,
the rationality of persons,

that is, of students.

Honest questioning does both.
brings

it must also promote

The honest questioner

the student to know how to justify by asking him

to justify, and brings him to rationality by treating
him as if rational.

(2)

Bringing the student to

knowledge and to rationality are the ultimate ends of
honest questioning.

I make the assumption that

knowledge is for the sake of rationality, and in the
interest of simplicity of style, I

shall, in what

remains, omit reference to knowing and refer only to
rationality as the end of honest questioning.
Integrity of means and ends is characteristic of
rational action.

The technique of honest questioning

fully exemplifies this characteristic.
its end.
its end is

It is one with

It is rational behavior in its own right and
the rationality of the student.

And it is as

plausible to think that efforts to answer honest questions will lead to rationality as to think that trying
to play a game will lead to one's being able to play the
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game.

(3)

Having said this,

it seems unnecessary to try

to explain the effects of honest questioning, as if one
were to try to explain how it is

that trying to learn to

ride a bicycle leads to learning how to ride a bicycle.
But not everyone thinks such an explanation is unnecessary, perhaps because not everyone sees the identity
of means and ends.

This is why Piaget, as was noted, is

criticized for not attending to the motivation for
development.
to change?

Why,

the critics ask, does conflict lead

The question being asked, note, is not a

question of why or how a person may be tempted to get on
the bicycle in the first place, a question of no
interest to the honest questioner, who does not attempt
the often futile task of trying to arouse the students'
interest in a subject in which they have none.
questions do provoke conflict.

Honest

That they do, almost

invariably, is simply a consequence of the fact that few
persons are in possession of sets of beliefs which have
been carefully formulated and examined for consistency.
(4)

The conflicts which result are moving, and that

they do prompt change is explained as either a function
of sheer cognitive conflict-- the recognition of
inconsistency between two beliefs as Piaget might put
it, or as a function of what might be called by Rogers
affective conflict,

that is a recognition of conflict
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between my self-concept (that I am a reasonable person),
and my perception that my beliefs are inconsistent so
that,

therefore, I cannot be so reasonable after all.
If I want to ride a bicycle and I

try to correct

my mistakes, I will probably learn to ride a bicycle.
If I wish to be rational and I
correct my mistakes,

recognize and try to

then I will probably move in the

direction of greater rationality.

The wish to be

rational is the motive for rationality, and,
there can be no other motive for it.

logically,

The teacher's

promise of gold stars will not produce greater
rationality, and will completely subvert it.

If

integrity of means and ends is to be preserved, as it
must be for the sake of rationality,
only motive to which she can appeal.

then this is the
A further point to

be noted is that the answer to the question ''why the
student learns?" is also the answer to the question
"what does the student learn?" that answer being, "to
resolve conflict."
Aristotle wrote that in dialectical reasoning one
must begin with what was familiar, with what is prior in
experience, but that the teacher should begin teaching
from the first principles of the subject.

Piaget,

like

many others who advocate a learning by doing, rejects
the second half of the claim in favor of the first half.
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Do not,

he says, axiomatize too quickly.

Honest ques-

tioning observes this injunction, and i t is, consequently, an informal way of teaching students.
to say,

That is

the students are asked to think about what is

familiar to them, and only gradually are they led to
articulate principles implicit in their thinking. The
students are learning skills, but always in context.
This teaching in context approach was defended as
sound pedagogy.

But there is another reason why skills

should not be taught in isolated fashion.

The proper

end of reasoning is rationality, but to teach reasoning
skills in isolation is to teach them as means which can
be put to any end, ·and is ~o encourage sophistry.

(5)

The skills of the surgeon are not taught outside of the
context of their proper use, which is healing.

The

skills of the lawyer are not taught within the context
of their proper use, which might conceivably be that of
justice.

To teach reasoning skills in isolation is

teach them as

to

the skills of the lawyer are taught,

rather than as the skills of the surgeon are taught.
Although I

claim much for honest questioning, I

am

not claiming that it is sufficient for either the
acquisition of knowledge or the development of rationality.

There are limitations to what it can do, and

these limitations come from several sources.

There are,
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first of all,

those quite arbitrary learnings which are

simply associative and to be remembered.

'The alphabet·

and the digits are prime examples, and the category as a
whole is

the category of names.

Whatever is the most

efficient way to learn these conventions which make
knowledge possible, honest questioning has little or no
contribution to make.

Nor can motor skills be learned

in a dialectical way.

If names are to be learned, if

typing or throwing a ball are to be learned,
learner must have a

reason to learn them.

cannot be given by the teacher.

then the

And this

A teacher may state a

reason why the student should learn, but unless the
learner sees that reason as a reason, he doesn't have a
reason.

(Obviously, from what was said earlier,

best reason to learn is

the

that he wants to.)

Honest questioning is, furthermore, not the way to
transmit quantities of information to the student.

I do

not deny that having information is one condition of
effective rationality:
rational.

the ignorant person cannot be

But, as stated in the introduction and in the

chapter on Piaget,

the teacher is not the most efficient

transmitter of information, and other means, which are
readily available, should be put to that end.

(6)

is honest questioning to be considered in any way a
substitute for experience, whatever one may mean by

Nor

270

that.
sen~e

It is not a substitute for experience in the
of that which yields information.

And it is not a

substitute for experience which is productive.

The

point I wish to make is not that honest questioning is
all there is

to teaching.

It is rather that whether the

students are doing something else, and whether the
teacher is working with the whole group or the
individual, if language is being used,
than is now the

cas~,

then more often

and more often indeed than not,

honest questioning is the form that language should
take.
Which brings me to the consideration of the ways
the effects of honest questioning are limited by.the
skills of the teacher.

A teacher may wish to ask honest

questions but be unable to do so, or be able to do so,
but badly.

A teacher cannot expect to get far if her

only response to whatever the student says is, "can you
tell me what you mean by that?" no matter how honestly
she asks

the question.

Nor will it do to ask a student

who has never heard of them if he thinks he has stated
necessary and sufficient conditions.
category of questions

Within the

that may be called honest,

will be good questions and bad ones.

there

Good ones will be

skillfully phrased in words students can comprehend,
will reflect the structure of the subject matter, and
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will not be all-purpose questions but will be
specifically tailored to fit what the student has saiq.
If the honest questioner is

to be skillful,

she be

capable of treating others as ends in themselves.
will be open, honest, nondefensive, which is

She

to say she

will possess the characteristics of mental health and
the skills of a good inquirer.
knowledgeable about her field,

She will also be
having a feeling for its

structure, and will be able to recognize coherence or
the lack of it.

Few teachers or teachers-to-be could

satisfy these conditions.

However, a

teacher who is

concerned enough about her students to make a serious
effort to find out where they are, already satisfies at
least some of the conditions in incipient form and will
do her students some good.
them to do some thinking.

She will undoubtedly prompt
Furthermore, if she has a

good intelligence, her efforts will yield fruits

in

terms of her own understanding of her own discipline.
(7)

The claim so often made by teachers

that they

learned more from their students than their students
learned from them sounds fatuous.

Nonetheless it is

true that honest questioning will yield benefits
teacher as well as to the student.

By inquiring,

to the
the

teacher will learn how to be an inquirer, and she will
learn something about reasoning by reflecting on the
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student's reasons.

The only means

to the end of

learning to ask good honest questions is asking honest
questions.

The teacher as well as the student learns

what she is doing by doing it.
Given the perfectly rational

teacher,

the student

perfectly capable of achieving rationality, and endless
time, honest questioning would produce rationality in
the student.

That is the ideal account, but not the

account of honest questioning as it occurs.

In prac-

tice, honest questioning is not sufficient to produce
rationality.

The capacity for rationality of both

teachers and students, never perfect to begin with, has
been affected by the circumstances of their lives, and
their time together is short.

The teacher will not be

perfectly rational, and the student will not be
perfectly capable of achieving rationality.
The student may have emotional difficulties of one
sort or another, of one degree or another, which the
honest questioner in a classroom setting may or may not
be equal to dealing with.

There

a~e

the emotional

difficulties experienced by students who are enrolled in
classes against their will, and the honest questioner
may not be able to make much headway with them, particularly when there may be no good reason why that student
should take that course.

Even if there is a reason for
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the student to take the course,

it may be too much to

expect that he accept it as a reason, in which case,
requiring him to take the course is requiring him to act
without reason.

(8)

These sorts of problems are the

result of the way schooling has been organized, and they
are not problems the honest questioner can resolve.
Other sources of emotional difficulties are mistrust,
shallow or deep, which may or may not be quickly let go.
Honest questioning,

like a knife, can be perceived to

have the characteristics of a tool and a weapon.
be seen differently by different students.
who has had much

~xperience

It can

A student

being "put down," may see

the honest questioner as an attacker.

Sometimes honest

questioning will be ineffective in the face of the
anxiety or hostility of students who simply do not like
a non-authoritarian teaching style.

There are students

who would rather the teacher lecture, but student
preference does not itself justify lecturing.

The

student may dislike school and find it is a lot less
trouble if the teacher just says what she wants.

The

student who prefers to be passive is a student only in
name, and

the passivity should be considered to be a

symptom of a problem.

(9)

Emotional difficulties are

present and make their presence felt in any classroom,
whatever techniques the teacher employs.

Honest
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questioning bears more than an accidental resemblance to
certain techniques of psychotherapy, and as is the case
with psychotherapy,

its success cannot be guaranteed.

The effectiveness of honest questioning will also
be limited by the innate capacity for rationality of the
student.

It is not clear to me what it means to speak

of innate capacity for rationality, yet I

believe there

are differences in such capacities, differences which
can be accounted for by genetic makeup or physiological
accidents.

What is clear to me, however, is that the

presumption should always be on the side of potential
rationality.

All persons, no matter what their innate

capacity, must be given a chance to speak for themselves.

Regardless of what their innate capacity is,

honest questioning is a way to develop that capacity.
Although much of my argument for honest questionin

is an argument based on the nature of

rationality and on ethical principles, and does not,
therefore, include claims which could be submitted to
empirical test, other portions of the argument do
include such claims.

No claim is being made that

students in courses in which the teacher uses honest
questioning will acquire more information than students
in more

traditional settings, but the claim is made that

as a result of honest questioning, students will learn
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to reason better and will learn how to justify beliefs.
How could this claim be evaluated?

It would not be

appropriate to compare the reasoning skills and
inquiry skills of students

the

taught logic, for example,

in

traditional ways with the reasoning and inquiry skills
of students

taught using honest questioning.

If such a

comparison were to be made, critics could reasonably
object that what was taught in the two courses was not
the same.

The student who learned in the traditional

way would,

presumably~

have been taught some of the

formal principles of reasoning, while the student who
has been exposed to honest questioning will probably not
be explicitly familiar with these principles or with the
vocabulary of logic, although explicit knowledge of this
sort may be an eventual outcome of honest questioning.
The student taught in the traditional way will not have
had much chance

to construct arguments to support his

own beliefs, and if he has,

then he has been exposed to

something similar to honest questioning.
valid,

it has

to test what has been taught.

assumption that what is
method,

If a

i t follows

test is

On the

taught is in part a function of

that the test format has to resemble

the teaching format, and it follows again that it is not
possible to construct one test to evaluate different
teaching

techniques.

Certainly an objective test would
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not be a suitable test of the effects of honest questioning.

What one would want to know is the student's

reasons for his answers and these could not,

in

principle, be anticipated as a series of choices, "a"
through "e".

One could ask students from a

tradition-

ally taught group to give reasons for their answers,
since they would not have had practice doing so,
test would be unfair to them.
evaluating

but

the

The problems of

effects of honest questioning are the

t~e

same as the problems of evaluating what a person knows,
in the strong sense of know.

One cannot evaluate what a

person knows unles"s one learns his reasons.

As

he

provides these, his beliefs are likely to change.

These

problems provide a further illustration of a point made
throughout this conclusion:

that means and ends not only

ought not be separated, but in some sense cannot be
separated.

(10)

The same comments would have to be made of course,
if the teacher wished to evaluate, not the program, but
the student.

Whether she wished to find out what he

knew, or how well he could reason, she would have to
evaluate by essay exams or oral exams.

Since there are

standards of reasoning, an examiner who was in possession of these standards, could approach an objective
judgment of the student's reasoning ability.

I

say

277

"approach" only, since it is well to bear in mind, as an
honest questioner,

that there will be times when it is

not possible to say with certainty of a given answer
that the student does or does not hold it for good
reason.

(11)

But this lack of certainty does not mean

we •cannot make good judgments, only that we must
recognize that judgments are, at least sometimes,
provisional.
Clearly, if the effects of honest questioning on
student learning can only be evaluated by honest
questioning, honest questioning will be expensive to
evaluate.

That fact will likely cause people to wonder

if it can be considered a practical technique.

Other

considerations will cause some to question the practicality of honest questioning.
those,

For example,

there are

teachers and parents alike, who will say they

value discussion, but that, given all the information
students have to acquire,
Honest questioning,
consuming.

But I

there can be no time for it.

like all discussion,

is time

have already argued that the teacher

is not efficient as a

transmitter of information, so

that it is not practical for her to lecture students.
Furthermore, if one interprets "practical'' to mean
practicable in the real world,

then honest questioning

seems to provide a kind of training far more practical

278

than that provided by lecturing and objective tests, for
one rarely has

to listen to lectures or take objectiv•

tests in the real world.

In many occupations,

one does

have to participate in discussions, and the more
effectively one can make one's point and grasp another's
the better.

It is difficult to think what could be more

practical than learning how to use the language
skillfully.
In another sense of practical,

this proposal on

behalf of honest questioning is not intended to be
practical.

It is not proposed in the expectation that

it will change educational practice, but is offered,
frankly, as an ideal.

Honest questioning is an ideal,

derived, as any ideal is, from a model.

Up until now,

the relationship of the authoritarian father to his
child has served, more often than not, as the model for
the teacher/student relationship.

Ideally,

the father

or teacher has been able to exert extensive control over
the compliant child or student.

(12)

The model is still

acceptable to many, and the schoolroom is the scene of a
daily struggle for control.
acceptable to me,
said.

Obviously,

the model is not

for reasons implicit in what has been

The model from which honest

que~tion~ng

is

derived is the model of good conversation between
equals.

It is an adaptation of that model which takes
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into account the ways the participants,
student, are not equals.
there is a

teacher and

In the ideal conversation

turn-taking, and only to the degree that

people share a background of training and information
and have assured themselves that the other participants
know what they are talking about, do they permit
themselves to make extended statements.

In an ideal

conversation, participants are sensitive to the
possibilities of misunderstanding.
well conversants know each other,

Ideally,

the less

the more careful they

are to corroborate interpretations and the more their
interaction approaches honest questioning.

(13)

To say that honest questioning is an ide~l

towards

which teaching might be directed, is to acknowledge
again what has been already acknowledged,
be achieved.

that it cannot

The schools will never be filled with

ideal honest questioners, and in fact there will never
be one ideal honest questioner.

An ideal honest ques-

tioner would be perfectly rational.

Honest questioning

is an impractical ideal in the way any ideal is
impractical.

Just as it does not count against a

religious ideal that it is unattainable,

it does not

count against this account of honest questioning that it
describes an unattainable ideal.

Nor does it count

against honest questioning that it is not a foolproof

280
method for bringing another person to knowledge or to
rationality.
I have shown that honest questioning is not sufficient to produce rationality or knowledge in another,
and now admit that it is not absolutely necessary
either.

That honest questioning is not absolutely

necessary if a person is

to acquire knowledge or become

rational is attested to by the fact that many human
beings have acquired some knowledge and many have
developed some of their capacity for rationality even
though few have been exposed to honest questioning.
However, few come to know as much as they could or
develop their capacity for rationality to the fullest
extent.

It is reasonable to suppose that the amount of

knowledge we acquire and the degree to which we become
rational depend to a great extent on the kinds of
encounters we have with other persons.

More parti-

cularly, it is reasonable to suppose that, other things
being equal, rationality is likely to develop better
when one is exposed to models of rationality and when
one is

treated as if one possessed the capacity for

rationality than when one is not so exposed or so
treated.
What has been said here about honest questioning
and rationality may be summarized in an analogy.
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Becoming rational may be compared to learning to run
well.

One learns to run well,

if at all, by running.

One becomes rational, if at all, by trying to be
rational.

But the image of the person learning to run

is not the one that best represents

the idea of the

person becoming more rational, for running is, essentially, a solitary activity, while rationality is,
essentially, the skill of a social being.

Perhaps a

better image for the person in process of becoming more
rational is the image of the person learning to dance
with partners, an image which brings the function of the
honest questioner into clearer focus.

Conceivably, one

could learn how-to-dance-with-partners, even if one had
no partner, by following directions shouted at one by a
teacher standing on the sidelines, but how much better
one would learn from the teacher who joined one on the
floor, who taught one to dance with a partner by being a
dancing partner.
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1. Quite naturally teachers assume a discussion
will be about the reading students have been asked to
do.
But too often what students have read is or
pretends to be nothing but a compilation of information
(as in textbooks), and as such, it is not discussible.
Or, if the students have read what is discussible, it is
too remote from their experience for them to be able to
discuss it: they don't really know what it is about yet
and may be able to do little more than disagree or agree
with isolated points.
A teacher who insists on trying
to get students to talk about the book is, in many
cases, going to be disappointed at the results.
Few
people can discuss what is very unfamiliar to them.
Few
have much of a feeling for the purposes of a discussion.
In particular, few think of a discussion as an occasion to try out one's ideas so that their shortcomings
might become visible, or as an occasion on which ideas
new to all participants might be germinated.
If one
seriously wishes to engage in discussion, it is sensible
to try to find out what participants are prepared to
talk about, in both senses of prepared.
If participants
do not have a problem, there is little to talk about.
2. It may be that integrity of means and ends
exists even though the teacher might not wish it.
That
is to say, a teacher who assigns a workbook to her
students might not think of herself as teaching students
how to do a workbook: that is not the end she has in
view, but it may be exactly the end she achieves.
To
put it a bit enigmatically, the teacher is teaching
exactly what she is teaching.
There is indeed transfer
of learning, and part of what gets transfered is a way
of looking at the subject that was embedded in the
medium in which it was presented.
If the teacher wants
to teach students to reason as well as how to reason, i t
will not do to have them memorize principles of
reasoning.
3. Questions along the lines of "why do you think
that is so?" are ambiguous as they stand.
They can be
interpreted to be questions about the world or questions
about the thinking process.
I would like to propose, as
a hypothesis to be tested, that students exposed
throughout schooling to honest questioning might move
from understanding questions of this sort as questions
about the world to understanding them as questions about
the thinking process, and would be more likely to do so
than students not exposed to honest questioning.
The
students exposed to honest questioning would have
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learned to be more reflective and aware of their own
mental processes.
Cf. Piaget's idea that we project our
mental constructs, as of causality, for example, onto
the world and think they exist out there.
4. An individual mind may be thought of as a more
or less organized world view.
As a result of cognitive
conflict this mind is brought into greater congruence
with the 'public mind', that is, with the bet~er
organized world view which is what we call public
knowledge.
5. See John Wild's interesting paper, "Plato's
Theory of Techne a Phenomenological Interpretation."
"Rhetoric may use cultural knowledge and command of
language not for its proper end, the instruction of an
audience, but rather for mere pleasure.
Finally sophistry may devote considerable logical skill and
information to produce the pleasing appearance of
knowledge, a mere byproduct rather than knowledge
itself, the real product.
Such distortions find an
apology in the doctrine of 'the relativity of ends,'"
which doctrine, says Wild, is false.
Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research I (March, 1949).
Reprinted in
Readings in the Philosophy of Education, ed. Malcolm
Carron and Alfred D. Cavanaugh (Detroit: University of
Detroit, 1963), p. 134.
6. There is a further point to be made about
information, one far too complex to be explored in
detail here and that is the question of what counts
as information to a given person.
Is any proposition,
the truth or falsity of which may be ascertained, to be
considered information?
In an objective sense that may
be so.
But one may also ask whether it makes more sense
to think of information as a proposition which can be
understood in the light of what a person already knows.
Must a person be in a state of ignorance rather than a
state of nescience with regard to a given proposition if
it is to count as information for him?
D. W. Hamlyn
makes a related point about information, although with a
different end in mind, when he asks: "how can what is
'given' constitute information if it does not already
presuppose concepts? "Epistemology and Cognitive
Development," in Co nitive Develo ment and E istemolo
ed. Theodore Mischel
New York: Academic Press, 1971
p. 14.
7.

Mary I. Yeazel! studied a group of teachers
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who were trying to teach philosophy to grade school
students.
She wished to learn whether teachers improved
their own critical thinking abilities while trying to
foster them in students.
She concluded that "the data
indicate that no significant change occurred in critical
thinking skills,
"
"What Happens to Teachers Who
Teach Philosophy to Children?"
Thinking, The Journal of
Philosophy for Children 2 (1981):88.
8. It is precisely because the young cannot always
be expected to see the reason or to accept the reason as
their reason that it is so important that the young
learn that adults are trustworthy.
The young person who
has learned to trust adults can trust that it is in his
best interest to take a course, that it will help him to
achieve his goals.
He will trust that the demand that
he take a given course is not an arbitrary obstacle in
his path even if he cannot see how it fits.
9. "Not only is the dogmatic person unable to
learn effectively in conditions of novelty, he is also
swayed in his judgments by the contradictory judgments
of high-status persons •
• The implications of
conformity on the part of dogmatic persons were
authenticated by Zagona and Zurcher (1964) in
observational evidence, gleaned over four months of
contact, to the effect that in small groups, dogmatic
persons are leader oriented, unspontaneous, and prefer
lectures to class discussion."
Salvatore Maddi,
Personality Theories •
. p. 475.
10.
For discussions of the literature on the
effects of teaching methods on student achievement see
David C. Berliner and N. L. Gage "The Psychology of
"Teaching Methods," The Psychology of Teaching Methods.
Seventy-fifth Yearbook of the National Society for the
Study of Education, pt. 1, ed. N. L. Gage (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1976), pp. 1-20.
11. Compare Martin Buber, who tells us "all
objective knowledge about a human being is knowledge
about his past, of what he has been rather than of what
he is.
• Genuine listening does not know ahead of
time what it will hear; in the full uniqueness of the
present it listens to the speech of the other without
filtering what it hears through the screen of its own
prejudgments."
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Martin
Buber," by Michael Wyschogrod.
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12. James McClellan writes that efforts to reform
education have never had much effect and that this fact
"validates the contention that in most times and places
schools exist to perpetuate a given social order rather
than to educate men and women to the status of
II
rationality."
"Dewey and the Concept of Method •
p. 218.
13. Different writers come to mind, making points
related to the one I make although in different ways.
Brian Crittenden has this (and more) to say about the
inequality of the teacher student relationship: "It is
suggested by S. I. Benn that 'the distinctive feature of
rational persuasion is that it invites and responds to
criticism'; it is 'therefore essentially a dialogue
between equals'.
If this account is taken literally, we
must rule out the practical possibility of rational
persuasion in education (at least a considerable part of
it).
For students are usually not equal to teachers,
assuming that the latter are competent in relation to
the subject matter and methods of argument.
However, I
think that Benn's description of optimal conditions for
rational persuasion can, and should, be applied with
some modification to the role of teacher."
Education
and Social Ideals, p. 117.
Michael Oakeshott refers to the "conversation of
mankind," which takes place in various modes, i.e. the
various disciplines.
He speaks of education as initiation into that conversation.
What one is learning in
school is a set of different languages so that one may
join in that conversation.
Honest questioning is a way
of conversing and a way of initiating persons into the
ways of conversation.
See also "The Psychology of Social Consciousness,"
George Herbert Mead, originally published in Science 31
(1910):688-693, and reprinted as "Language as Thinking"
in Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children 1
(May, 1979):23-26.
"Education.
.is conversation-belongs to a universe of discourse," Mead claims, in
arguing for disciplined dialogue in the classroom.
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